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SUMMARY 
This Report compares the strategy of the ECB with that of eight other central banks, to 
suggest reforms in its goals, institutional arrangements and monetary instruments. 
Despite the comparative success of the euro as an international currency, the present 
financial crisis has uncovered some flaws in the functioning of the ECB that can be put 
in order by attending to the experience of the ECB and the other eight central banks 
examined. 
1. The theoretical basis of monetary policy 
• The starting point for our analysis of central bank strategy and the justification 
for central bank independence in the pursuit of a non-political remit is the fact 
that there is no long run trade-off between inflation on the one hand and 
employment and output on the other (there is no exploitable Phillips curve). 
o Over a period of nine to ten years, increase in the money supply will 
result in a similar rise in the rate of increase of the general price level and 
will have no systematic effect on the real side of the economy.  
o This belief is based on a long run interpretation of the “quantity theory”, 
expressed by Fisher as  
      P ≡ ( M · V ) / T, 
where the price level P is shown to depend on the quantity of money M, 
the velocity of circulation V, all divided by the number of transactions T. 
In the long term, however, the effects of an increase in the money supply 
will have run their short-lived course and the expansion of M will have 
fallen wholly on P. 
o Rational expectations imply that sooner or later inflation fully enters the 
public’s expectations (in central banker parlance, “inflation expectations 
become unanchored”). When the information about increases in money 
supply is fully discounted by the market, it will be passed on to prices, so 
that employment and real output turn out not to be correlated to money 
supply. (This is an instance of the separability of the nominal and the real 
economy, the so-called “classical dichotomy”). 
o In the short and medium run, however, unexpected inflation can lead to 
an expansion of jobs and output, since people may then interpret growing 
prices as increases in the real demand for their goods and services.  
o Hence, a time-inconsistency problem arises for monetary policy. Unless 
some institutional arrangement forces monetary and political authorities 
to focus on the long run, they will tend to pursue monetary policies that 
lead the economy down a less than optimal growth path. One such 
institutional arrangement is granting a measure of independence to the 
central bank, so that, free from political pressures, it can follow a 
monetary policy leading to a stable value of money.  
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• Inflation has high costs:  
o the ‘shoe leather cost’ of looking for goods and services at non-inflated 
prices to avoid the opportunity cost of holding money that depreciates; 
o the cost of changing one’s prices with inflation; 
o the misalignment of prices from staggered nominal price-setting; 
o the deterioration of the currency as unit of account;  
o the unfair redistribution brought about by inflation: it redistributes 
income unfairly, both with the tax drift caused by progressive rates on 
higher nominal incomes and with debtors obtaining windfall losses at the 
expense of lenders; and vice versa for deflation.  
However, if the rate of inflation is small, its effects may be slightly but 
consistently positive. 
• Institutions for price stability 
o Fixed exchange rate regimes are one kind, by which a country prone to 
inflation pegs its currency to that of a more stable economy. The more 
common way is setting up a currency board, as some EMU candidate 
countries have done with the euro. An extreme kind of peg is to give up 
one’s currency in favour of the dollar or the euro, a course of action 
perhaps advisable for countries whose small size makes them highly 
vulnerable to external shocks.  
o Another kind of arrangement is central bank independence, coupled with 
the rule that the central bank (CB) must bring about a reduced rate of 
inflation.  
• The general agreement is that in an advanced country, the rate of inflation 
should be held at between 2 and 3%, since Consumer Price Indices (CPIs) tend 
to underestimate quality changes and thus reflect apparent price increases. In 
countries with an underdeveloped tax system, inflation and tariffs may be the 
only significant sources of revenue for the State; hence less orthodox monetary 
and trade policies may be excusable. 
2. The evolution of monetary strategies 
• All central banks today have the following two aims in their strategy:  
o To keep the value of money steady by avoiding inflation and deflation; 
o To maintain the financial system in good working order. 
• The 20th century started with the gold standard holding general sway in the 
world and ended with attempts to get the benefits of a reliable currency by 
other means. Also and just as in gold standard days, central banks have to look 
after the stability of the financial sector under their care. 
o After World War II, the machinery established at Bretton Woods tried to 
guarantee the value of participating currencies by half pegging them to 
the dollar, while the dollar was pegged to gold; while the stability of the 
members’ financial systems was based on IMF supervision and, if 
necessary, conditional loans. 
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o With the oil crises of the 1970s, the “Bretton Woods trilemma” became 
apparent: countries cannot at the same time maintain exchange rate 
stability, stay open financially and commercially, and exercise monetary 
independence. Discretionary policymaking by CBs ushered a period of 
monetary disorder, with high and variable inflation rates and worrying 
unemployment rates.  
o Under the leadership of that great President of the Fed, Paul Volcker, 
followed by Margaret Thatcher in Britain, the need to control the money 
supply became the orthodox policy.  
o The US having reined in runaway inflation, the world entered the period 
of the “Great Moderation”, with stable prices, high growth rates and low 
unemployment. The world economy functioned well based on floating 
exchanges and financial globalisation.  
o For a time, CBs especially used the control of some definition of the 
stock of money, such as the monetary base or a broad money measure 
(such as M3) to rein in inflation and counteract recessions, by means of 
liquidity injections or withdrawals. But the connection between M3 
growth and the CPI appeared to break down; and the difficulty to manage 
money supply directly in a world of globalised finance has led monetary 
authorities to prefer short-term interest rates as their instrument. This 
may have gone too far, in that money plays no role in the canonical New 
Keynesian macroeconomic models. 
o Another element of CB strategy went off track. The Lender of Last 
Resort function morphed into the “Greenspan put”, the guarantee that 
over the medium term nominal income and stock exchange indices 
would not be allowed to fall. 
• Finally, the present financial and foreign exchange crisis has highlighted some 
of the weaknesses of an anchorless monetary system coupled with central bank 
autonomy. Led by the Fed, CBs seemingly tried to avoid downturns and 
deflation at all costs. This led to over-indulgent monetary policies resulting in 
unsustainable booms in property and securities and finally to the 2007-2008 
crash. 
3. The euro and the ESCB 
• After a number of failed attempts, the Maastricht Treaty (1992) finally created 
the European Monetary Union. The signature of the Stability and Growth Pact 
in 1997 preceded the actual launch of the euro in 1999, a Pact whose aim was 
to underpin the new currency with stable fiscal policies in all Member States. 
The new currency is now well established in Europe and the world. The 
impatience of some of the recent arrivals in the EU to join the euro club is an 
indication of the frailty of small monetary areas when world finances are in 
turmoil. 
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• The new currency is managed by the European System of Central Banks 
(ESCB) under the leadership of the European Central  Bank (ECB). The 
ECB’s ultimate legitimacy derives from the Treaties and thus from the 
national parliaments of the Member States. According the Maastricht Treaty, 
the ECB is an independent institution within the EU and may not even lend to 
European institutions or to Member States. It informs the European Parliament 
but receives no instructions from it.  
• “The primary objective of the ESCB shall be to maintain price stability. 
Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, the ESCB shall support 
the general economic policies in the Community with a view to contributing to 
the achievement of the objectives of the Community.” So read the Treaties. 
• At present, the definition of the primary objective has been interpreted by the 
ECB Governing Council as aiming to keep the increase of the Harmonised 
Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) at rates “below, but close to, 2% over the 
medium term”.  
• The ECB adopted in 1999 a two-pillar strategy; within this strategy, the ECB 
assessed inflationary presures by analysing both the first pillar (money growth 
and other financial indicators) and the second pillar (a broad set of real 
indicators). From 1999 to 2003 the ECB assigned to money growth a primary 
role in predicting inflation, and even published a reference value (not an 
intermediate target) for M3 growth compatible with price stability; thus, broad 
money growth was viewed as the main policy guide during those years. 
However, in May 2003 the ECB reviewed and clarified its strategy, and 
abandoned the publication of that reference value. The reason was the 
persistent deviation of M3 growth from the announced reference value, 
without any observable effect on CPI inflation developments; which also made 
the ECB communication policy more difficult and exposed to 
misunderstanding. 
o The general framework is the simultaneous appraisal or crosschecking of 
the two sets of data modelled as “pillars”, to help formulate a forward-
looking price policy.  
o The “first pillar” (or monetary analysis) includes all monetary data that 
are relevant for the ECB’s monetary decisions. 
o The “second pillar” (or economic analysis) models expectations about 
the real economy, on the assumption that inflation and deflation in the 
short and medium term are correlated to: the “output gap” – the 
difference between the observed aggregate output and the trend real 
output of the Eurozone – and the difference between the unobservable 
real rate of interest and the bank rate. 
• For transparency, the ECB uses: a weekly financial statement, Monthly 
Bulletins, quarterly reports and an annual report; announcements of monetary 
decisions at the end of each Governing Council meeting, though no minutes or 
voting records are published; quarterly hearings of the President of the ECB at 
the European Parliament; and among others, “Eurosystem staff projections” 
and “ECB staff projections” published twice a year alternatively. 
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o Transparency at the ECB, however, is short of ideal: the two-pillar 
system contrasts with the practice of other CBs of making its model of 
the economy known.  
o In the same vein, the ECB has consciously refrained from specifying the 
length of its “medium term”, though according to some studies, and the 
statements of some ECB board members, policy measures start to affect 
the targeted variables after 3 or 4 quarters; the peak effect takes place 
after 8 to 9 quarters and then decays gradually. 
o Transparency is a desirable democratic requisite and a crucial element 
for conducting an effective monetary policy. The commitment of the 
central bank to its strategy is more credible the more information it gives. 
The public’s ability confidently to discount short-term variance in the 
price level reduces price fluctuations and the real costs of monetary 
policy. Finally, the benefits of transparency are especially large in the 
event of a shock, as a credible CB enjoys more leeway how much to 
react without affecting long-term expectations. 
• Supervision and regulation at the ESCB have become controversial in the 
present crisis, because the competencies are delegated to the national level, 
where the national central banks (NCBs) or separate bodies conduct them.  
o A Memorandum of Understanding allows some cooperation by the 
ESCB Banking Supervision Committee, the Economic and Financial 
Committee, the Financial Services Committee and the Committee of 
European Banking Supervisors.  
o The system is under revision following the recommendations of the de 
Larosière Group. 
• The ECB has followed a more prudent strategy than the Fed (because of the 
need to preserve consensus in a big board?). This relative prudence, however, 
fell short of what was needed. The directorate of the ECB paid more attention 
to the demands of the French and German governments, which wanted 
monetary easing to boost their growth, rather than the circumstances of 
peripheral EU countries, such as Ireland, Spain and Greece that now have 
reason to rue those relatively low interest rates and the attendant housing and 
securities boom. 
4. Strategies of other banks of reference 
We have divided the eleven CBs into two groups: the four large ones, the ECB, the Fed, 
the Bank of England and the Bank of Japan – and other CBs of interest because they 
show features that could prove interesting for the ECB. To start with the smaller ones: 
New Zealand 
• The Reserve Bank Act of 1989 determined that the primary function of the 
Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) was “to formulate and implement 
monetary policy directed to … achieving and maintaining stability in the 
general level of prices”. 
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• An annual CPI inflation rate in the range of 0 to 2% was taken to represent the 
achievement of price stability. House prices and credit services were soon 
taken out of the CPI index.  
o Previously, the Labour Government had opted for a free float of the New 
Zealand (NZ) dollar, a necessary condition for an independent monetary 
policy. 
o The central bank would not be held responsible for the effect of major 
supply-side shocks, government policy changes, particularly in taxation 
and administered prices. 
• The minister and the appointed or reappointed Governor would subscribe to a 
Policy Target Agreement (PTA), containing a forward looking inflation target, 
and the Governor was personally responsible for achieving it. 
o Inflation targeting predated its adoption by other CBs and was the result 
not of academic research but of political exigencies.  
o Expected inflation was the main information datum supplied to the 
markets. 
o The duty of reporting frequently and regularly turned the Bank from 
secretive to open. 
• With the reputation of the RBNZ consolidating, the PTAs signed along the 
years delineated a more flexible monetary regime. 
o Initially, the Bank used narrow money as an immediate target and 
instrument and set a short run interest rate but this caused excessive 
volatility in the short-run markets. 
o It very soon moved to formal inflation targeting, by making its inflation 
expectations explicit and also its no-inflation horizon. With a better 
knowledge of transmission channels, the Bank was able to lengthen the 
period to that horizon. 
o Under some political pressure, the successive PTAs eased the target to 
between 1% and 3%. The RBNZ then aimed for the middle of the range.  
• The New Zealand system of stability of the financial markets and supervision 
of the banks is worthy of study. 
o Banks have to disclose major features of their balance sheets quarterly. 
o The failure of most finance companies in 2007-8 has led to extending 
regulation from banks to insurance and other intermediaries. 
o In normal times bank deposits are not guaranteed; only during the 
present crisis have such guarantees been issued. In the event of a run, the 
RBNZ would become the statutory manager and write down claims until 
the bank was recapitalised and open for business again. These powers 
have never been used. 
o All New Zealand banks are foreign-owned but are all subsidiaries, thus 
avoiding the problems that a branch system poses for small economies, 
as the Iceland meltdown has shown.  
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• The best test of the New Zealand arrangements is that they have been widely 
copied. 
o The positive lessons have been: a clear institutional framework of 
accountability; and very explicit inflation targeting. 
o The negative lesson has been that the small size of the New Zealand 
monetary zone and economy has made monetary and exchange rate 
policy difficult to manage. The Bank, finding it difficult to keep inflation 
down, has had to set high interest rates. This has led to an overvalued 
currency, with spikes in the real exchange and the dangerous 
development of the foreign exchange carry-trade. 
The link of the Swedish krona with the euro 
• The fixed exchange system proved time and again unsustainable, both under 
Bretton Woods and after Sweden joined the Exchange Rate Mechanism 
(ERM). 
• On abandoning the exchange peg at the end of 1992, Sweden adopted inflation 
targeting, this despite an experience of price level targeting in the 1930s. 
• The Riksbank became independent in 1999, so that the six members of the 
Executive Board cannot seek or accept monetary instructions. 
• The informational basis for inflation targeting was refined with experience: 
o Quarterly Inflation Reports; 
o Decision under uncertainty, underlined by publishing fan charts showing 
explicit probabilities for inflation forecasts; 
o 18-24 months time horizon; 
o Model-based assessment of monetary policy that makes it endogenous. 
• Inflation targeting became more effective as the Riksbank turned into one of 
the more transparent CBs. 
o Six regular Monetary Policy Reports a year signed by the Executive 
Board, who are personally responsible; 
o Minutes of the meetings published with a lag of 2 weeks; 
o Transparency could go no further, as it could lead to publicity-conscious 
positioning. 
• The Riksbank is not the supervisor of the financial system but works in close 
conjunction with the integrated supervisory authority at the Ministry of 
Finance. 
• The present turmoil has highlighted the special difficulties faced by small 
countries facing runs on their currency. Since becoming independent, 
however, the Riksbank has been outstandingly successful in fulfilling its remit: 
the Swedish record on inflation has been rather better than that of the ECB; 
policy has not needed to be much more active; and the Swedish economy has 
not been more volatile than those of its partners. 
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The Baltic States, mainly Estonia 
• On attaining independence, all three Baltic States have set up strong currency 
pegs to attain price stability. Estonia and Lithuania pegged via a currency 
board, one to the Deutschemark and one to the Dollar initially, while Latvia 
did to a basket of currencies. 
• A currency board is no panacea: it needs to be accompanied by the rule of 
law, good institutions, a prudent fiscal policy, political stability and a flexible 
economy. 
• As with the Czech Republic, their experience supports a multi-stage strategy 
for small countries wishing to join the euro (or dollarise):  
o A hard peg initially until inflation is brought down;  
o inflation targeting to stand a better chance of controlling inflation;  
o Finally entering ERM2 for two years or so, to prepare for convergence. 
• The supervisory arrangements of Estonia are especially interesting: 
o Banking supervision was split off from the Bank of Estonia in 2002. 
However the supervisory agency is an agency of the Bank of Estonia. At 
the same time the agency acquired responsibility for insurance and 
securities markets, which had previously been dealt with separately. 
o Though EU rules would allow the large branch of the Finnish bank 
Nordea to be supervised directly from Finland, the Finnish authorities 
have decided to operate supervision with the Estonian supervisor acting 
as an agent. 
The Czech Republic 
• After monetary separation from Slovakia 
o The currency divorce between the Czech Republic and Slovakia on  
1 January 1993 was smooth and easy, an indication that the difficulties 
adduced against leaving a monetary union are more a question of game 
theory than economic theory. 
o The Czech National Bank (CNB) at first chose an exchange rate peg but 
targeting inflation rather than the exchange rate, as the inflation remained 
stubbornly high. The price effects of the 1997 devaluation of the koruna 
and the freeing of regulated prices had to be digested.  
• Approaching EMU 
o For the transition to the euro a shift was made to inflation targeting in 
early 1998. The Bank Law had laid down the independence of the CNB. 
The price stability objective was set at 1% - 3% a year.  
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o The CNB took some time understanding that convergence from the 
lower price level in the Czech Republic to that of the euro zone did not 
imply higher price inflation and should not be worked into the inflation 
forecasts. Repeated undershooting of the inflation target due to 
productivity increases showed that only inflation can be dealt with by 
monetary policy; convergence of price levels depends on relative 
productivities. A transition economy can operate successfully with low 
levels of inflation despite a large price level gap. 
o Prematurely joining EMU would have impeded the nominal appreciation 
of the koruna demanded by Czech productivity strides needed when 
relative prices are still rigid. Also, State spending an the budget deficit 
had to be brought in line before Optimal Currency Area conditions 
obtained, so as to make life within the euro zone comfortable. 
o Real convergence is progressing well and one can expect that the Czechs 
will join EMU in time on more equal terms than other new members 
will. 
• Financial stability  
o The CNB has been deeply involved in the supervision and reorganisation 
of the financial system, when many banks got into difficulties and indeed 
failed. 
o Within its organisation, the CNB has deliberately separated its financial 
stability and financial supervisory functions although the information 
flow remains. This enables stability to be treated as an economy-wide 
issue rather than simply be built up from aggregating the experience with 
the individual banks. 
China’s monetary policy 
• China’s monetary policy is slowly evolving from that typical of a State-
controlled financial system to one free of interest rate limits, credit directives 
and capital controls. China’s central bank is not an independent monetary 
authority. 
o Though the People’s Bank of China's (PBoC) official objective is to 
“maintain the stability of the value of the currency and thereby promote 
economic growth”, monetary targets are not so much intended for 
inflation control but mainly for growth promotion. 
o A subsidiary aim is to avoid both excessive inflation and deflation.  
• Money supply has occupied a central place in the monetary policy framework. 
Domestic growth in credit has also served as an intermediate target for 
monetary policy.  
o Capital controls allow China to use money supply for its monetary policy 
rather than interest rates, which do not work well in a semi-command 
economy. 
o In the mid-1990s, the People’s Bank started to publish annual 
intermediate targets for monetary aggregates, M1 and M2 being the most 
prominent. 
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o The PBoC controls the growth of monetary base by open-market 
operations and with the adjustment of the reserve requirements. 
o Interest rate liberalization began in 1996, although in the second quarter 
of 2007 the share of floating-rate loans that had interest rates above the 
benchmark rate was still only 44%. To diminish the impacts of the global 
financial crisis on China, in autumn 2008 interest rates were cut a total of 
five times. 
• China’s monetary policy operates in the framework of limited flexibility in its 
exchange rate. 
o The exchange rate system was officially changed to a managed float. 
Since 1995 until mid-2005, the yuan was pegged to the US dollar.  
o In July 2005, the authorities announced that the yuan would be pegged to 
a basket of currencies. Nevertheless, the US dollar has clearly occupied a 
central place in the currency basket.  
o Including the small revaluation of July 2005, the yuan has appreciated by 
end-2008 by some 20% against the US dollar 
• Though in 2003 the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) was 
established to supervise the banking industry, the amended central bank law of 
December 2003 mentions the regulation of financial markets. 
o The central bank’s functions include interbank lending and bond 
markets, foreign exchange and gold markets, together with the 
prevention and mitigation of financial risks to safeguard financial 
stability.  
o Reform is taking place in the banking sector and commercial banks’ 
activities were under close guidance of the authorities. However, the 
stability of the Chinese financial system is more than ever in doubt. This 
could make the yuan appear overvalued if one considers the risk factor. 
The easy money policy of the Bank of Japan (BoJ) 
• Japan provides helpful pointers as to what to do and not to do in the face of 
deflation and the zero bound for the nominal rate of interest. Japan also 
provides pointers over how to avoid protracting recession far longer than 
necessary.  
• Land prices and the stock market indices quadrupled in the boom from 1985 to 
1991. Then, asset prices fell for a long period. 
o Land prices declined very rapidly for 5 years and then continued to 
decline more slowly to below their starting values. 
o The stock market showed a 60% decline by 1992, then 8 years of 
volatility and a second decline at the bursting of the dotcom bubble. 
• Accompanying this poor economic performance has been a slow decrease in 
the price level. Inflation was briefly negative in 1995 but from 1998 until 2003 
the price level fell slowly by 3% after which prices were stable through to late 
2007, and it is only in 2008 that inflation started to reach levels typical of other 
OECD economies.  
IP/A/ECON/ST/2008-18 Page xiv PE 416.223
 In the last few months inflation has again died away. However, Broda and 
Weinstein (2007) argue that the actual deflation problem in Japan is much 
larger because the computation of the price index is deficient and implies an 
overestimate of the rate of inflation by as much as 1% a year compared to the 
United States. Since US inflation is itself thought to be biased upwards by 
around 1%, the limited measured deflation in Japan may reflect a decline in a 
properly measured price level in excess of 20%. The economy has not really 
got back to sustained growth two decades after the original collapse in asset 
prices. 
• Monetary policy was eased steadily until the rate reached 0.5% in 1996 and 
with intervals was effectively at the zero bound down to 2008. 
o In the second half of 2001 the Bank began a policy of ‘quantitative 
easing’ which continued until 2008, seeking to increase the liquidity 
taken up by the banks despite the zero interest rate. 
o Japan has been criticised for not taking other measures, particularly for 
not seeking to depreciate the exchange rate or tackle the problem of 
hidden losses, particularly among the banks. 
• The 1998 new BoJ Law granted it effective independence. 
o There is a record kept of the policy board meetings, focusing on what 
was decided and why. There is an opportunity for members to express 
dissent. Detailed minutes are published with a six week lag and the 
Governor gives a press conference after the decisions. 
o On being granted independence, the BoJ, wanting to build up a 
reputation for inflation aversion, erred on the side of monetary 
restriction. 
• There have been attempts to solve the conundrum of Japanese deflation by 
blaming the BoJ for not keeping policy in line with a Taylor rule. 
o The Taylor rule is useful as a post hoc description but, as it is not 
forward-looking and ignores information on asset prices, it is not so 
useful in prescription. 
o The BoJ has not formulated an inflation target nor even communicated 
clear objectives. Consequently, mistiming of CB action may explain a 
great deal of the conundrum. 
• Recourse was had to quantitative easing after the year 2000 recovery 
evaporated. The BoJ pushed commercial banks to increasing the short term 
reserves they held at the CB. 
o The problem for banks was not so much funding as an unhealthy balance 
sheet. 
o Quantitative easing ended in 2006 and its actual contribution to the 
ending of deflation is not clear. 
• The BoJ was sceptical about the effectiveness of monetary policy in the 
situation of the banking sector. 
o In the early stages of the crisis there was a need to recognise the losses 
particularly in the banking system and then recapitalise the banks. 
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o The process merely created large weak banks to replace the smaller ones. 
o Later in the crisis, the BoJ argued that restructuring was required – the 
inefficient banks must go out of business so that the dynamic could 
prosper. 
• The lesson could be drawn from the Japanese experience that in a crisis such 
as the present one, the problem is not liquidity risk but counterparty risk. 
Inflation targeting in the UK 
• Inflation targeting came as a surprise in the UK but had been long in the 
brewing. On becoming Chancellor, Gordon Brown had the 1997 Bank of 
England Act passed and implemented: thereby the Bank became independent 
in that it could vary its policy instrument as it wished to achieve a particular 
level of a particular measure of inflation, both chosen by the Government. 
o The pound had been pegged to the dollar after Bretton Woods, was 
floated without an anchor in the seventies (when in August 1975 
inflation reached 27% per annum). 
o When Margaret Thatcher became Prime Minister in 1979 she 
immediately announced a “Medium Term Financial Strategy”, one of 
whose key parts was targeting money supply to fight inflation. The 
connection between M3 and price rises seemed statistically well 
established but soon broke down. 
o The anchor was changed to shadowing the Deutschmark and joining the 
ERM. In 1992, however Britain had to leave the ERM. 
o Then started a period of increasing disclosure of inflation forecasts by 
the Bank that ended with the Bank in charge of implementing monetary 
policy. 
• The institutional set-up conforms to inflation targeting arrangements 
elsewhere. 
o A Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) of nine members chaired by the 
Governor – five from the Bank, four outsiders – takes interest rate 
decisions. The MPC meets monthly and detailed minutes are published 
but with no attribution to individual members. Interest rate decisions are 
announced at the end of each meeting. An Inflation Report published 
quarterly gives forecasts for inflation and output, and key underlying 
assumptions such as the path of the exchange rate. 
o The Governor must send an open letter to the Chancellor if inflation is 
more than 1 percentage point above or below target. This letter explains 
why the deviation has occurred, what is going to be done about it, when 
it is expected to return to the target range, and why, in some 
circumstances, it would be wrong to try to bring inflation back to target 
too quickly. The Treasury Committee of the House of Commons hears 
the Governor on set occasions. 
• The target the MPC has to achieve is inflation measured by the Consumer 
Price Index, another name for the EU’s Harmonised Index of Consumer 
Prices, often criticised because it excludes housing costs. 
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o The MPC has to achieve the inflation target with consideration to the 
behaviour of the real economy, not responding aggressively to deviations 
from target. 
• The instrument is the official short term interest rate, the rate at which the 
Bank supplies reserves to the banking sector. 
o Banks can also borrow as much as they want (against collateral) through 
a “standing facility”, at 1 percentage point above base rate, and deposit at 
the Bank any reserves they do not need at a rate 1 percentage point below 
base rate. 
o When the London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR) is very substantially 
above base rate, this is an indication of serious liquidity or counterparty 
risk. 
• The system is designed to achieve credibility and time consistency. 
o The Bank together with the MPC publishes two-year forecasts. These 
now take the form of probability fan charts, as with the Riksbank. 
o The model on which such forecasts are calculated is published in full but 
may give different results according to how inflation expectations are 
assumed to form. 
o Votes are personally attributed to each member of the MPC, which 
makes them accountable for their decisions. 
o The “Open Letter” is a unique feature in the monetary policy-making 
world and one which we generally thought to enhance credibility. 
• Several matters could undermine time consistency and credibility. 
o No formal procedure is necessary to change the target. 
o LIBOR overrun as at present casts doubts on the efficiency of the 
system. 
o The system has been buffeted by large-scale upheavals in a globalised 
and innovating financial system. There is need to review the relation 
between the lender of last resort function and who carries out inspection 
and regulation of the financial system. 
o The absolute sovereignty of Parliament endangers time consistency. 
The strategy of the Fed 
• The Federal Reserve Act was passed in December 1913.  
• By the end of the First World War, the New York Fed, led by Governor 
Benjamin Strong, had achieved a leading role in the conduct of monetary 
policy. 
• Benjamin Strong came to repudiate the real bills doctrine based on the 
experience of the 1920-21 recession, and wanted to buy and sell acceptances 
and government securities to control monetary conditions.  
• During that recession the Fed discovered open-market operations, a major tool 
even today of monetary policy in the USA. 
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• Among the changes during the Great Depression, three were important: 
o The separation between commercial and investment banking; 
o The creation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, an innovation 
that fostered unit banking and reduced the incentive to capitalise banks. 
o In 1935 decision-making became more centralised and the newly named 
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) reduced the participation of 
the presidents of the district banks. 
• The 1946 Employment Act added employment to the Fed’s goals, so that it 
had to attend to multiple goals – maximum employment, stable prices, and 
moderate long term interest rates. 
• War on Poverty and the Vietnam War finance forced President Nixon to close 
the gold window and unleashed inflation. 
• Paul Volcker was appointed Chairman of the Board of Governors by President 
Carter and successfully brought inflation under control. 
• Alan Greenspan was appointed in 1987. Under him, the Fed’s focus on 
inflation was erratic. The 1987 stock market fall and the need to rescue 
Savings and Loan set the tone for a Presidency focussed on the need to counter 
any cyclical downturn.  
• It has been suggested that the Fed in fact behaves, either consciously or 
unconsciously, as if implementing a “Taylor rule” (see Taylor, 1993) – 
adjusting the Fed Funds rate in 0.5 percentage pint steps in response to 
deviations 1 percentage point from 2% inflation or potential GNP.  
• In recent years, with the appointment of more (academic) economists to the 
Board of Governors, there has been further discussion of adopting an explicit 
inflation target. 
• The Lender of Last Resort role traditionally involved the provision of liquidity 
on collateral at a time of general shortage in the banking system. In the 
financial crisis of 2008 the US Treasury became involved in assisting the 
banking system. The problem could well be shortage of capital, not shortage of 
liquidity. 
• Concluding observations: 
o The constitutional position of the Fed is anomalous and indeed unclear. 
o Of particular importance for the Eurosystem is the change in its Lender 
of Last Resort role. 
o The US system of financial regulation is not a system but a patchwork. 
IP/A/ECON/ST/2008-18 Page xviii PE 416.223
5. Policy implications for the ECB 
Questions posed are: (i) Without the benefit of hindsight could monetary policy have 
been run in a manner that would either have avoided the present crisis or at least made 
its impact milder? (ii) With the benefit of hindsight can monetary policy be improved so 
that there is greater stability in future? 
• The relative success of the ECB: 
o Inflation was above 2% in every year and averaged 2.2% in 2001-2007. 
It was 3.3% in 2008. 
o The ECB sets some store by having a monetary policy that is not very 
responsive or active but steady. However, this in itself can cause greater 
fluctuations in the economy as it allows booms/inflation to develop 
further and recessions to be deeper. An ideal policy is anticipatory but 
often not feasible, a lagging policy can be just as destabilising. 
o The ECB has resisted giving a clear idea of the requirement on future 
policy to bring inflation back into line. 
o John Taylor attributes much of the mis-setting of policy to a tendency to 
follow US interest rates. He also fears that, in the present crisis, the ECB 
follows the mistake of the Fed in believing that the cause is a liquidity 
crunch rather than counterparty risk.  
• In times of disturbance, in addition to easing monetary policy by expanding 
the size of their balance sheets (quantitative easing), CBs can widen the class 
of assets that they accept as collateral (qualitative easing). The ECB accepts a 
wide range of collateral compared to many other CBs (but with heavier 
haircuts on lower quality assets).  
o Usually lifeboats inevitably involve the Treasury of the country 
concerned, because the institution at risk is so large that other banks 
coming together cannot commit enough means to support it, because 
they are themselves under stress, or because they do not recognise a 
common interest. 
• Final recommendations: 
o In order to transmit a more comprehensive and accurate definition of 
price stability, the current final target as measured as a small growth of 
the HICP should be accompanied by a review of non-consumption goods 
and assets. 
o More detailed projections, as well as the public release of the model of 
reference of the ECB Governing Council used for their calculation, 
should be adopted to communicate the ECB expected inflationary bias, 
and thus the expected path of interest rates in the medium term. 
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o Generally central banks have found that small committees are more 
effective for making monetary policy decisions. The Eurosystem may 
therefore gain by appointing a small body, based on professional 
competence and not nationality. The composition of such committees 
should be based on monetary policy decision-making competence 
without a requirement for administrative skills as with the Executive 
Board. 
o The Governing Council minutes, including the voting record, should be 
released to foster a better understanding of the different views coming 
into play in the meetings1.  
o Without affecting its independence, the ECB should be more accountable 
by making the quarterly hearing of the ECB President in the European 
Parliament (EP) more effective and fruitful, and better focused on the 
questions addressed in each session. 
                                                 
1 On the question of whether the names of the individual members should be identified on the voting 
record there was a difference of views among the authors of this Report. All agreed on the importance of 
transparency but, while one insisted on full disclosure, others feared that the Governors of the national 
central banks might be open to the pressure from their respective Governments, if they were candidates 
for reappointment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The question: lessons to be drawn from comparing the ECB strategy with 
that of other central banks  
The object of this Report is to make a summary but informative comparison of the strategies 
followed by a diverse group of central banks, so that lessons can be drawn for the conduct of 
monetary affairs at the European Central Bank (ECB).  
The institution of the central bank has become one of the commonest in the world, even more 
so than that of democracy. At the end of the 19th century there were 18 central banks in the 
world: at the beginning of the 21st this number had grown to 173. Their transformation is not 
only evident in their number but also in their organisation, since in recent years many central 
banks have seen their statutes reformed in the direction of greater independence and 
transparency. Growing numbers and deep changes would by themselves make the question of 
central bank strategy topical; the present financial crisis and economic recession have made it 
urgent. 
The strategy of a central bank is principally the expression of its long term goals within the 
general economic management of a nation or a monetary zone. Beside these goals, the 
definition of its strategy must also include a consideration of the instruments it can use to 
pursue those goals; of its internal organisation; and of the institutional relations of the bank 
with the political powers that define its remit. All these arrangements only make sense if they 
are well grounded in monetary theory and in the theory of public choice: they must be based 
on an understanding of the limits of monetary management in a world of fast financial 
innovation; of time inconsistency problems afflicting all monetary authorities; and of 
principal-agent conflicts between central bank officials and their political masters. 
To organise this complicated set of issues, we will define a central bank’s monetary policy 
strategy by four main elements.  
• The first is the desired outcome: what are the goals of monetary policy and what 
weight is placed on each.  
• The second element is the process: how is monetary policy implemented and what 
instruments are used.  
• The third is the assignment of responsibilities: what tasks are allocated to the central 
banks and how are responsibilities assigned within central banks.  
• The final element is oversight: to what entity or entities are the monetary policy 
authorities answerable and in what manner do monetary policy-makers 
communicate with their supervisors and with the public.  
The theoretical bases of these arrangements will be kept continually in mind to help evaluate 
their relevance.  
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1. THE THEORETICAL BASIS OF MONETARY POLICY 
The most important role of a central bank is to provide a stable means of payment. This is 
primarily achieved by ensuring the stability of the value of the medium of exchange, although 
– as events in 2007 and 2008 have made clear – it may also involve assisting the relevant 
fiscal authorities and regulatory bodies to promote a stable financial system. At one time it 
was also believed that central bankers should be concerned with other macroeconomic 
variables, such as employment and long-term growth. Today, however, most new central 
bank legislation in advanced economies mandates price stability as the overriding goal of the 
central bank. In many cases, central banks or their governments go as far as setting explicit 
numerical targets for inflation.  
In this chapter we discuss how an evolving theoretical view of monetary policy led to a 
consensus that central banks should be primarily concerned with inflation and also to a 
widely shared belief that, left to themselves, central banks would inflate too much. We 
describe attempts to devise institutions that would ensure good policy-making and protect 
societies from this inflation bias. 
1.1. Evolution of desired objectives 
As already mentioned, for most modern central banks, the provision of low inflation is seen 
as the primary goal. It may not be completely obvious why inflation is seen as so costly as to 
merit this importance and, therefore, we present some of the reasons. We then explain why 
other macroeconomic goals, such as employment and output or a stable exchange rate are 
typically given less or no importance in many central bank mandates.  
1.1.1. Inflation has high costs 
Inflation is defined as the percentage increase in the general level of prices of goods and 
services in an economy over a period. For purposes of monetary policy, inflation is typically 
measured as the percentage increase in a consumer price index, such as the Harmonised 
Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) used in the EU Member States. A consumer price index is 
the weighted average of the prices of goods in a typical household’s consumption basket.  
The classical cost of inflation is the shoe-leather cost. The opportunity cost of holding non-
interest bearing money is the nominal interest rate. The higher inflation is, the higher is the 
nominal interest rate and the more resources households and firms expend to avoid holding 
money. A second cost is menu costs: if prices change, then menus and other price lists must 
be updated. A third cost arises with staggered nominal price setting. Often firms set prices in 
advance and keep them unchanged for some time. If not all prices are set simultaneously, 
then inflation may cause relative prices to be distorted. A fourth way that inflation is harmful 
is that inflation makes the currency an inconvenient unit of account; a yardstick is not as 
useful if its size keeps changing. A fifth cost is that inflation can interact with the tax system 
in a way that produces distorted or unfair outcomes. For example, in years of high inflation, 
people may pay capital gains taxes on capital losses. Finally, inflation can redistribute income 
in a way that is regarded as unfair: the sophisticated and relatively wealthy gain at the 
expense of the poor and the badly educated.  
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Measuring the exact cost of inflation is difficult. There is, however, a substantial literature 
looking at the relationship between inflation and growth. The evidence leaves no doubt that 
double-digit inflation is bad for growth, but there is some controversy about the effect of low 
inflation on growth.3 
1.1.2. There is no long-run trade-off between inflation and employment and output 
Despite the long-recognized costs of inflation, the belief that low inflation should be the 
primary, and possibly even the overriding, mandate for a central bank is a product of the past 
three or four decades. At one time, central banks were expected to pursue both low inflation 
and high employment and output. Even now the Federal Reserve is formally charged with 
pursuing “maximum employment” in addition to price stability. That high employment and 
output are desirable seems clear, so why should they, too, not be part of a central bank’s 
objectives? 
In the 1960s most academics and policy-makers believed that there was a long-run trade-off 
between inflation and unemployment and output; society could enjoy a higher level of 
economic activity if it were willing to tolerate the higher inflation. It was thought that 
monetary policy involved weighing the benefits to those better off by higher growth and 
employment against the costs to those worse off by higher inflation. 
By the end of the 1960s, the belief in a stable Phillips curve relationship between inflation 
and unemployment had waned. Edmund Phelps (1970) argued that, although monetary policy 
can have a significant temporary effect on the economy, it has little long-run effect on 
employment and output. Since the rational expectations revolution of the 1970, the 
prevailing, indeed near-consensus, view is that there is no long-run exploitable trade-off 
between inflation and unemployment and output, except possibly at very low levels of 
inflation. (We will return to this exception later.) 
1.1.3. There is a relationship between unexpected inflation and employment and output 
While it is generally thought that there is no exploitable Phillips curve trade-off between 
inflation and employment and output, it is believed that there is a positive relationship 
between unexpected inflation and employment and output. This can arise with rational 
expectations if there is nominal wage contracting. To see this, suppose that workers and firms 
choose a contractual nominal wage that will be fixed for some time in the future. Monetary 
policy is then made and the resulting inflation determines the real wage over the term of the 
contract and firms make their hiring decisions based on this real wage. At the time that they 
contract, workers and firms choose a nominal wage such that, given their expectation of 
inflation, they will attain their most preferred level of employment. In this case, the higher 
unexpected inflation is, the lower is the real wage and the higher is employment, and thus 
output. This relationship between unexpected inflation and employment and output is often 
called an expectations-augmented Phillips curve. 
An implication of this expectations-augmented Phillips curve is that monetary policy might 
possibly be used to smooth business cycle fluctuations if the central bank has an 
informational advantage over the private sector. Such an advantage may be present if the 
private sector commits itself to fixed nominal wage or fixed nominal interest rate contracts 
and a shock occurs after these contracts are signed and before monetary policy is applied.  
                                                 
3 See Bernanke (1999) and Fischer (1996) 
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Milton Friedman and the monetarist school, however, questioned even a short-run 
stabilisation role for monetary policy, claiming that there are long, variable and uncertain lags 
between the implementation of monetary policy, when its effects occur and how systematic 
they are. 
1.1.4. Monetary policy is subject to a time-inconsistency problem 
An unfortunate implication of the relationship between unexpected inflation and employment 
and output is that it creates an inflation bias. Once workers and firms have formed their 
expectation of inflation and incorporated it into nominal wage contracts, benevolent policy-
makers can increase employment and output by increasing inflation. However, at the time 
that the public forms its expectation of inflation, it understands the policy-maker’s incentives 
and expects the resulting inflation to occur. The outcome is that there is inflation, but rational 
expectations imply that on average inflation fully enters expectations. The central bank 
cannot systematically engineer an increase in employment and output above what would 
occur with no unexpected inflation. This is the time-inconsistency problem, developed in the 
academic literature by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983). 
There is a related time-inconsistency problem for countries with inefficient tax systems. In 
this case, public finance considerations may cause a benevolent policy-maker to want to 
collect an inflation tax and the amount that it can collect is increasing in unexpected inflation. 
Thus, once the public forms its expectation of inflation, the policy-maker has an incentive to 
increase government revenue by causing inflation and the public realises this. The outcome is 
inflation, but this is expected, not unexpected inflation.4  
In both of the above time-inconsistency scenarios, the policy-maker and society would be 
better off if the government could commit itself to not inflating. In this case there would be 
no unexpected inflation. Employment and output or government revenue would be the same 
as in the time-inconsistency scenarios and there would be no inflation. 
1.2. Designing institutions to ensure price stability 
As a consequence of the view that low and stable inflation is desirable, that monetary policy 
cannot be used to systematically increase employment and output, and that long and variable 
lags in monetary policy limit it usefulness in offsetting transitory shocks it is now common to 
mandate price stability as the principle goal of the central bank. The ECB, the Bank of 
England, the Bank of Japan, the Bank of Korea, the Bank of Canada, the Banco Central do 
Brazil and the South African Reserve Bank are among the many central banks that have price 
stability as their legislated primary goal.  
Given the time-inconsistency problem, however, it is not enough to mandate the pursuit of 
low inflation. The government must find some way to commit itself to low inflation. 
Unfortunately, however, as law-maker, judge and enforcer, it is difficult for a government to 
compel itself to behave in a particular way. 
Governments can try to solve the credibility problem in monetary policy in three main ways. 
The first is to find a way to make it more costly to policy-makers to cause inflation. The 
second is to sidestep the problem by appointing policy-makers who are so inflation-averse 
that they are not tempted to use inflation to increase output. The third is more subtle.  
                                                 
4 See Calvo (1978). 
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If a policy-maker were to resist the temptation to inflate early in his tenure in office, the 
public might think it possible that the policy maker is highly inflation-averse and it would 
expect low inflation in the future. Thus, a policy-maker’s desire to gain a reputation for being 
tough on inflation might serve as a commitment device. Unfortunately, as policy-makers 
serve finite terms, at some point before the end of their tenure they are likely to exploit a 
reputation for inflation aversion by creating more inflation than is expected. Thus, this last 
solution is only a partial one. In this section, we consider how different monetary policy 
institutions have been used to solve the credibility problem. 
1.2.1. Fixed exchange rate regimes 
One strategy for insuring low inflation is for a government to peg its currency to the currency 
of a country that can be counted on to pursue low inflation. It is a central result in the theory 
of international finance that if a country is to maintain a fixed exchange rate, it cannot follow 
an independent monetary policy.5 Thus, as long as the country maintains its peg, it must 
follow the less inflationary country’s monetary policy. The formation of the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System can be viewed as an attempt by other 
nations to attain the same rate of inflation as Germany. Many developing countries have 
pegged their currencies to the dollar with the intent of achieving the lower US inflation. 
As long at it has enough foreign reserves to buy back its monetary base it is always possible 
for a country with a fixed exchange rate to maintain its peg. Policy-makers may be able to 
commit to pursuing the monetary policy necessary for maintaining a fixed exchange rate, at 
least for a while, because devaluations can cause severe economic disruption and are not a 
career-enhancing move for the policy-maker involved.  
There are drawbacks to fixed exchange rates, however. One problem is that the link between 
the exchange rate and inflation is imperfect. Successfully maintaining a peg does not 
necessarily guarantee price stability. More importantly, however, in a world with highly 
mobile capital, fixed exchange rates are subject to speculative attacks; this is so when the 
fundamentals are weak but, as with bank runs, these attacks may occur even when the 
fundamentals are relatively good. If holders of the domestic currency think that there will be 
a successful speculative attack, then they sell the domestic currency. Although it may be 
feasible for the country to avert the attack, if doing so is too damaging to the domestic 
economy; the government chooses to devalue and market participants’ expectations are self-
fulfilling. Sterling’s spectacularly ungraceful exit from the ERM in September 1992 – the 
Bank of England reportedly suffered a capital loss of $5 billion in just a few hours6 – was 
probably the death knell for fixed exchange rate regimes in most advanced economies.7 
Some developing, transition and very small economies still opt to peg their currencies. This is 
because developing and transition economies are especially vulnerable to the time-
inconsistency problems associated with inefficient tax systems and because it is particularly 
difficult to make monetary policy in very small economies.  
A currency board is probably the most successful and credible type of peg for countries that 
choose to fix their exchange rate. Under a classical currency board the government pegs its 
currency to a foreign currency, say the euro.  
                                                 
5 The only exception is a country with an important reserve currency. The United States under the Bretton 
Woods system is an example: although the dollar was pegged to gold, it was able, up to a point and for a limited 
period, to pursue an overly expansionary monetary policy because other governments were willing to 
accumulate dollar reserves. 
6 See Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995). 
7 Denmark is a counterexample; it pegs its currency to the euro. 
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It then stands willing to buy and sell unlimited amounts of its own notes and coins for euros 
at the pegged rate and it holds enough euros to buy back all of its own notes and coins. It 
does not otherwise pursue any monetary policy: it does not attempt to influence interest rates, 
fund the government or act as lender of last resort to its banking system. The advantage of 
this system is that if the government adheres to it, it can maintain its peg. Lithuania is an 
example of a country that has operated a successful currency board since 2000; Argentina is 
an example of a country that operated a currency board, but was unable to commit to the rules 
and suffered a financial meltdown in 2001-2002.  
An extreme, but credible way for high inflation countries to commit to a less inflationary 
monetary policy is to give up their own currency. Examples are countries such as Italy and 
Greece that joined the European Monetary Union (EMU); Ecuador, which dollarized in 2000 
and Montenegro, which adopted first the German mark and then the euro as its currency. The 
option could also have considerable benefits for countries that are too small and vulnerable to 
external shocks to achieve stable inflation, even if they could commit to attempting this.8 
1.2.2. Inflation Targeting and Central Bank Independence 
It is widely believed that a good way to ensure price stability in a sizable advanced economy 
is to make the central bank operationally independent of the government and to give it an 
inflation target. This is the reasoning behind the wave of central bank legislation that 
introduced inflation targeting around the world. The Norges Bank, Sveriges Riksbank, the 
Bank of England, the Banco Central do Brazil are among the central banks that must meet an 
explicit inflation target set by the government. Perhaps less appealing are looser variants of 
this: the Bank of Korea can choose its own target; the South African Reserve Bank is given a 
band rather than a point target; the ECB is merely enjoined to keep inflation low. 
Making the bank operationally independent does not necessarily solve the time-inconsistency 
problem. If the central bank shares the government’s preferences, it will have a time-
inconsistency problem as well. However, Bernanke et al (1999, p. 25) argue that central 
bankers are apt to be more inflation-averse than the government, saying that this, “… may be 
the result of ‘tough’ central bankers … or it may just be that their professional backgrounds 
and socialisation make central bankers relatively hawkish on inflation.”  
1.2.3. Intermediate Targets 
An explicit inflation target has been praised as a simple, visible, verifiable, easily understood 
and rarely changing goal that permits central bankers’ to enhance their reputation for being 
tough on inflation. Unfortunately, however, if inflation is too high, the public may not be able 
to tell whether the central bank has an inflation bias arising from the time-inconsistency 
problem or is just incompetent or unlucky.  
Central banks have various instruments at their disposal with which to try to attain their 
desired level of inflation. These include open-market operations, discount rates and reserve 
requirements. A motivated member of the public might attempt to infer from open-market 
operations, reserve requirements and discount window rates whether or not the central bank is 
being too expansionary, but the relationship between these instruments and inflation is highly 
complex. 
                                                 
8 Countries such as the Baltics and Iceland would benefit in the short run from unilaterally adopting the euro and 
may only be deterred from doing so because it might preclude their entry into the euro area. 
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Even the central bank might find it difficult to infer undue expansion from the values it sets 
for these instruments. Since it is difficult to know what level of a particular instrument will be 
most apt to produce a given inflation rate, central banks often use intermediate targets; that 
is, the central banks target variables that are both more directly related to inflation than their 
instruments and easier to target precisely using their instruments than inflation itself. As 
many economists believe that there is a stable long-run relationship between money and 
inflation, monetary aggregates were a popular intermediate target in the 1970s and 1980s and 
were used by the German Bundesbank and the Swiss National Bank. 
A problem with this regime is that its merits depend upon the short-term and medium-term 
relationships between the monetary aggregates chosen as targets and inflation. Currently, 
these relationships are not stable or predictable enough for monetary aggregates targeting to 
be a good way of ensuring that inflation is low and not too variable. In addition, the targeting 
of monetary aggregates is relatively hard for the public to understand, making it more 
difficult to acquire and maintain a reputation for inflationary toughness. The success of the 
Bundesbank in maintaining low inflation may have been due to its legendary inflation 
aversion, rather than properties inherent in this framework. Bernanke and Mihov (1997) use 
data from 1969–1995 to argue that the Bundesbank would have been better described as an 
inflation-targeter than as a money-targeter. 
The ECB originally assigned a prominent role to the broad monetary aggregate M3, stating 
that it would announce a reference value for M3 that would be consistent with price stability. 
While the Governing Council of the ECB did not commit to always meeting this target in the 
short run, it stated that deviations would signal a threat to its low-inflation objective. This 
policy was probably intended as a mechanism for the ECB to communicate its monetary 
policy to the public. However, as M3 regularly exceeded its reference value the policy served 
only to undermine the ECB’s credibility. On 8 May 2003, to the near universal approval of 
academic economists, the Council announced that M3 no longer had a special role.9  
While it is neither surprising nor regrettable that the targeting of monetary aggregates has 
been abandoned, it may seem somewhat curious that money is of so little importance in 
modern monetary policy-making. There is a well-established connection between monetary 
base creation by central banks and the rate of inflation in the long run. Mervyn King (2002) 
calculates that over the 30-year horizon 1968–1998 the correlation coefficient between both 
narrow and broad measures of money and inflation was .99. Yet, money plays no role in the 
canonical New Keynesian macroeconomic model that is en vogue today and, as Mervyn King 
(2002) comments, econometric forecasting models in most central banks do not include 
money.  
The problem is that, as previously mentioned, the short-run correlation between money and 
output is small and unstable so that reduced-form models are of little use. Estrella and 
Mishkin (1997) and Stock and Watson (1999) find that money growth has little or no useful 
information for inflation forecasting. Nevertheless, some prominent economists, such as 
Charles Goodhart (2007), believe that matters have gone too far; that paying attention to 
money, especially in times of turbulence, is important. Not all economists have despaired of 
developing structural models that would enable the extraction of information from monetary 
aggregates – see Chadha et al (2008) – but, this research is in its infancy. 
                                                 
9 See Svensson (2003) and Wyplosz (2003). Gerlach and Svensson (2003) find that the growth of M3 appears to 
have no predictive power in forecasting future inflation. Woodford (2007) argues strongly against a special 
importance for money in policymaking. 
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Because of the problems with monetary aggregates, most inflation-targeting central banks 
have adopted short-term interest rates as intermediate targets. Monetary policy-makers make 
monetary policy by announcing a policy interest rate and then having the central bank staff 
conduct liquidity management operations to attempt to ensure that the announced policy rate 
coincides with some reference interest rate10. Thus, central bank short-term interest rates 
often play a double role in central bank policy: they serve as intermediate targets and they are 
used to signal the central bank’s monetary policy stance to the public.  
1.2.4. A single precise goal helps to promote efficiency in monetary policy committees 
The discussion so far has relied on purely macroeconomic arguments to explain why most 
central banks have and should have low inflation as their primary goal. We now present a less 
orthodox reason for this and a reason why specific numerical inflation targets may be 
desirable. In most central banks, monetary policy is made by a committee, usually a fairly 
sizable committee. A prominent feature of committees is that their output is not as good as 
what would be suggested by the capabilities of their members. Kerr and Tindale (2004) 
comment, “The ubiquitous finding across many decades … is that groups usually fall short of 
reasonable productivity baselines … they exhibit process losses.” The process losses appear 
to result primarily from coordination problems and free-riding. 
Coordination problems lead to significant process losses in large groups. A monetary policy 
committee faced with multiple aims may waste its time arguing over what weight to put on 
each goal, rather than how best to achieve its goals. Members may withhold information to 
manipulate the outcome strategically. A precise specification of the committee’s objectives is 
apt to result in a more efficient process and more inter-committee cooperation. From the 
point of view of efficient policy-making, a single objective for monetary policy committees 
may dominate multiple objectives and if the sole objective is price stability, a point target 
may be better than a more vague specification. 
A vast social psychology literature documents the problem of “social loafing”, or free-riding, 
in committees. This problem is especially severe in larger committees and appears to 
disappear only when the contributions of individual members can be identified and 
compared.11 For mitigating social loafing by monetary policy committee members, it appears 
that a single precise goal, coupled with the release of individual votes is ideal.  
From a point of view of efficiency, the Bank of England scores well: its relatively small 
monetary policy committee is mandated to pursue a point target for inflation and votes are 
taken and published. The Federal Reserve’s FOMC and the Governing Council of the ECB 
are less well designed. Both committees are far too big. The Federal Reserve has multiple, 
poorly specified goals and while votes are taken and published, members usually feel 
compelled to vote with the chairman so they are not usually informative. The ECB has a 
single, fairly clear goal, but as votes are not published, and may not even be taken, there is no 
way to evaluate an individual member’s contribution. 
                                                 
10 For many central banks the policy rate and the reference rate coincide. The ECB does not have a formal 
reference rate, although the EONIA rate, a benchmark unsecured overnight rate may be an informal reference 
rate. The ECB’s policy rate is the minimum bid rate on its main refinancing operations. Unusually, the Swiss 
National Bank uses the three-month uncollateralised interbank interest rate as both its policy rate and its 
reference rate. 
11 See Harkins and Jenkins (1985). 
IP/A/ECON/ST/2008-18 Page 8 of 123 PE 416.223
1.2.5. In an advanced economy, the inflation target should be between 1 and 3% 
To attain price stability, the arguments advanced earlier in this chapter suggest that central 
banks should have a target inflation rate that is equal to zero, or possibly even one that is 
small and negative (so that the nominal interest rate is equal to zero). Most advanced 
economies, however, favour an inflation rate between one and three percent. We suggest 
some reasons why this is sensible and explain why less advanced economies might choose a 
higher inflation target. 
In addition to the costs of inflation that we have identified, there may be a benefit. Printing 
more money causes inflation, but it also provides the government with revenue, known as 
seigniorage. This tax on the holding of money is believed to be distortionary relative to other 
taxes, but has no significant administrative costs. This suggests that, from a public finance 
point of view, for modern economies the optimal inflation tax is near zero, but might even be 
in the double digits for some less developed economies, such as those in the early stages of 
transition or, possibly, for economies with extraordinary fiscal needs arising from, say, a war.  
Further, it is sometimes argued that the costs for deviating from inflation are asymmetric: 
because of its redistributive effects on debts and the real resource costs of the resulting 
bankruptcies, low deflation is more harmful than low inflation. This suggests that the 
inflation target ought to be positive. It may be, however, that as the world becomes more used 
to very low inflation that this asymmetry will disappear. 
The two most important reasons for having an inflation target greater than zero arise from 
practical considerations in the implementation of monetary policy and measurement error. It 
is difficult, although not necessarily impossible, to have a nominal policy rate below zero and 
thus it might be difficult for a central bank to offset an unexpected negative shock if actual 
and expected inflation were near zero. In most countries the consumer price indices used to 
compute the central bank’s measure of inflation significantly exceed actual inflation.12  
It is sometimes suggested that a final possible reason that some inflation may be desirable is 
that, as mentioned previously, it is conceivable that there is a Phillips curve trade-off at 
sufficiently low inflation.13 The trade-off would arise if there is downward wage inflexibility. 
This seems plausible; it is believable that workers are disproportionately averse to a cut in 
their nominal wage. However, the empirical evidence of this phenomenon is inconclusive. 
Lebow, Stockton and Wascher (1995), for example, argue that nominal wage cuts are 
common in the United States. Moreover, aversion to nominal wage cuts is not a necessary 
feature of an economy and may disappear as workers and firms become more used to low 
inflation. 
Throughout this chapter we have taken price stability to mean low and stable inflation. An 
obvious alternative definition is a constant level of the consumer price index. Current 
inflation would be offset with future deflation. Stabilising the value of the consumer price 
index has not proved a popular idea and was last tried by Sweden in the 1930’s.14 There are 
few, if any, mainstream economic models where welfare depends upon the price level. 
                                                 
12 In the United States, for example, the CPI may overstate inflation by over 1.5 percentage points. See 
Hamilton (2001), Costa (2001) and Hausman (2003). 
13 See Akerlof et al (1996). 
14 See Murray (2006). 
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1.2.6. Rules vs. discretion or, there may be a trade-off between credibility and flexibility 
Devising institutional structures that force central bankers to focus on inflation to the near 
exclusion of employment and output is not costless. While it is not possible for central banks 
to systematically increase employment and output, as discussed earlier, it is theoretically 
possible, although practically difficult, for central banks to offset transitory random shocks if 
they have an informational advantage over the public. That is, there may be some 
stabilisation role for central banks. Central banks cannot affect the levels of real variables, but 
perhaps they can affect their variances. If the central bank is unwilling to tolerate any 
variance in inflation, however, it will be unwilling to smooth real variables.15  
A sizable body of research has grown around the problem of designing a central bank that is 
both credible that it will pursue low inflation and flexible enough to respond to shocks. Walsh 
(1995) shows that a properly specified incentive contract, providing monetary bonuses to 
central bankers who provide low inflation and penalties to those who do not can solve this 
problem. To write such a contract, however, requires that the government has an unrealistic 
amount of knowledge about the central banker’s preferences. Briault et al (1997) also argue 
that giving the government responsibility for enforcing the contract simply shifts the time-
inconsistency problem from the central bank to the public. As a result of these problems, we 
do not know of real world examples of such contracts. 
In practice, however, the prevailing view is that using monetary policy to offset small shocks 
is too difficult. The central bank’s knowledge of the economy is incomplete. The available 
data is constantly subject to revisions. Monetary policy operates with too long and too 
uncertain lags and its effects are too hard to quantify. Using monetary policy to fine-tune the 
economy is not possible. 
This does not mean that a central bank should permit or create unnecessary turbulence in 
employment or output. If some large, visible event created a collapse in domestic demand, it 
might be that the central bank ought to pursue a more expansionary policy than would be 
sufficient to ensure price stability. In the face of a sufficiently large and visible supply shock, 
say a rise in the price of oil, there could be a case for the central bank not to pursue a 
monetary policy that is contractionary enough to ensure that it hits its inflation target. If the 
communication strategy of a central bank is good and if a central bank has a reputation for 
inflationary toughness, then failing to pursue its mandate to the letter in the face of a rare, 
large, easily observable event should not cause a serious problem.16 
                                                 
15 The classic theoretical reference is Rogoff (1985). 
16 In some countries legislators have put escape clauses into central bank legislation. In New Zealand, the 
government can override the Reserve Bank in “extraordinary” circumstances; in “extreme economic 
circumstances”, the UK Treasury is allowed to instruct the Bank of England for a limited time. These 
arrangements merely shift the time-inconsistency problem back to the government. A government that wants to 
intervene in normal times may have an incentive to define normal circumstances as extraordinary.  
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2.  A SHORT REVIEW OF THE EVOLUTION OF MONETARY STRATEGIES IN 
RECENT DECADES 
2.1 The discretionary paradigm of the post-WWII years: the Bretton 
Woods fixed exchange system, and its breakdown and the pros and cons of 
flexible exchange rates 
The 20th century is the period of the growing dominance of monetary arrangements by 
central banks. Much has changed from the time at the beginning of that century, when central 
banks of the leading nations followed the fixed rules of the gold standard, to the present day 
when they have discretionary and growing powers. These powers have been to good effect in 
bringing down and maintaining low inflation and helping to establish a period of sustained 
growth. With those powers, however, has come the possibility of doing much harm and 
matching the powers has been a drive for transparency of action and accountability. The 
present crisis may provide an assessment of the success of this balance. 
2.1.1. The Bretton Woods fixed exchange system and its breakdown 
The economic reconstruction of a world racked by war included the task of restoring the 
international payment system, which had broken down in the thirties after the general 
abandonment of the discipline of gold. The return to currency and trading blocks, with the 
consequent implosion of trade, was to be avoided at all costs. At Bretton Woods in 1944, a 
hybrid system was created that tried to combine the advantages of the gold standard while 
avoiding its defects. The aim was to restore full convertibility of the main currencies at fixed 
but (exceptionally) variable exchange rates. Competitive devaluations, the plague of the 
thirties would be ruled out, though parity changes would be permitted by agreement in the 
event of fundamental maladjustments. A supervising authority, the IMF, would supply 
interim funds to deficit countries while imposing plans to bring their balance of payments 
back to equilibrium. This meant that countries would never be forced to deflate. It also meant 
that there was less need to control trade to avoid large deficits in the foreign balance.   
The Bretton Woods system worked reasonably well until the first oil crisis of the 1970s, but 
there were earlier attempts to replace it17. There had been an early and failed attempt to make 
sterling fully convertible, principally because the exchange rate chosen overvalued the pound. 
But then, during the 1960s, the US Fed was allowed to act responsibly by the US Treasury: 
the Fed in fact kept the rules of the gold standard, as implied by the dollar being convertible 
into gold at $35 an ounce, even if the gold window was only open for other central banks.  
To behave responsibly meant choosing two elements of the so-called “Bretton Woods 
trilemma”. This trilemma expresses a fundamental restriction of international financial 
sovereignty: countries cannot at the same time maintain exchange rate stability, stay open 
financially and commercially, and exercise monetary independence. In the 1960s, as was just 
noted, the US Treasury followed an orthodox fiscal policy that allowed the Fed to limit 
money creation at a rate that did not undermine the exchanges.  
                                                 
17 In Europe, the Werner Committee was created in 1970 to replace the Bretton Woods system. 
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However, the escalation of Federal expenditure with the Viet Nam War and Johnson’s War 
on Poverty pushed the Treasury slowly to reduce financial openness, with the Interest 
Equalization Tax and other policies with effects analogous to capital controls. In 1971 Nixon 
was forced to close the gold window and allow the dollar to float. The UK soon followed suit 
and the whole edifice crashed beyond repair with the 1973 oil crisis.  
2.1.2. The pros and cons of flexible exchange rates 
As early as 1953, Milton Friedman published a paper calling for flexible exchange rates 
rather than fixed as obtained under the Bretton Woods system. This idea changed the 
panorama of macroeconomic policy completely. If exchange rates were freely determined by 
markets, there would be no need for controls to be imposed on exchanges, capital movements 
and trade for keeping the balance of payments in equilibrium. These ideas were slowly put 
into practice, especially after Margaret Thatcher lifted all exchange controls suddenly in the 
summer of 1979 and no catastrophe occurred.  
At present, the world economy functions based on floating exchanges and financial 
globalisation. This has the advantage of reducing the need for distorting Government 
interventions in capital and commercial movements but is proving to have some drawbacks.  
The first drawback is the temptation of “dirty floating”, of central banks intervening in 
exchange markets to keep the national currency undervalued, to make national products more 
competitive and follow a path of export-led growth. The trouble with this kind of policy, akin 
to those that led to the competitive devaluations of the thirties, is that it leads (a) to 
international friction, and (b) eventually to internal inflation: it is difficult to sterilise the 
reserves accumulated by a continuous payments surplus, so that in the end their counterpart 
increased the internal money supply. This is what was happening in China until the present 
world recession started to depress prices all round the world. Only a compensating outflow of 
capital investment of the kind witnessed in Japan could avoid domestic price rises as the 
equilibrating factor. 
The second drawback is that fast moving hot money can be destabilising, especially for small 
currency zones. Speculative capital can flow in overwhelming amounts when investments or 
interest rates look attractive. Then, if the macroeconomic situation changes, capital outflow 
leads to sharp currency depreciations. True, these depreciations may be a response to 
mistaken policies or defective institutions but they impose such sharp social costs that the 
political backlash can be destructive. The case of Iceland in 2007-8 is an example of such a 
process. That is why some small countries prefer to link their currencies to that of a large 
monetary zone by means of a currency board arrangement and carry out the fiscal and 
institutional reforms at a faster pace: this is what Lithuania has chosen to do. Other small 
countries simply choose to give up their national currencies and dollarise/eurorise, as Panama 
has done for the US dollar and Montenegro for the euro, or join the euro, as Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus have done. In sum, a monetary zone has to be of a minimum size 
and small zones are even more bound to apply orthodox fiscal and monetary policies: only 
thus can they hope to withstand the socially destabilising effects of transversal shocks and 
panicked withdrawal of foreign capital. The destabilising effects of monetary and exchange 
rate shocks should not lead one to forget the advantages of having different competing world 
currencies, with freely floating exchange rates: such a regime should allow the authorities 
governing a currency to avoid the unwanted repercussions of imprudent policies of the 
authorities of another. As Friedman put it in (1953), 
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“[A] system of flexible exchange rates eliminates the necessity for [a general] far-
reaching co-ordination of internal monetary and fiscal policy in order for any country 
separately to follow a stable internal monetary policy” (p. 199). 
A single world currency with no anchor would pose a high risk of inflationary abuse. 
Monetary competition, at least among large international currencies, is necessary to isolate 
one’s monetary authority from the imprudent behaviour of others. True again, the possibility 
of investing abroad inherent in a system of free capital movements does expose the financial 
system of one zone to the uncontrolled risks created in another, as we have seen during the 
present world crisis. This makes it more imperative that the central bank of each zone be in 
charge of regulating, supervising and settling financial operations in its backyard. 
2.2. Two successive policy consensus for managing purely fiduciary money 
systems: “monetary targeting” vs. “inflation targeting” 
2.2.1. The escape from discretionary policy-making since the 1970s 
The general implementation of discretionary economic policies in the developed countries 
after the Second World War ended in higher inflation and higher market volatility in the late 
1960s and finally in recession during the crisis of the early 1970s. After decades of a typical 
Keynesian economic policy mix, which comprised the design of discretionary active fiscal 
policy and government control on the money supply growth, the developed economies during 
the 1970s experienced both higher unemployment and higher inflation. This adverse policy 
outcome was a true challenge for the mainstream Keynesian theoretical models; by which 
inflation was either a cost- push phenomenon or just the result of an excess of aggregate 
demand in relation to the potential of the economy. Within this academic and policy 
framework, monetary policy, on the one hand, acted as a mere subsidiary political instrument 
designed to finance the desired fiscal policy; and the government, on the other hand, actively 
used discretional fiscal policy as if it were an effective tool to manage aggregate demand and, 
thus, employment and output. 
After the failure of this type of active discretionary strategies, policy-makers started to pay 
more attention to the new consensus in the academia. As mentioned in Chapter 1, a decade 
earlier economists such as Friedman or Phelps, among others, had criticised the basis of the 
traditional Phillips curve; thus denying the existence of a politically exploitable, or a 
sustainable relationship, between the rate of inflation and unemployment.18 Not only their 
academic findings, but most importantly, the empirical evidence of the disruptive effects 
from the implementation of unrestricted and countercyclical fiscal and monetary policies, 
supported a major revision of the policy goals and the policy strategy; and, finally, led to a 
true change in the policy paradigm. 
Regarding monetary policy, the result of this major change of paradigm, first in academia and 
then in politics, was the adoption of new rules to (1) restrict the scope and goals of monetary 
policy, and (2) give more autonomy and independence to central bankers. The aim was to 
prevent politicians from interfering in ordinary policy-making to avoid a short-run driven 
monetary policy and reinforce the commitment to a long-term goal.  
                                                 
18 Of course Bill Phillips (1958) never claimed that there was any such option when presented the curve 
originally. 
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In the following lines, we will discuss two of the most relevant practical attempts to conduct 
a non-discretional monetary policy19; which can be taken as the two alternative references for 
a rule-based monetary policy: the so called “monetary targeting” and “inflation targeting”. 
These two types of rules led to two successive policy consensuses for conducting non-
discretionary monetary policy in practice and, to some extent, still are competing references 
in academia.   
2.2.2. The rationale of “monetary targeting”: inflation/deflation as monetary 
phenomena in the medium term 
Following the classical monetarist tradition, M. Friedman (1956) developed a new 
explanation of the money demand function as part of the quantity equation. According to his 
restatement of the quantity theory, agents can allocate their total wealth to alternative assets 
(including, money, variable or constant return financial assets, real assets and human capital). 
Further and in view of the available empirical evidence, he underlined the stability of the 
desired money ratio to income, as mainly depending on individual preferences, habits and 
other institutional factors. For this reason, an increase of the supply of money alters the 
agent’s cash ratio above its desired ratio, thus triggering portfolio decisions to get rid of the 
excess of liquidity. In particular, because of the excess of money, agents will increase their 
demand for other real and financial assets, as well as their demand for final goods and 
services, until they reduce their liquidity to the desired ratio. As a result of those portfolio 
adjustments, the injection of more money will raise prices; which underlines the relation 
between the excess of money in the market and the expected upward change in the price 
level. 
Friedman’s restatement of the quantity theory formed the theoretical basis of a new monetary 
rule; one by which the control on money growth was considered as the best way to achieve 
price stability in the medium and long term. To do so, the central bank should (1) choose the 
monetary aggregate most correlated with inflation, and then (2) fix a money rate of growth 
according to the quantity equation: 
All variables expressed in rates of growth, the quantity equation states that: M+V=Π+Y. So, 
taking the estimated values for money income velocity (V) as stable, a true zero inflationist 
oriented policy (Π = 0) required liquidity (M) to grow at the same rate as the real output (Y) 
of the economy. The following of this simple and easy to interpret rationale produced a 
money growth rule compatible with price stability, commonly known as the “k% Friedman’s 
rule”. The practical proposal of a monetary rule thus defined required (1) a reliable relation 
between the selected monetary aggregate, as the intermediate target, and inflation, as the final 
policy target, and (2) a stable money demand function20, at least in the medium and long 
term. 
By adopting a credible and medium-term oriented strategy through espousing this type of 
rules goes some way to solve the time-inconsistency problem (Kydland and Prescott 1977, 
Barro and Gordon 1983), and provides a commitment to achieving price stability and 
avoiding active and frequent interventions in the markets.  
                                                 
19 Exchange rate targeting is another attempt to conduct a non-discretional policy; and it will be discussed in 
Chapter 4 within the description of alternative monetary strategies of several central banks. 
20 As stated by Friedman (1956, p. 16), the running of the quantity equation did not require V to be constant, but 
a stable money demand function. In fact, as Friedman and Schwartz (1963) showed, money velocity follows an 
expected stable decreasing pattern in normal times.  
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With these rules, the announcement of the central bank final inflation goal for a defined time 
horizon was followed by the communication of the money growth (intermediate) target 
needed to achieve the inflation target. As a result, and in the absence of exceptional factors 
affecting the economy, the central bank determined the money supply growth appropriate to 
fulfil its target for a defined time period (frequently a year); this in effect is a non-reactive 
rule. However, as we will see below, the adoption of this strategy did not totally tie the hands 
of the central bankers during that period, allowing for a certain, but limited, degree of 
flexibility. 
These monetary rules were implemented in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and the long 
experience of the Bundesbank is the most relevant, both because of its successful record of 
price stability for more than 20 years, and for its major influence on the decision of the 
monetary strategy initially adopted by the ECB in 1999. 
2.2.2.1. The Bundesbank “monetary targeting” experience from the 1970s 
In 1975 the Bundesbank adopted a target value for money growth as the intermediate target 
of a policy strategy committed to maintaining (domestic) price stability; as clearly mandated 
by its statutes. From 1979 to 1999, the strategy of the Bundesbank evolved to announcing a 
corridor for money growth compatible with its inflation target. First in the form of a narrow 
definition of money (M1) until 1987, and afterwards choosing a broader measure such as M3, 
the Bundesbank formally adopted an intermediate band target for money growth as an 
essential element of its monetary policy strategy. In doing so, the central bank not only 
published its intermediate and final targets, but also provided regular communication 
channels to explain the rationale of the strategy to the general public; which was a key 
element of its communication and transparency policy. In fact, with the regular 
announcement of the targets, the central bank was able (1) to explain the most important 
variables behind the calculation of the liquidity target, (2) to underline the relation of this 
intermediate target with the final target within a medium-term oriented policy and, so, (3) to 
enhance its commitment to achieve the inflation target. 
The announcement of an intermediate target band for money growth clearly evidenced the 
need to keep some flexibility in the running of this strategy. Given the uncertainty 
surrounding the forecasting of variables such as money velocity or output growth, even in the 
short term, conducting a credible “monetary targeting” strategy required the adoption of an 
intermediate band target; and not a single value. From 1979 to 1999, the width of the corridor 
for money growth conveyed the degree of uncertainty of the Bundesbank; which consisted of 
2 or 3 percentage points. Following this strategy, persistent deviations of money growth from 
the target band were taken as priority signals of medium-term price mismanagement; and, 
thus, deviations of money growth from the intermediate target were taken as the primary (but 
not the only one) information set used to correct in advance expected deviations from the 
inflation target. Occasional short-run deviations of liquidity from the announced band, if 
considered temporary, did not have to be followed by an automatic reaction of the 
Bundesbank.  
Meeting the money growth corridor was not a target per se, but a way to achieve the final 
price stability target. Accordingly, if unexpected events affected the economy, the 
Bundesbank could, and in fact did, conduct a monetary policy different from the one needed 
to achieve the intermediate target. As a result, the non-fulfilment of the announced band for 
money growth was tolerated when unexpected factors pushed inflation away from its target.  
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However, though permitted, the Bundesbank had to explain the exceptional reasons that 
caused the non-fulfilment of the band for liquidity growth, as well as the expected time 
required to return to the announced rule21. Otherwise, the constant appeal to extraordinary 
factors in the event of a persistent deviation from its intermediate target could soon be 
interpreted as an implicit discretionary policy; which would have resulted in the loss of 
credibility of the central bank and, thus, in the virtual ineffectiveness of the rule as a 
monetary anchor. In this sense, the central bank retained some room to depart from the 
announced rule, but it was not a free margin. 
Even though the Bundesbank achieved the final inflation target during this period, it only met 
the intermediate target 10-13 years out of 24. This means that, at least for 11 years, the bank 
conducted its price stability monetary policy but without following the prescriptions of 
money growth in relation to its target. According to Bofinger (2001, p. 298), the Bundesbank 
systematically chose too low money growth targets “to provide the central bank with a 
protective shield against political pressure. […] Monetary targeting can therefore be seen as 
an approach whereby a central bank can obtain additional independence from the politicians”. 
In the debate on “monetary targeting”, the explicit and primary role assigned to money 
growth, as a valuable and primary policy indicator, endows the central bank with a simple 
and clear rationale to make a more comprehensive analysis of inflationary pressures in the 
medium and long term. As recently seen, both in Europe and in the US since the 1990s, there 
has been a long period of low inflation and at the same time of systematic higher money 
growth. Even though not fully reflected in consumer inflation indices, the continuous 
injection of excessive liquidity has led to an increase of the demand of residential, real and 
financial assets, as well as that of final goods and services, that have finally deteriorated the 
purchasing power of the currencies on both sides of the Atlantic. And, in the absence of an 
intermediate reference such as money growth, the central banks of both economies did not 
have institutional elements that exerted enough pressure to change their policies, despite the 
continuous increase of liquidity every year. On the other side, this strategy is very much 
dependent on the stable relation between money growth and the measure of inflation; which 
is especially difficult to maintain in times of economic crisis, of financial innovation, or of 
institutional or political changes, such as the creation of a single currency for quite different 
countries. 
In sum, from 1975 to 1999, under a monetary rule, the Bundesbank achieved a successful 
record of low inflation, even avoiding the high inflation figures associated with the years of 
the “Great Inflation” of the 1970s. Rather than a fixed mechanism to conduct monetary 
policy, “monetary targeting” provided the policy framework to restrict the central bank’s 
policy and to underline its commitment to achieve price stability according to a pre-
announced strategy; in which the regular announcement and explanation of an intermediate 
money growth target was a key element. By doing so, in the face of unexpected events, the 
central bank did have certain, but limited, room to deviate from the announced intermediate 
target in order to achieve the final goal; being de facto a “flexible monetary targeting”, or 
what some economists have called a “pragmatic monetarism” (Issing 1997). 
                                                 
21 “Deviations of money growth from the targeted path always had to be justified. Even if it is true that the 
reputation of the Bundesbank ultimately was achieved by its success in fulfilling its mandate to safeguard the 
stability of its currency – its ultimate goal – current policy continuously had to be justified in the context of its 
pre-announced strategy. In this case, the strategy contributed to the transparency, the accountability, and the 
credibility of the Bundesbank’s policy.” Issing et al. (2005), p. 50-52. 
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2.2.2.2. The emergence of “inflation targeting” in the 1990s 
The collapse of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rates system after the so-called “oil crises” 
led to a floating system and higher rates of inflation in most developed economies. With 
some exceptions, in the 1980s the West European countries adopted the German Mark as a 
credible and effective anchor for achieving price stability under the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism. To do so, these countries pegged their currencies to the Deutschmark (DM), thus 
linking their monetary policies with that of the Bundesbank.  Between 1992 and 1993, the 
speculative attacks on several European currencies evidenced the fragility of the European 
Monetary System, which resulted in the exit of several currencies (among others, the UK's), 
the weakening of the ERM to permit 15% bands, and the need to adopt new monetary policy 
strategies. 
With the notable exception of Germany, after several monetarists attempts (see the US from 
1979 to 1981), most developed economies opted for a more transparent policy framework, 
different from both pegging the exchange rate or adopting intermediate monetary targets. As 
explained in detail in Chapter 4, since 1992 UK monetary policy has evolved towards a more 
transparent, independent and, finally, a rule-based monetary strategy. Though previously 
adopted by other economies, such as New Zealand (1989) and Canada (1991), the Bank of 
England was at that time the largest central bank to adopt an explicit “inflation targeting” 
strategy. Other economies adopted this strategy, such as Sweden and Finland in 1993, and 
many others afterwards. In this section, we describe the general outline of this new monetary 
policy rule, leaving the description of the country specific institutional settings and other 
policy details to Chapter 4. 
While there is no explicit definition of inflation targeting (see Svensson 1999, Bofinger 
2001), it is characterized by the following: 
(1) the central bank has a quantified target for inflation that is not easy to change; 
(2) it has the operational independence to achieve that target; 
(3) it is held accountable for its performance so it has a strong incentive to succeed. 
Most inflation-targeting central banks argue that for such a policy to be credible it has to be 
exercised in a manner that would readily show up deviations, i.e. policy should be 
‘transparent’. Success also relies upon people understanding the arguments behind policy – 
hence it is felt necessary to publish models, forecasts and analyses and hold press conferences 
and answer questions in public. 
A key element of this strategy is the regular announcement of the conditional inflation 
forecasts; which can be interpreted as a true leading indicator of policy changes in the 
medium term. In fact, if the central bank expects inflation to be above the numerical target, 
the rule prescribes a more restrictive policy in order to correct that deviation in advance. As a 
result, if the bank is credible, the public announcement of its forecasts normally reveals the 
most likely monetary policy path in the near future. Of course, inflation forecasts are 
conditional. They may assume unchanged interest rates, but these days it is more normal to 
set out a particular interest rate path implied by market expectations or a policy rule 
embedded in the central bank’s main model, given the estimates of the expected 
fundamentals of the economy. Hence, this rule allows for deviations from the previously 
announced forecasts when circumstances change and unexpected factors affect the economy. 
In some cases it may be necessary to deviate from the inflation target temporarily to avoid 
imposing too harsh adjustment costs on the economy.  
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As with the “monetary targeting” strategy, this deviation from the strategy should be 
exceptional and would require a detailed explanation to the public. Accordingly, even though 
it is a rule-based strategy, “inflation targeting” also provides some, limited, flexibility. 
While both types of rules stress the need for increasing transparency and the commitment to a 
low inflation final goal, the key difference between “inflation targeting” and “monetary 
targeting” mainly relies on the different mechanisms and procedures established to achieve 
the goal, and explain policy decisions. In the case of “monetary targeting”, inflation forecasts 
are fundamentally calculated according to the expected money growth, and the intermediate 
money growth target is set by applying the quantity equation. In the case of “inflation 
targeting”, there is no intermediate target, and the inflation forecasts are based, in principle, 
on an unrestricted and unlimited set of information including monetary aggregates. In fact, 
rather than being based on a particular model, “inflation targeting” is plainly compatible with 
adopting different types of models; or with the adoption of a comprehensive eclectic 
approach (Bofinger, 2001). 
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2.3. Central banks as lenders of last resort: the so-called ‘Greenspan put’ 
Once the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates broke down each of the founding 
members was able to have an independent monetary policy or so it seemed. In principle, a 
flexible exchange rate allowed the central bank of each monetary zone to create money and 
fix its bank rate as it saw fit, with the consequence that each zone had its own inflation rate. 
Flexible exchange rates made an independent monetary policy possible. 
This, however, slowly turned out to be an appearance. The free movement of capital that had 
made Bretton Woods unsustainable now limited the autonomy of monetary policies to mere 
appearance. ‘Hot money’ as it was called flowed at great speed from one monetary zone to 
the next equating real returns on Government bonds, given inflation expectations. In the long 
run, underneath the nominal interest rates of each zone were adjusted by the market so that 
real interest rates tended to converge; and the same could be said of nominal and real 
exchange rates. In fact it became clear that the level of those real rates was out of the hands of 
national monetary authorities. 
The convergence of these rates was speeded up under the influence of the monetary policy of 
the Fed, given the importance of the dollar as international money. If the Fed practised a 
lenient monetary policy, the increase in world liquidity impinged on all monetary zones, and 
influenced inflation rates and asset prices everywhere, whatever the different monetary 
authorities may have wanted. 
After the Volcker presidency of the Fed (1979-1987), when the great American inflation was 
beaten back by a very severe monetary policy, there came a period of thirty years when the 
main concern of monetary authorities round the world was to avoid recessions or get quickly 
out of them. The Friedman-Schwartz lesson had been learnt: by dint of a generous creation of 
money, nominal income and asset prices could be reset on a growth path despite temporary 
hiccups in the real cycle. Another way of saying this is that the function of lender of last 
resort of central banks, especially of the dollar central bank, was to guarantee that over the 
medium term nominal income and stock exchange indices would not be allowed to fall. 
This implicit promise of central banks was associated with the policy of Chairman 
Greenspan: the Fed was assumed to guarantee an upward path for nominal income and a floor 
to asset prices, so that a virtual ‘Greenspan put’ was believed to be in effect. 
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3. THE EURO AND THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM OF CENTRAL BANKS (ESCB) 
3.1. A new experiment 
The lines along which the European Monetary Union (EMU) and the euro were created were 
deeply influenced by the monetary arrangements in Germany after WWII. The menace of 
another hyperinflation along the lines of what happened after WWI was conjured by the 
Währungsreform enacted by Ludwig Erhard in 1948. This monetary reform was a central part 
of the freeing of the German economy that helped bring about the post-war ‘German 
miracle’. The new Deutschmark successfully replaced the discredited Reichsmark by freeing 
the new money from the exchange controls surrounding the old currency but at the same time 
entrusting its issue to an independent Bundesbank, whose remit was to control inflation. In 
this the Bundesbank was successful and over half a century the Deutschmark became a 
byword for monetary stability. 
When the moment came to establish a common currency for the European Union, the 
influence of the Bundesbank was paramount. The drive towards a European currency mainly 
originated in post-Gaullist France when the French political establishment wanted to free the 
country from the monetary discipline imposed by the founder of the Vth Republic. There was 
also a wish to avoid foreign exchange instability within Europe and towards the US, since 
sudden changes in the exchange rate were felt to be harmful for local industry. The 
Bundesbank however was reluctant to create a common currency without guarantees that it 
would not be a cause of continuous inflation. 
The first two attempts to set up a monetary union failed signally. One was the Werner plan of 
1970: it miscarried because of German insistence that monetary union be accompanied by 
well-defined institutional safeguards. The other was the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), 
established in 1979: the DM was the anchor currency and the effort to keep a weak currency 
within the defined band had to be financed by all members not only by the Bundesbank. First 
there was the resistance of the Banque de France to keep interest rates well above those of 
Germany, as it was felt that such high rates impaired growth. Then came the forced exit of 
sterling from the ERM: a general feeling that the British currency was overvalued came to a 
head when George Soros successfully shortened it and forced its exit from the ERM in 
September 1992.  
The third attempt however did end in the creation of the European Monetary Union (EMU) 
and the launch of the euro. The blueprint came from the Bundesbank and was adopted by the 
German Government, which presented it to other Union members: a single currency and 
central bank preceded by a concerted reduction in inflation rates and budget deficits, by the 
liberalisation of capital flows, accompanied by progress towards a political union. The latter 
fell by the roadside but convergence towards low inflation and balanced budgets was written 
into the Maastricht Treaty, signed in February 1992. Of course the Treaty contained many 
other points apart from monetary union (MU), where an effort was made to strengthen the 
Union as a counterweight to a united Germany. The date set for the launch of the MU was 1 
January 1999 but before that the Bundesbank and the German Government in 1997 obtained 
the signature of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) by all the European partners. This 
prolonged the need to abide by the essential conditions for monetary stability demanded for 
entry in the first place. Some of the Maastricht conditions were redundant after adoption of 
the euro, namely those of exchange rate and interest rate stability of the different currencies.  
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Those pertaining to budgetary discipline, however, were in danger of being relaxed once 
entry had been obtained, namely that national debt should not top 60% of GDP and that 
budget deficits should not be higher than 3% of GDP. The SGP set out a mechanism of 
review, warning and penalties that were felt to be excessive in later years, so that the Pact 
was diluted with in March 200522. 
The 2007-2009 financial and economic crises have in effect suspended the application of the 
SGP, as the Treasuries of the Member States have flown to the rescue of their banks, their 
large industrial companies and their property markets, despite the steep fall in tax revenues. 
The European Commission has reduced its efforts to trying to avoid the protectionist fall-out 
of national rescue measures – with what success is still to be seen.  
3.2. The evolution of ECB monetary policy: the two pillar strategy 
3.2.1. Political and economic restrictions in the early years 
The euro experiment is unprecedented in as far as it consists in the creation of a new currency 
by a method of social engineering. A number of conditions for the success of this project 
have been distilled from existing monetary theory and past experiments in monetary policy.  
• The experiment must last for a number of years and be seen to subsist under 
conditions of boom and slump. 
• The euro must be seen as a quality currency, in that it does not lose value over time, 
so that ordinary people as well as non-European central banks and national 
Treasuries are happy to use it as a store of value. 
• The fact that the euro zone is not a single economic zone, that employment, 
investment, and fiscal conditions are deeply different in the various parts of its area, 
must not be seen to impinge on the monetary policy of the ECB, which must show 
confidence that a spontaneous convergence will slowly erode local differences.  
• Markets must be convinced that the ECB is mainly concerned with the long run in 
its monetary policy and will not be tempted to curry favour by trying to use the euro 
to create jobs or foster growth by using short-term trade-offs. 
• The ECB must be seen as independent of all political authorities, be they European 
or of the Member States, so that its goal to keep inflation under control becomes 
credible. 
• The claim that the ECB is independent of European or local politics will not be 
believed if the budgets of the Union and the Member States are not balanced in the 
long run, for fear that public debt will be monetised, especially the implicit debt of 
unfunded social entitlements.  
These constraints govern the creation of general confidence in the quality and permanence of 
the new currency. They may explain some of the differences in strategy between the ECB and 
other central banks.  
                                                 
22 See Buiter (2006). 
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The ECB has shown itself less ready to move its official interest rates according to changing 
market conditions, more wary of full transparency for fear of nationalist backlash, more 
resistant to calls from the European Parliament to apply expansive policies in response to 
depressed local circumstances, more critical of budget deficits, than other central banks. The 
2007-2009 financial and economic crises will put its relative orthodoxy to the test. 
3.2.2. Statutory definition of a stable HICP as the primary target 
3.2.2.1. Definition of the primary mandate 
The tasks of the ESCB and the ECB were defined by its statutes in 1992, annexed to the 
Maastrich Treaty23. According to them, the primary objective of the ECB is to maintain price 
stability in the euro area: “In accordance with Article 160 (1) of this Treaty, the primary 
objective of the ESCB shall be to maintain price stability. Without prejudice of the objective 
of price stability, it shall support the general economic policies in the Community with a view 
to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Community as laid down in article 
2 of this Treaty”. This is an institutional mandate that clearly sets out the priorities of the 
single monetary policy, in terms of maintaining the domestic purchasing power of the euro. 
Within the legal definition of its tasks, there is a well defined hierarchy among the goals of 
monetary policy, and thus a single mandate. The mandate excludes the adoption of an 
exchange rate target (actually, see in Figure 1 the variability of the exchange rate vs. US 
dollar since 1999), and the implementation of monetary policy measures incompatible with 
maintaining price stability. Thus, unlike the statutes of the central bank of the US Federal 
Reserve, the statutes of the ECB provide a well defined and single mandate, easy to interpret 
and undoubtedly committed to maintain internal price stability. 
Figure 1: Euro exchange rate vs. US dollar 
 
Source: From the ECB website (monthly data). 
                                                 
23 See the Protocol of the Statutes of the European System of Central Banks and the European Central Bank 
(Official Journal of European Communities Nº. C 191/68). 
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The mandate of price stability thus defined is a strong legal restriction on monetary policy-
makers. It effectively limits the range of discretion of the policy-makers by setting the 
primary goal of the institution. However, the operational definition of price stability is not 
given in the statutes, nor is it set by any executive power (the latter being the case for the 
Bank of England). Nor does the definition of the primary target lay down the time horizon 
over which it must be achieved. In the euro area, the operational definition of the target, 
which includes not only the announcement of the inflation rate compatible with price 
stability, but also the variable used to measure it as well as the time horizon, has been 
determined by the Governing Council of the ECB24, the committee25 that conducts the single 
monetary policy in the euro area. Accordingly, even though restricted by its own statutes, the 
governing bodies of the ECB maintain a (limited) degree of goal independence; in the sense 
that its mandate needs to be made operational by the policy-maker and this exercise is 
compatible with pursuing several goals in the short run (Bofinger, 2001). Several months 
before the launching of the single monetary policy in January 1999, the ECB Governing 
Council defined its policy target and it was announced by the then President of the ECB, W. 
Duisenberg, as follows: 
"In the interest of transparency and in order to give clear guidance with regard to 
expectations regarding future price developments, the Governing Council of the ECB has 
agreed to announce a quantitative definition of price stability. In consequence, the 
Governing Council of the ECB has adopted the following definition: "Price stability shall 
be defined as a year-on-year increase in the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices 
(HICP) for the euro area of below 2%. Let me emphasize the fact that price stability is an 
objective which is to be maintained over the medium term"".26 
According to this definition of the target, highlighted by the President of the ECB during the 
above mentioned press conference:  
(1) inflation in the euro area is measured by calculating a single and harmonised 
consumer price index for all the area; which stressed the wish to conduct a single 
monetary policy according to the developments of the euro area as a whole; 
(2) the adoption of a medium-term time horizon also emphasised the need to 
conduct a forward-looking strategy, which avoids myopia in policy, fine tuning, 
and erratic, short run focussed, policies.  
Consequently, if transitory, short-run HICP inflation deviations for the 2% target are plainly 
compatible with a price stability oriented policy in the medium term and they are ignored27. 
 
                                                 
24 It is interesting that ECOFIN chose not to offer a view on what constituted price stability at early stage before 
the Governing Council came into being. 
25 The ECB Governing Council comprises the members of the ECB Executive Board (6, the President, the Vice 
president and four more members) and the governors of the euro area NCBs (16). After consulting the European 
Parliament, the members of the Executive Board are appointed by the Heads of State or governments of the euro 
area Member States for a (non-renewable) 8 years term. 
26 ECB Press Conference, October 13th 1998. 
27 See ECB (1999) for more details on the specification of the objective of the ECB. 
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Figure 2: The ECB policy task in terms of HICP 
 
Source: From the ECB website (Eurostat data). The blue line represents the average of euro 
area inflation since 1999, which has been above the ECB quantitative definition of price 
stability (below but close to 2%). 
There are other important questions regarding the definition of the target that need to be 
addressed. 
Firstly, the announcement of the quantitative definition of the primary objective was 
considered by the ECB as the best way to provide reliable and easy to interpret information to 
the market, so agents could form expectations and guide their decisions more efficiently. 
However, from the very beginning of the single policy, the ECB has stressed that the 
announcement of a target compatible with price stability should not be seen as implying an 
inflation targeting strategy; such as those of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand or the Bank of 
England. The mere adoption and announcement of a point or even an interval target is plainly 
compatible with conducting several strategies but is rather difficult to see how this differs 
from inflation targeting central banks with medium-term objectives. In fact, since the 1990s 
most central banks are committed to achieve a quantitative definition of price stability but 
they do not all follow a single strategy to achieve it. In this vein, there has been a growing 
consensus on the goals of monetary policy but the selection of the best operational strategy is 
still open to controversy and academic debate. 
The objective thus defined was viewed as an extension of the policies pursued by the euro 
area national central banks (NCBs) prior to 1999; and particularly as part of the successful 
price stability policy developed by the Bundesbank since the late 1970s. In this sense, 
especially in the early years, the ECB opted to continue the main elements of the 
Bundesbank’s strategy in order to reduce the uncertainty inevitably associated with the 
conduct of a single policy for different (eleven) economies. 
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Secondly, the primary objective is defined and measured in terms of a specific inflation rate, 
and not of a price level target. While having the advantage of being more predictable and 
easier to interpret and monitor, in case of a positive deviation from the target, the adoption of 
a price level target would require a policy reaction to bring back prices to the targeted level; 
in a world with nominal rigidities in the short run this implies output and unemployment 
costs.  
Finally, the ECB opted for the overall HICP, instead of a more restricted or core inflation 
index. On the one side, excluding unprocessed food and energy components from the index 
would result in a more consistent measure of the underlying inflation; which would be 
compatible with the notion of medium-term price stability adopted in the definition of the 
policy target. However, on the other side, aiming at core inflation implies that all non-core 
inflation components just fluctuate randomly, and thus disturbances revert to the mean; this 
assumption does not necessarily correspond with the empirical evidence. 
Some policy-watchers and academics interpreted the absence of a floor in the ECB definition 
of the target as a source of indeterminacy and as an asymmetrical target (Svensson, 1999). 
(Although this was soon clarified when the ECB President pointed out that the target was 
inflation giving an implicit lower limit of zero.) In particular, following the initial 
announcement of the quantitative definition of the objective, the ECB was criticised for not 
defining either a clear point target or a range target; this was interpreted as an incomplete 
definition of the policy target. As part of an overall evaluation of its strategy, in 2003 the 
Governing Council confirmed the initial objective as well as clarified it in the following way 
(Press Conference on 8 March): “"Price stability is defined as a year-on-year increase in the 
Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) for the euro area of below 2%. Price stability 
is to be maintained over the medium term." Today, the Governing Council confirmed this 
definition (which it announced in 1998). At the same time, the Governing Council agreed that 
in the pursuit of price stability it will aim to maintain inflation rates close to 2% over the 
medium term. This clarification underlines the ECB's commitment to provide a sufficient 
safety margin to guard against the risks of deflation. It also addresses the issue of the possible 
presence of a measurement bias in the HICP and the implications of inflation differentials 
within the euro area.” With this clarification of the objective, the ECB made a clear statement 
against inflation and even more against deflation by committing to achieve a positive (but 
low) rate of inflation which, after taking into account the estimated measurement bias of 
current CPIs, virtually means price stability. In fact, the positive target given for inflation is a 
bit higher than the conventional estimations of the measurement bias (around 1%), thus 
creating an additional margin to avoid deflation. 
3.2.2.2. A forward-looking strategy and objective 
The adoption of a medium-term horizon responds to the fact that inflation is a medium and 
long term monetary phenomenon; thus, central banks are able to affect the general price level 
over the medium and long term but with some delay. As summarised in Schwartz and 
Castañeda (2008): “There is therefore general agreement that monetary policy must not 
attempt instantly to correct all deviations of the general price level from target. The need to 
focus on the long term, and not to try discretionary micro-management of the economy, is 
reinforced by the existence of two kinds of lags. One is the transmission lag, whereby the 
open-market operations of the central bank to change the short-term interest rates in the 
money market take time to have an effect on the liquidity of the monetary economy. The 
other is the information lag, the limited information, even about the situation of the economy 
at the time, at the disposal of monetary authorities when decisions have to be made.  
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These transmission and information lags make it inevitable that central banks focus on the 
medium and the long term and implement a forward-looking oriented and gradual monetary 
policy”. 
However, despite several general statements made by the President of the ECB28, the 
announced medium-term time horizon has not been specified by the ECB. The selected 
horizon depends on the expected time needed to influence the targeted variables to achieve 
the final goal in response to a specific shock affecting the economy. In the event of a shock 
that drives inflation from target, the central bank should adopt the time horizon needed to 
allow for a gradual reverse of inflation to its pre-shock value without producing important 
costs and adjustments in terms of output losses. Since the selection of the horizon is affected 
by the above-mentioned transmission and information lags, its operational definition largely 
depends on the financial and economic conditions of the economy, as well as on the nature 
and the size of the shocks. However, the recognition of this fact does not justify any 
extension of the adjustment process; this could be interpreted as an implicit tactic to defer the 
adjustment process, thus resulting in a credibility problem for the central bank. Consequently, 
the central bank should also select the time horizon in line with the expected length of the 
shock affecting the policy goal. In the case of the euro area, the starting of a new currency 
area was considered a true structural change, and in the absence of reliable data on the euro 
area as a whole, the ECB was surrounded by a considerable degree of uncertainty (especially 
during its early years). For this reason, the governing bodies of the ECB opted not to tie their 
hands to a previously announced fixed horizon (see ECB 2003). According to the evidence 
for the euro area, and supported by available research (Angeloni et al., 2002, 2003) policy 
measures start to affect the targeted variables after 3 or 4 quarters. The peak effect takes place 
after 8-9 quarters and then decays gradually29. A true medium-term horizon should be 
consistent with those empirical results, which support the adoption of a more than two years 
time horizon for a smooth and gradual policy-making. However, we should treat this 
evidence with great caution. Since they are all the result of the available limited data and just 
approximations to the euro area monetary transmission mechanism models, we cannot 
assume the stability of the lags. 
3.2.3. Policy-making: Simultaneous evaluation of the two pillars 
3.2.3.1. Uncertainty as the determinant element in the early years 
The statutes of the ECB firmly guaranteed the operational independence of the new 
supranational institution, thus leaving its governing bodies the power to design the monetary 
policy strategy deemed necessary to achieve the given mandate. The strategy adopted by the 
ECB during the last quarter of 1998, applied as from January 1999, clearly reflected: (1) 
institutional constraints, such as the different political and economic traditions in a new 
currency area shared by eleven economies; and (2) uncertain expectations among the public 
as to the strategies and modes of operation of a brand new central bank.  
Especially during its early years, the ECB had to make policy decisions necessarily on the 
basis of limited knowledge on the functioning of the new monetary area and unavoidable lack 
of financial and economic data. The mere aggregation of the existing national models and 
indicators did not result in fully reliable representations of the new integrated currency area. 
                                                 
28 In the Monetary Dialogue between the European Parliament and the President of the ECB (March 2008), 
when questioned by a MEP (Mr. Purvis) on this issue, Mr. Trichet answered that “In the constituency of central 
banks we generally consider the medium term to be between 18 and 24 months”. 
29 In contrast to the effects on output, the effect of interest rates movements on prices is permanent. 
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The operation of a new currency, within a single monetary policy for all Member States, 
constituted a true structural change that could imply behavioural changes by market 
participants. As a result, past and national based macroeconomic models and indicators had 
to be interpreted with extreme caution. Consequently, the ECB did not have a reliable 
description or an approximation to the monetary transmission channels of the new area; and 
this factor was also determinant in the final adoption of its strategy. Also, the ECB lacked a 
policy record. In contrast to the US Fed, which had had a very good record of price stability 
since the end of the 1970s, a discretionary strategy was not a sensible option for the ECB, as 
it had to gain credibility by its own policy from the very beginning. To do so, it had to rely on 
its announced or “posted” strategy (Padoa-Schioppa, 2004) and on the successful record of 
price stability achieved by one of its main predecessors, the Bundesbank (Issing, et al. 2005). 
In order to reduce the high degree of uncertainty associated with the birth of the ECB and the 
new currency area, its governing bodies opted to gain credibility and reputation ex ante by 
adopting many of the main guidelines of the Bundesbank’s successful strategy. In any case, 
Germany was the biggest economy of the new area and had a major impact on the available 
data. 
As a result, the decision to follow the basic elements of the strategy of the Bundesbank has to 
be interpreted within that particular institutional and economic scenario, surrounded by more 
than usual limited knowledge, scarce information and thus a high degree of uncertainty; and 
not as a definitive option in favour of a particular type of strategy30. Moreover, from the very 
beginning, the ECB made clear that it was not following a single strategy, either the so called 
monetary targeting or alternatively inflation targeting, but a plural approach. By doing so, the 
ECB did not commit to follow a specific or restricted set of information a priori (money 
growth or inflation expectations, respectively) to guide its policy decisions. In its place, the 
ECB Governing Council (see ECB, 1999) designed a new “two pillars” strategy based on a 
multi-model approach and on more than any single set of decision-making indicators. The 
rejection of a single strategy to conduct the ECB’s monetary policy also responded to the 
heterogeneity of the financial conditions, economic backgrounds and economic policies 
pursued by the Member States prior to 1999. 
Another defining element of the ECB strategy since 1999 is the choice of conducting a 
relatively non-active monetary policy compared to most central banks of reference, thus 
having a conservative or non-reactive bias. Even though still an informal approximation to 
the degree of activism of the central banks, since 1999 the ECB has changed rates less 
frequently and in more modest steps (see Figure 3)31. However, this defining element of its 
strategy is not only the result of that initial environment, but also reflects the conduct of a true 
forward-looking policy committed to achieve a single objective; which excludes fine tuning 
polices, as well as reducing the need to frequently intervene in the money markets. In this 
regard, the recent experience of the ECB confirms that the selection of the policy strategy of 
a new institution should be a pragmatic decision made on the basis of the unavoidable 
restrictions that surround policy-making, and on the need to anchor inflation expectations on 
a long-term basis. However, it must also be admitted that two further factors favour relative 
inaction. The first is that with a very diverse set of economies there is more chance of 
variations offsetting each other and weaker common movement.  
                                                 
30 In fact, there was a high degree of controversy and debates within the members of the Eurosystem in relation 
to the selection of the ECB monetary strategy; between the ones that supported the adoption of a money 
targeting and those in favour of adopting inflation targeting. Thus, the strategy finally adopted can also be 
interpreted as a consensus between those two policy strategy alternatives. 
31 See ECB (2006) for a revision of the techniques used to assess the degree of activism of central banks. 
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Second, the Governing Council has opted to act by consensus and consensus building takes 
longer than acting by simple majority. 
 









99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
ECB rate (main refinancing operations)
 
 
3.2.3.2. “Monetary analysis” as a medium term indicator of inflation 
Money as the “first pillar” 
The elements of its strategy were first communicated in October 1998 within the 
announcement of the quantitative definition of the final objective, and explained in more 
detail in the ECB’s January 1999 Bulletin (see ECB 1999, p. 39-50). According to the literal 
description of the ECB, “Inflation is ultimately a monetary phenomenon. The Governing 
Council therefore recognised that giving money a prominent role in the Eurosystem’s strategy 
was important.” (p. 47). Accordingly, money was first considered a primary indicator in the 
design of a price stability oriented policy in the medium and long term. Even more, “To 
signal the prominent role it has assigned to money, the Governing Council has announced a 
quantitative reference value for money growth as one pillar of the overall stability-oriented 
strategy.” (p. 47). Following the details of the announcement of its strategy, the ECB 
announced (See Press Conference, 1 December 2008) the reference value for a broad money 
indicator as M3. 
The calculation of that value was based on the quantity theory (M V = P Y) and on medium-
term assumptions on output growth and money velocity (and the ECB continued to publish it 
once a year from 1999 to 2003): M being broad money growth, V money velocity, P prices 
and Y real income. After taking the logarithmic transformation, the quantity equation is 
equivalent to expressing all those variables in rates of growth (M3 stable prices = Trend GDP 
+ HICP target – Trend V).  
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The desired growth of broad money supply (thus, the reference value) is calculated by setting 
the target for inflation (HICP) below 2%, and adding the expected growth of the economy 
(around 2%) and the expected decline of money velocity (0.5 - 1%)32. 
Even though having given a prominent role to money, and assigned and published a reference 
value to M3 growth, the ECB made clear that it was not adopting a monetary targeting 
strategy. Thus, persistent deviations of money growth from the reference value would signal 
risks to price stability in the medium and long term, but it would not necessarily result in a 
mechanical policy correction. The reference value was not an intermediate target, nor did the 
ECB commit to any type of monetary targeting rule. On the other hand, the first pillar was 
not merely the analysis of a single money indicator such as M3, but involved the evaluation 
of other monetary aggregates and, most important, their financial counterparts. 
 
Figure 4: M3 moving average rate of growth, seasonally 
adjusted
 
Source: From the ECB website. 
The announcement of a reference value for M3 served as a way to communicate the risks to 
price stability in the medium and long term by using a single indicator, as well as providing 
an institutional framework to explain the rationale and the hypothesis used by the ECB in the 
design of medium-term and forward-looking oriented policy. In this sense, the prominent role 
of the first pillar was reflected in the importance given to money growth in the introductory 
statement to the press conference of the President of the ECB, following each Governing 
Council’s meeting. And moreover, the year on year publication of the reference value was 
also part of the communication policy of the ECB, and thus a channel to transmit the central 
bank’s output and inflation expectations to the market, which contributed to increase the 
transparency and credibility of the ECB’s initial strategy. 
                                                 
32 Following the calculation of the ECB (1999), M3 reference value = (below) 2% + 2% - (below 1%) ≈ 4.5%. 
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Money growth as part of the ECB “monetary analysis”: the revision of the strategy 
(May 2003) 
The strategy of central banks involves not only the procedures used to extract and process 
information in order to assess monetary policy, and finally produce and implement policy 
decisions, but also the central banks communication with market participants and to which 
extent they are open and accountable to Parliament33. In this sense, the strategy mirrors the 
central bank’s knowledge of the functioning of the economy, and reflects the set of 
information used to produce the policy outcome. The introduction of the euro area and the 
single monetary policy in 1999 reduced the (initial) degree of uncertainty, while providing 
both practical information and more accurate statistics to the policy-makers. The evaluation 
of the strategy of the central banks is always an ongoing process which is the result of a 
“learning by doing” dynamic. In the idiosyncratic case of the ECB, the need to evaluate its 
initial strategy, correct mistakes and extract policy lessons is even a more relevant exercise 
for a new institution such as the ECB. And that continuous evaluation is made not only 
externally by the ECB policy observers but internally by the staff of the Eurosystem. 
Since the very beginning, the calculation of the reference value for M3 was exposed to a high 
degree of uncertainty and error; the mere aggregation of national data could lead to statistical 
distortions, and there was a significant (and unexpected) increase of non-residents’ assets 
denominated in euros that altered the expected M3 growth (see Issing, 2008). In addition, 
since mid 2001, a much higher volatility in world financial markets had widely affected 
monetary variables in the euro area. Portfolios were adjusted to reallocate financial assets in 
favour of the more liquid. It resulted in a liquidity run that affected money measures such as 
M1, M2 and M3, which even (temporarily) eroded their role as medium and long-term 
indicators of price level changes. All these factors led to systematic deviations of M3 growth 
from the announced reference value34, which were judged to have no relation to the role of 
money growth as a leading indicator of the long term purchasing power of the currency. 
Accordingly, since the ECB monetary policy did not react to correct those deviations, it led to 
increasing difficulties in explaining policy decisions, and thus to a deterioration of its 
communication policy and credibility.  
In 2003, the increasing discrepancy of M3 relative to its reference value accelerated the 
announcement of the clarification of the ECB’s strategy, which was finally adopted in May. 
After more than four years of conducting the single monetary policy, that public revision 
reflected the deepening of the strategy, as well as the clarification of controversial elements. 
Firstly, viewed as a way to avoid misunderstandings and to make its communication policy 
clearer and more effective, since 2003 the ECB abandoned the announcement of the reference 
value for M3 growth. This policy change moved the ECB strategy away from the one of its 
predecessor (the Bundesbank), which made even more evident the non-adoption of a 
monetary targeting strategy. Secondly, the ECB stressed that first pillar involved much more 
than focus on the mere deviations of M3 growth in relation to the reference value, but a true 
monetary analysis of all monetary aggregates and their counterparts.  
                                                 
33 See the definition of this term in Angeloni et al. (2000, p. 4): “by strategy we mean the framework and the 
procedures that the central bank uses to translate relevant information into monetary policy decisions”. Padoa-
Schioppa’s definition stresses the non-mechanical process of policy-making (2004, p. 77): “Its role is to identify 
relevant information, help interpret it, and connect it with possible actions, but not to mechanically produce a 
decision.” 
34 As shown in Fisher et. al. (2008), even if considered the corrected measure of M3, which was calculated to 
eliminate the exogenous factors affecting broad money growth, the ECB still faced a significant deviation of the 
new corrected M3 growth from the reference value during 2002 and 2003.  
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Thirdly, the ECB changed the structure of the President’s introductory analysis given in the 
press conference held after the Governing Council meetings; and it also referred to the two 
pillars in a broader, more comprehensive sense. Since 8 May 2003, it starts with the analysis 
of the economic indicators (economic analysis) and it is followed by the monetary analysis. 
Either a mere clarification or a true change of the ECB strategy, those announcements were 
the result of the internal revision of its strategy, which at least had explicit effects in the ECB 
communication policy. Anyhow, the ECB emphasised its commitment to follow the strategy, 
by which inflation was explained according to two different sets of information and time 
perspectives: one that explains inflation as a medium and long term monetary phenomenon, 
that is the monetary analysis; and another that explains inflation in the short run as the result 
of “the interplay between demand and supply factors” (ECB, 2003, p. 87), that is the 
economic analysis. Especially since May 2003, the ECB made it clear that there is no 
hierarchy of pillars since the overall assessment of inflation is made by cross-checking both 
information sets. In the following section, we concentrate on this point with some detail.  
3.2.3.3. “Economic analysis” or the “second pillar”: inflation in the short term 
Even though a monetary phenomenon, in the short term inflation responds to quite diverse 
economic factors, such as changes in goods and services and labour markets. As stated above, 
interest rates affect money growth and hence inflation with a time lag, and this correlation is 
also exposed to temporary distortions that could make it less reliable as an effective policy 
guide. In consequence, we need to consider a wide set of indicators to complete the 
evaluation of inflation in the short to medium term. 
The adoption of this strategy permits the ECB to distinguish between two sets of indicators 
that affect inflation over two different time horizons: on the one hand, the ECB is able to 
identify variables that affect inflation in the very short run (energy prices, exchange rates, 
supply shocks…); and on the other, using monetary analysis, the ECB concentrates on the 
variables that determine inflation in the medium to long term. In practise, as part of the 
economic analysis, four times per year the Eurosystem staff (June and December) and the 
ECB staff (March and September) make and announce projections on inflation and the GDP; 
which are based on certain assumptions on the exchange rates and interest rates, and on euro 
area and multi-country macroeconomic models. In order to reflect the uncertainty associated 
with the projections, they are not presented as single values but as ranges; and, furthermore, 
that unavoidable high degree of uncertainty also explains why the ECB opted not to publish 
the projections within a “fan chart”. Following Issing (2008)’s argument: “The ECB decided 
not to use the ‘fan chart’ in order to avoid giving the impression that it had specific 
knowledge of the profile and distribution of forecast uncertainty” (p. 116). The projections as 
well as the information used for their calculation are one of the basic inputs evaluated by the 
members of the ECB Governing Council to make monetary decisions. 
Such an outcome is likely to be true of any central bank in a relatively large country where 
the decision-making is not dominated by an individual or close-knit group. Thus in Canada 
the policy board has clearly distinguished their own views from those of the ‘staff forecast’ 
and in Australia there has been no exclusive focus on a single model. 
However, in contrast to the role of inflation forecasts inside some inflation targeting 
strategies, these projections are not made by the Governing Council, nor imply any policy 
commitment. They are only part of the information used to produce interest rate decisions: 
Firstly, since the projections are always based on non-definitive and diverse and controversial 
models, as well as uncertain information, the outcomes of the projections must be filtered and 
evaluated by the judgement of the members of the Governing Council.  
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In fact, they do no have to share the same model or even approach to interpret the available 
information; which results in the practical evaluation of more than a single model during the 
meetings. Furthermore, even the so-called optimal policy decisions embody a degree of 
model uncertainty, which recommends the use of several models and indicators as inputs to 
produce forecasts. Secondly, by its own construction, the projections are short term biased, 
since they do not necessarily take into account monetary factors that affect inflation in longer 
time horizons. For these reasons, the members of the Governing Council make monetary 
policy as the result of an overall analysis of inflation; which is made by the process of “cross-
checking” of all the available information. By the cross-checking, the policy-maker is able to 
incorporate the monetary factors that explain the expected trend of inflation in order to focus 
on a true medium term oriented policy; which results in a forward-looking strategy. 
Within the second pillar, the set of real indicators evaluated by the ECB is not restricted a 
priori, and thus comprises all the information needed to assess expected inflation in the euro 
area in the short term. In this regard, the analysis of the output gap is an element of the 
economic analysis, but it is neither another target nor the policy variable used by the ECB to 
guide monetary policy decisions, even in the very short term. However, in recent years, under 
the so-called New Keynesian Models, this variable has received more attention in the 
academia as one of the inputs of the new (forward-looking) IS and Phillips curves (Clarida, 
Galí and Gertler, 1999). Following them, inflation is explained by a long-term component, 
inflation expectations, and a short-term one, the marginal cost of labour. Many modellers 
have chosen to try to represent marginal cost by the output gap. Thus, once expectations are 
set, inflation in the short run is driven by output gap changes. However, the role of the output 
gap is small in comparison and has been difficult to determine. According to this type of 
models, the (optimal) interest rate is entirely explained by real factors. In effect, those models 
prescribe changes in interest rates in order to minimise a loss function with respect to both 
inflation and the output gap, which is taken as a condition to maintain nominal interest rates 
in the path of the natural interest rate of the economy. 
As stressed by policy-makers (see King, 2005 for the Bank of England, and Issing, 2008 for 
the ECB), even though these models are useful for filtering and interpreting the available 
information, the practice of policy-making does not correspond to the so-called optimal 
approach associated with those models. Policy-makers do not adhere to a single model or a 
specific variable to make monetary policy. Furthermore, even if those models were adopted, 
the natural interest rate or the output gap are non-observable variables, difficult to estimate 
and subject to uncertainty; which makes them difficult to operate in practice. Any 
miscalculation of either variable could lead to significant policy mistakes. For this reason it is 
normally argued that policy-makers should concentrate on getting the direction of policy 
change right and not attempt to assess the size of any such gaps or deviations from natural 
rates (see Walsh, 2003, for example).35 As stated above, both assumptions do not correspond 
to the main elements of the ECB strategy. In consequence, the reaction functions coming 
from those models are not reliable representations of the practise of the ECB. 
                                                 
35 Walsh C, “Speed limit policies: the output gap and optimal monetary policies”, American Economic Review, 
vol 93(1), 2003, pp. 265-78. 
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3.2.4. Accountability and transparency 
3.2.4.1. Openess, credibility and legitimacy of a new institution  
According to Article 7 of its Statute, “In accordance with Article 108 of this Treaty, when 
exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred upon them by this 
Treaty and this Statute, neither the ECB, nor a national central bank, nor any member of their 
decision-making bodies shall seek or take instructions from Community institutions or 
bodies, from any government of a Member State or from any other body. The Community 
institutions and bodies and the governments of the Member States undertake to respect this 
principle and not to seek to influence the members of the decision-making bodies of the ECB 
or of the national central banks in the performance of their tasks”. In practice, this means full 
independence from both national and supranational political bodies regarding the conduct of 
its functions. This operational independence is reinforced by having its own budget, separated 
from that of the other European institutions, and fully financed by the operations of the ECB. 
As a result, the ECB is a separate policy agency that has legal independence and financial 
autonomy, which makes it truly operational independent. 
The ECB’s ultimate legitimacy derives from the EU Treaty and thus from the national 
parliaments of the Member States, and thus it should be seen as accountable to democratic 
institutions and to the general public. Again, the case of the ECB is exceptional; it is an 
independent institution in charge of monetary policy for a monetary area constituted of 
several sovereign countries. De facto, with the EU Treaty, the Heads of State and 
Governments created a new independent institution to conduct a single monetary area without 
a political union; for this reason, from its origin the ECB faced a problem of political 
legitimacy (see Buiter, 1999). As remarked in Chapter 1, transparency is not only a desirable 
democratic requisite but a crucial element for conducting an effective monetary policy. In 
principle, the commitment by the central bank to achieve its policy task is more credible the 
more information is given to economic actors about the policy-making-process. If credible, 
the central bank’s policy is more predictable, and it all results in a firm anchoring of the 
market expectations in line of the tasks of the central bank; which in the end strengthens the 
effectiveness of monetary policy. The benefits of transparency for policy making are very 
significant and especially visible in the event of a shock affecting the policy task: if 
considered temporary, a credible and transparent central bank has some flexibility whether to 
react or not to the shock without affecting the market long-term expectations. 
Accountability requires the regular explanation of the achievement of the tasks of the 
institution as well as of the ways used to achieve them (Buiter, 1999). So, accountability 
involves the evaluation of both the policy outcomes and the policy strategy followed to 
achieve the outcome. This broad definition of accountability allows the policy-watchers and 
the general public to know ex ante whether the central bank is adopting a strategy compatible 
with its announced target (see “ex ante accountability”, Bofinger, 2001, or “transparent 
procedures”, Buiter, 1999). A weaker definition of accountability is that made on the basis on 
the policy outcome or the policy record achieved ex post by the central bank, and not on the 
process adopted in each case (see “ex post accountability”, Bofinger 2001, or “transparent 
outcomes”, Buiter, 1999). Following the definition of De Haan et al. (2005, p. 109), the 
central bank is accountable when (1) it provides “the explicit definition and a ranking of 
objectives”, (2) it discloses “actual monetary policy” and (3) it assigns “final responsibility 
with respect to monetary policy”. We have already analysed above the targets of the ECB 
and, since the governing bodies of the ECB are fully independent in the conduct of monetary 
policy, the division of responsibilities is clearly stated in the Statutes.  
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Then, we will concentrate on the degree of openness of the ECB concerning the design and 
conduct of monetary policy. In particular, we address below whether the ECB (1) sets the 
basis of its expected policy path ex ante, and (2) explains ex post whether it followed the 
announced path or why it did not. 
3.2.4.2. Elements of transparency 
As required by its Statutes, the ECB must publish a weekly financial statement, quarterly 
reports on its activities and an annual report on the last and the current year’s activities. This 
has to be presented to the European Parliament, the European Commision, the EU Council 
and the European Council. In order to fulfil those legal requirements, the ECB publishes the 
annual report and the weekly financial statements and, in addition, the ECB provides regular 
information to the market through the following complementary channels: 
The ECB announces and explains monetary decisions just after the end of each meeting of 
the Governing Council. To do so, the President of the ECB makes an introductory statement 
to the press conference with a summary of the economic and monetary analyses. Afterwards, 
the President is also able to explain the details of the decision made by responding to the 
questions in the press conference; which is fully available live on the ECB website. However, 
unlike some other central banks, the ECB does not publish the minutes of the meeting nor the 
voting record of individual members. This is a quite controversial issue, since a transparent 
policy could arguably involve the publication of both. The institutional uniqueness of the 
ECB is again behind this decision. Every Member State has a vote in the Governing Council 
through the president of its NCB. However, countries may have different economic cycles or 
be suffering from specific shocks, and thus have different national “interests”. Since the 
Governing Council makes a single interest rate policy for the whole of the area, the members 
will all disregard such national concerns in making their decisions. Hence, the lack of 
transparency in not publishing the minutes and the voting record enables them to avoid 
national political pressures; and hence helps to preserve the independence of the Council 
members and their commitment to making monetary policy decisions on a supranational 
basis. 
The ECB publishes a Monthly Bulletin which includes analysis of the recent economic and 
monetary conditions in the euro area, as well as specialised research papers on specific 
questions related to monetary policy. With this regular publication, the ECB is able to explain 
the determinants of monetary policy and to provide technical information that promotes a 
better understanding of the models and factors taken into account in policy-making. 
The President of the ECB also attends quarterly hearings at the European Parliament36 
(Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, ECON), which constitutes the so-called 
“monetary dialogue with the ECB”. Every session starts with an introductory statement by 
the President of the ECB; this concentrates on explaining the policy decisions recently made 
by the central bank, and on expressing the views of the ECB on two pre-selected questions 
related to its tasks, which are supplied by the European Parliament. After that, the President 
answers the questions of the members of the Committee, who do not have the possibility of 
asking a supplementary question. With the hearings the members of the EP have a potential 
tool for asking the ECB why it did or did not achieve its policy target. However, this 
procedure is not as strong as the one of the Bank of England, since the ECB does not have the 
obligation to report to the Parliament if it misses the target (by more than 1 percentage point). 
The full transcript of the hearings is available at the ECB and the EP websites.  
                                                 
36 See Art. 113(3) Treaty establishing the European Community (consolidated version). 
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Even though not a fixed arrangement for all meetings, the hearings are preceded by a 
preparatory meeting between the members of the Committee and a panel of experts, who 
submit brief reports on the selected questions that will be addressed with the President of the 
ECB; which are also available at the European Parliament website. In principle, with these 
reports and the preparatory meeting, the information (and knowledge) gap between the 
ECON members and the President of the ECB is reduced, which may contribute to a more 
effective evaluation of the decisions made by the central bank. 
Finally, in relation to monetary policy strategy, the ECB rejected the adoption of a single 
policy rule such as inflation targeting or monetary targeting. As mentioned in previous 
sections, the governing bodies of the ECB chose a two pillar strategy based on a multi 
approach focus. The absence of a single hierarchy of procedures makes the ECB less 
accountable ex ante, since the central bank is not committed to achieve an intermediate target 
or to follow a particular forecast; so it does not provide the basic information needed to 
evaluate whether it is going to achieve the policy target or not.  As a result, it does not fully 
explain which is going to be its expected policy in the near future. Even though not an 
intermediate target, the abandonment of the publication of the reference value for M3 in 2003 
reduced that information, and thus also eroded its degree of ex ante accountability. 
However, even though the ECB has not communicated all the information needed to evaluate 
its effectiveness a priori, it regularly provides key information to the market participants and 
the general public through other mechanisms. Firstly, twice a year the ESCB and the ECB 
staff publish the inflation and output expectations for the euro area in a two years time 
horizon (“Eurosystem staff projections” and “ECB staff projections”) in the Monthly 
Bulletin. This results in quarterly forecasts with the summary of the projections on key 
variables for policy-making, which is part of the set of information evaluated by the members 
of the Governing Council. However, the publication is heavily truncated as it is by far the 
smallest report of any central bank that does publish it forecasts. Secondly, the ECB staff 
publishes extensive research on monetary policy issues; which includes the description of 
forecasting and modelling techniques that permits a better understanding on the functioning 
of the euro area economy and on the rationale used by the ECB staff to make its forecasts. 
Undoubtedly, this is not the single model of the economy, nor the model officially selected 
for policy-making, but only one of the different models used by the ECB staff to filter the 
available information and to make policy projections; which is one of the inputs of the second 
pillar and thus of the monetary policy outcome. 
3.2.5. Some remarks on supervision and regulation in EMU 
Regulation, supervision and inspection of the euro area financial institutions are 
competencies delegated to the national level; which are conducted by the NCBs or a separate 
body. On the supranational (“federal”) level, the ECB, in addition to the conduct of the single 
monetary policy, has to preserve the well-functioning of the European payment system and, if 
needed, provide extraordinary liquidity to financial institutions. Apart from the advisory 
functions set out in its Statutes, the ECB also promotes the cooperation37 of the national 
regulatory legislation by adopting common regulations and informal agreements better to 
react to a euro area crisis. This cooperation is currently conducted at the ESCB Banking 
Supervision Committee, the Economic and Financial Committee, the Financial Services 
Committee and the Committee of European Banking Supervisors.  
                                                 
37 See a more detailed explanation in Schwartz and Castañeda (2007). 
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As a result of this cooperation, the different actors involved in supervision and regulatory 
functions have recently signed the so-called Memorandum of Understanding, to ensure the 
transmission of timely information throughout EMU and effectively react to a crisis. 
Seeing the gravity of the recent financial crisis, this division of responsibilities in the euro 
area is currently under revision. First, the ECB though in charge of monetary policy and a 
Lender of Last Resort, has turned out not to have direct information on the balance sheets of 
the financial institutions of the Member States; though it has to rest content with information 
about the amount of liquidity and price of the bid of each single institution and hence market 
liquidity shortages (see Gonzalez-Páramo, 2009). Secondly, regulatory bodies (either the 
NCBs or separated agencies), which directly know the financial situation of member financial 
institutions cannot assist if needed. Simple coordinarion may not be enough to prevent early 
notice of a crisis and thus delay the required assistance. This is a very relevant, and disputed, 
policy question which has been subject to analysis with the creation of a High Level Group in 
November 2008. This Group, chaired by Jacques de Larosière, has already formulated policy 
recommendations on the division of competencies between the national and supranational 
levels38. 
 
                                                 
38 See the so-called de Larosière report. 
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4. THE STRATEGIES OF OTHER CENTRAL BANKS OF REFERENCE 
4.1. The Inflation Targeting Experience of New Zealand 
4.1.1. A brief history of the institutional arrangements for monetary policy in New 
Zealand 
Up until the election of the Labour Government in 1984 New Zealand had followed the 
policy of having a fixed but adjustable peg for the exchange rate. However, within a few days 
of taking office the new government opted for a freely floating arrangement, which has 
continued ever since. Initially, after the float, monetary policy was based on targeting narrow 
money but this not only did not succeed in holding inflation down but it resulted in 
considerable volatility in short-run markets. While policy evolved in the ensuing years it 
became clear that a different anchor was required.  
Two other main factors led to the adoption of inflation targeting. The Minister of Finance had 
made it clear that in his view the objective of monetary policy should be no inflation. At the 
same time the new government had also followed a policy of insisting that each public sector 
agency and government department should sign a contract with the relevant minister that laid 
out the objectives of the agency and how these were to be assessed. The turn of the Reserve 
Bank (RBNZ) came in 1988 although discussions had taken place earlier. The new ideas 
were incorporated in the Reserve Bank Act that came into force in 1989. The key provision 
of the Act is that ‘the primary function of the Bank is to formulate and implement monetary 
policy directed to the economic objective of achieving and maintaining stability in the 
general level of prices’. This is then to be made operational by a specific Policy Targets 
Agreement (PTA): ‘The Minister shall, before appointing, or reappointing, any person as 
Governor, fix, in agreement with that person, policy targets for the carrying out by the Bank 
of its primary function during that person’s term of office, or next term of office, as 
Governor’. (RBNZ Act). 
The Governor is personally responsible for ensuring that this agreement is adhered to and can 
be dismissed for failure to do so. Indeed it is a key feature of the arrangement that 
performance should be measurable and that there be a clear means of holding the Governor to 
account for his stewardship. The target is spelt out in the PTA, the first of which was signed 
in March 1990 – ‘the Reserve Bank should formulate and implement monetary policy with 
the intention of achieving price stability by the year ending December 1992. An annual 
inflation rate in the range of 0 to 2 per cent will be taken to represent the achievement of 
price stability’. The accountability is however in the Act itself: ‘The Bank shall deliver and 
publish a policy statement on or before the 1st day of October 1990 and thereafter at intervals 
not exceeding 6 months from the date of publication of each preceding statement. The policy 
statement shall be signed by the Governor and shall [s]pecify the policies and means by 
which the Bank intends to achieve the policy, [s]tate the reasons for adopting those policies 
and means: [c]ontain a statement of how the Bank proposes monetary policy might be 
formulated and implemented during the next 5 years: [c]ontain a review and assessment of 
the implementation by the Bank of monetary policy during the period to which the preceding 
policy statement relates.’ These statements are automatically referred to parliament. 
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The main points worthy of note in this formulation are: 
First that inflation targeting arose in this context of setting out objectives, not from an 
academic study of optimal monetary policy. Indeed it was not really until about 6 years later 
that inflation targeting achieved much serious academic focus, by which time it had been 
shown to work and had spread to some 8 countries (Haldane, 1995). At that stage the central 
banks involved had developed a clear exposition of the transmission mechanism.  
Second, from its outset, inflation targeting was forward-looking. As the initial PTA shows, 
the RBNZ had the task of lowering inflation to achieve price stability over a period of just 
less than three years. (In practice they achieved it a year early.) 
Third, price stability was defined as inflation in the CPI between 0 and 2% a year. This range 
was picked because the inflation bias from mismeasurement in the CPI was thought to be a 
little less than 1% a year and it was felt sensible to have a very simple definition. A 2 
percentage point band was thought to be the narrowest that had a credible chance of success. 
Fourth, it was felt necessary to introduce a range of caveats over events that might lead to 
short-run deviations from the target, for which the central bank could not be held responsible: 
major supply-side shocks, government policy changes, particularly in taxation and 
administered prices. 
Fifth, there were concerns about the measurement of the CPI, as it contained an element of 
house prices and the RBNZ was instructed to produce a comparable internationally verifiable 
index without such a weight. 
Sixth, the government had the right to override the agreement for a period of 12 months and 
substitute a different economic objective – a step that has never been taken. 
Lastly the requirement to produce regular reports that look forwards as well as back, which 
were interpreted as entailing the publication of forecasts, has transformed central banks from 
secretive institutions into ones that are now more open than much of the rest of the public 
sector. 
4.1.2. The development of the PTA 
There have been nine PTAs in nearly 20 years and only the seventh survived the full five 
years as neither the Governor nor the Minister of Finance changed. A new government was 
elected in November 2008 and so a ninth PTA was signed. Despite changes in governments 
the basic characteristics of the PTA have been unaltered. When the new National Party 
government took office in December 1990 the new PTA contained very much the same 
provisions but rather more straight-forwardly expressed. The most important distinction was 
that the RBNZ was to achieve ‘a stable general level of prices by the year ending December 
1993 and [maintain] price stability beyond that date’. Attaining a stable price level and 
inflation targeting were equated. Even though there is no provision for ‘error correction’ in 
the specification of inflation targeting it was assumed that over the longer term prices would 
indeed remain stable (after measurement error). 
There have however been some important steps in the evolution of the framework as time has 
gone past. In the early days there were no accurate estimates of how the transmission of 
monetary policy worked as the New Zealand economy had undergone a massive structural 
change in the decade following 1984, with widespread freeing up of markets (Bollard and 
Buckle, 1987).  
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The only reliable forecasts could be drawn about the impact of the exchange rate on inflation 
and even there the pass-through varied over the economic cycle. In that period therefore the 
exchange rate played the major role in policy making and consequently the policy horizon 
was around a year ahead as much of the exchange rate impact on inflation came through 
rapidly. 
The first step introduced by the Bank itself (Mayes and Riches, 1996) was to lengthen the 
horizon for policy and include other channels of the transmission mechanism more explicitly 
in policymaking.  
The second, in response to breaching the target range for the first time in 1995, was to focus 
future policy on returning to the middle of the range rather than simply remaining within it. 
Many subsequent inflation targeters have set up their framework with a point target around 
which inflation is permitted to vary, usually by a maximum of 1%. Nowadays, irrespective of 
whether the target is a point or a range, central banks aim for the middle of the range to give 
them greatest chance of having a successful policy. 
The third change, however, was external. In November 1996 the first election was held under 
proportional representation. Prior to that either Labour or National had been in power under 
the first past the post system and both parties had been firmly wedded to the Reserve Bank 
Act. In the 1996 election National, although the largest party did not win enough seats to 
govern on its own (no party has as yet won an election outright). In 1996 after eight weeks of 
bargaining they went into coalition with New Zealand First, a small party that was itself an 
interesting coalition of Maori and senior citizen interests. New Zealand First argued that the 
correct objective for monetary policy was not price stability but the inflation rates of New 
Zealand’s trading partners, so that competitiveness was maintained. The resulting 
compromise was an expansion of the target to 0 to 3% inflation. This broke the link with the 
objective of a stable price level. Thus the shift to a low inflation objective had nothing to do 
with any of the arguments about stabilising prices running too great a risk of deflation or 
being unduly costly because of nominal rigidities in the economy. Indeed such evidence as 
had been compiled by the Reserve Bank suggested that there was sufficient flexibility in the 
labour market that the existing target was not costly and that price setters too were prepared 
to adjust downwards as well as upwards in response to shocks, albeit not completely 
symmetrically. 
At the very same time the RBNZ started using its new model in producing the forecasts 
behind the December 1996 Monetary Policy Statement (Black et al, 1997). This set out all of 
the main transmission channels in what is these days the accepted framework, with a strong 
role for forward-looking expectations and with a policy reaction function built into the model 
so that a policy path and not just the current setting of policy was built into the forecast. 
Endogenous policy rules had first started being applied two years earlier when in late 1994 
the RBNZ realised that it would be forecasting a failure to keep inflation within the target 
range if it made a projection on the basis of constant policy. 
New Zealand has had more problems than some countries with the official definition of the 
CPI and its appropriateness as a target. After the initial problems with seeking a verifiable 
index excluding an excessive weight on house prices were resolved by a change in definition 
of the CPI, the PTA moved in 1997 to making the target CPIX, where the excluded portion 
was credit services. Since interest rates in effect entered the CPI, tightening policy would lead 
to an immediate increase in headline inflation. This and other experiments with using 
measures of underlying inflation to give a clearer explanation of the basis for policy have 
largely been abandoned as these measures do not resonate with the media nor the general 
public.  
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In the same way the attempt to include specific caveats under which temporary departures 
from the target would be allowed have increasingly been replaced with a more general 
phraseology. In the latest (2007) PTA this reads: ‘For a variety of reasons, the actual annual 
rate of CPI inflation will vary around the medium-term trend of inflation, which is the focus 
of the policy target. Amongst these reasons, there is a range of events whose impact would 
normally be temporary. Such events include, for example, shifts in the aggregate price level 
as a result of exceptional movements in the prices of commodities traded in world markets, 
changes in indirect taxes, significant government policy changes that directly affect prices, or 
a natural disaster affecting a major part of the economy. When disturbances of the kind arise, 
the Bank will respond consistent with meeting its medium-term target.’ 
There has thus been a considerable move away from a simple verifiable target. In many 
respects this reflects the increasing credibility of policy. When inflation targeting first started 
it took some time for inflation expectations for to fall in line with the target but these have not 
been shaken much by recent quite high inflation on the back of oil price rises. Initially any 
departure from the target was treated very seriously and in late 1994 when the RBNZ first 
forecast that inflation might go a few decimal points above 2% the Minister of Finance 
immediately called for a report on the governor’s performance. When inflation exceeded 3% 
in 2006 and again in the current year there has been no outcry as the excess was expected to 
be temporary.  
Changes have continued with successive PTAs. In 1999 there was an explicit emphasis that 
inflation targeting was to be ‘flexible’: ‘seek to avoid unnecessary instability in output, 
interest rates and the exchange rate’. The particular reasoning advanced by the Minister of 
Finance, Michael Cullen: ‘The renegotiation sought by the Government reflected a concern 
not to repeat the experience of the mid-1990s, when the export sector was placed under 
immense pressure by a sharp increase in the value of the dollar.’ is the subject of the next 
subsection. 
In 2002 the target was eased again, first by making it 1-3% instead of 0-3% and by making it 
explicitly a medium term concern. This was made clearer in 2007: the ‘policy target shall be 
to keep future CPI inflation outcomes between 1 per cent and 3 per cent on average over the 
medium term’. No definition of the medium term is offered. 
Before moving to the final issue of the exchange rate it is worth noting one other 
idiosyncratic feature of New Zealand monetary policy that reflected their philosophy of 
inflation targeting. Up until March 1999 the RBNZ did not set a short run interest rate. It 
stabilized the overnight market by fixing a cash ratio target and smoothing operations round 
this. In many respects this was a hangover from the previous regime of targeting narrow 
money aggregates. Its main policy instrument was what has been labeled ‘open mouth 
operations’. In its Monetary Policy Statements and policy decisions it would announce an 
interest rate for 3-month Treasury Bills that it considered consistent with maintaining price 
stability. This was of course dependent on the exchange rate also forecast over the period.  
Over time it became clear how much variation the RBNZ was prepared to accept round that 
interest rate for it still to be consistent with price stability. If the rate moved too far it would 
warn markets, threatening them with a change in the cash ratio if after a first warning market 
rates did not move. In practice these open mouth operations proved very effective and the 
RBNZ was able to go through much of the cycle without any need to adjust the cash ratio.  
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Figure 5 
 
Source: New Zealand Interest Rates, Current Account Balance and Exchange Rate  
Source: www.rbnz.govt.nz. 
However, it did prove very difficult to communicate the contingency of the interest rate 
setting on the exchange rate. For a period from 1995 the RBNZ experimented with a 
Monetary Conditions Index (MCI), where the weights reflected the approximate relative 
effects on inflation through the transmission mechanism. They explained to markets that in 
the absence of external shocks it was up to the market to choose what combination of the 
exchange rate and the 3-month interest rate it wanted within a fairly broad range that the 
RBNZ deemed consistent with future price stability at the time. Or put differently, that the 
RBNZ did not need to respond to what were pure portfolio shocks. In practice the market 
treated the MCI as a target and this increased volatility. The idea was therefore abandoned 
and with some reluctance the RBNZ moved to the traditional setting of an overnight cash rate 
OCR, thereby suppressing some of the market information it wanted to see.  
4.1.3. Controversy over the exchange rate 
The RBNZ has found it very difficult to bring down inflation in the period since inflation 
targeting started. As a result real interest rates have had to be high, with the consequence of 
driving up the real exchange rate at the same time. In part this is the result of New Zealand 
being a small very open market in a different hemisphere from the world’s main markets. As 
a result it is open to different shocks and its economic cycle can be out of phase with that in 
Europe or North America. The resultant pressures (see figures 5, 6 and 7) have been very 
difficult politically. On the first occasion in 1996-7 after a 25% increase in the real exchange 
rate over 3 years the government merely lent very heavily on the central bank, mainly in 
private, but with the real exchange rate rising again in 2004 the RBNZ requested and received 
an increase in the foreign exchange reserves so that it could intervene in the markets. The 
argument ran: ‘The amplitude of the New Zealand exchange rate cycle has long been a 
concern. The exchange rate varies across the cycle to a far greater extent than the underlying 
economic situation warrants. That is, the degree of exchange rate variation goes beyond that 
which is useful to the economy in terms of absorbing economic shocks and motivating 
business and household to adjust to lasting changes in New Zealand's external trading 
situation. Excess exchange rate variation makes engaging in business more difficult, reducing 
investment and thereby restricting the opportunities for New Zealand's growth.  
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Excessive exchange rate variability can also make the Bank's task of achieving and 
maintaining price stability more difficult, potentially leading to unnecessary output, inflation 











Source: New Zealand Interest Rates, Current Account Balance and Exchange Rate  
Source: www.rbnz.govt.nz. 
 
This move started with research and was followed by a conference in 2002 on ‘Exchange rate 
strategies for developed open economies in the new millennium’ and a second in 2006 
published as Testing stabilisation policy limits in a small open economy: proceedings from a 
macroeconomic policy forum. However, this was only part of the analysis as the 
investigations also considered reasons why such high interest rates were needed. In the event 
the exchange rate increase did not stop and by 2006 it was 40%.  
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This triggered an intervention but this had no longer term impact. It was only when the 
country started moving into recession and the extent of the financial crisis started becoming 
obvious that the exchange rate fell away. 
4.1.4. The relative success of New Zealand monetary arrangements and policy 
The best test of the New Zealand arrangements is that they have been widely copied and 
represent what is close to the state of the art as described in Woodford (2003). It is not simply 
the monetary policy that has been copied but the clear institutional framework, with the bank 
having a clear target, the instrument independence to achieve it, and established arrangements 
for accountability that entail substantial transparency, particularly about the future needs of 
policy. 
Other countries have been able to learn by New Zealand’s mistakes and to prepare properly 
for inflation targeting rather than learn by doing. Overall other countries have not gone for 
the personal responsibility of the governor but for decision making by committee. They have 
also avoided the stage of having a stricter and shorter run target. None has yet given up 
inflation targeting because it does not work. 
Nevertheless New Zealand has revealed starkly that there are severe problems for small open 
economies with idiosyncratic difficulties. With a flexible exchange rate fluctuations can be 
unpleasant. Its near neighbour Australia which was slower to adopt inflation targeting and has 
followed a medium term focus from the start has fared rather better. Thoughts of currency 
union have been dismissed but some route to more sustainable and faster growth is clearly 
desired. When New Zealand underwent its programme of radical reform in 1985-95 it was 
widely expected that it would be able to recapture much of its position as one of the more 
successful OECD countries. That has not happened. Could monetary policy have done more? 
4.1.5. Financial stability and financial supervision 
The RBNZ is also the financial supervisor in New Zealand of all sectors except securities 
markets. It has long been the supervisor of banks but only recently required responsibility for 
insurance and for other parts of the financial sector which until that time had remained 
largely unregulated. This shift to increased regulation reflects the failure of most finance 
companies during 2007 and 2008, not as part of the global financial difficulties but as a result 
of heavily concentrated lending, inadequate risk assessment and exposure to volatile sectors 
such as used-vehicle finance. The New Zealand economic cycle was in advance of the 
problems in the US and as the economy peaked so the risks were revealed. 
Financial supervision in New Zealand is unusual in a number of respects. First, since 1996 it 
has been based on a disclosure regime where banks are required to make quarterly public 
disclosures of major features of their income and expenditure and balance sheets such as peak 
exposures and concentration risk as well disclosing their methods of risk management. Bank 
directors are personally liable for these statements, which have to be produced by branches as 
well as subsidiaries. 
Along with Australia, New Zealand has been alone in the OECD in having no deposit 
insurance (until guarantees were issued during the global crisis). To counter this, the RBNZ 
has strong powers of intervention and resolution and would step into a failing bank as 
statutory manager, writing down all claims following a summary assessment so that the bank 
is effectively recapitalized and able to be open for business without a material break. The 
process is known as ‘bank creditor recapitalisation’. It has never been used in practice. 
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All New Zealand’s main banks are foreign (Australian) owned. As a result the RBNZ not 
only insists that all significant banks must only be subsidiaries and not branches but that they 
must be credibly able to operate on their own without parental or other support within a day 
of the failure of any system, including the parent. This results in a recognition of the 
problems of cross-border banks, which is without parallel in the OECD. Again it is untested. 
It is not applicable in the EU/EEA because of the passport principle and the inability of host 
country supervisors to deny entry to a foreign owned branch that is properly registered in its 
home country – despite any realistic fears they may have over the lack of ability of the home 
country to provide adequate support as illustrated by Iceland. 
4.2. The Swedish Krona and the Link with the Euro 
4.2.1. Twin Objectives, Controlling Inflation and Keeping the Krona in the EMS. 
Before the switch to inflation targeting, Swedish monetary policy in the late 1980s was 
directed towards reducing inflation and keeping a stable exchange rate. Sweden had followed 
the policy of having an exchange rate peg from the Bretton Woods days. On the break up of 
Bretton Woods it joined the ‘snake’ of European currencies in 1973 and on leaving in 1977 
established a peg against a trade-weighted basket with a 2.25% band of permitted fluctuation 
in line with the normal limits of the day. There were devaluations in 1981 and 1982 but 
thereafter the exchange rate remained fixed until a forced exit from the ERM of the EMS in 
1992. It is widely argued (see Jonung et al, 1996, for a summary) that the Swedish economy 
was following an increasingly unsustainable course. Progressive bouts of inflation had made 
Swedish industry increasingly uncompetitive but strong countercyclical policies meant that 
‘the public sector acted as employer of last resort’, and in each downturn public sector 
revenue had to rise to match it. After the last adjustment in 1982 it was arguable that this 
process could not be taken any further. 
The problems with the fixed exchange rate system began to emerge again around 1988 when 
the run-up to the Swedish financial crisis began to take shape. Assisted inter alia by financial 
deregulation the Swedish economy grew steadily during the mid-1980s but by the end of 
1986 pressures began to emerge. Inflation, which had fallen to 4%, began to rise and 
unemployment, which had been falling, passed below 2% in 1987. Interest rates did not really 
respond until into 1988 and it was only when the exchange rate started to be threatened in 
1990 that they moved sharply upwards. This in combination with fiscal measures started the 
economic slowdown. This continued into 1991, at which point, with the Soviet Union 
disintegrating, Sweden decided to apply for membership of the EU in December 1990 and in 
May the exchange rate peg was switched from the basket to the ECU as Sweden joined the 
ERM of the EMS. This process resulted in a fall in interest rates, and margins with respect to 
Germany fell.  
However, this was the point at which German interest rates began to rise as the country 
started to come to grips with the consequences of unification. Thus rather than helping turn 
Sweden round after a year of recession, monetary policy had to tighten. Finland made the 
problem worse by devaluing in November 1991, triggering fears of a matching devaluation in 
Sweden, which required a further increase in interest rates to offset. This sharp increase by 
600 basis points worked but there was only a limited opportunity to relax when speculation 
eased. The recession continued into 1992. This downward pressure was successful in 
reducing inflation, which reached 2%. With rapidly rising unemployment and a worsening 
public sector deficit the requirements for monetary policy were becoming clearly 
contradictory.  
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An easing was required for turning the economy round but concerns over sustainability 
putting pressure on the exchange rate argued for a tightening in order to remain within the 
ERM bounds. In September 1992 the Riksbank again tried the tactic of a sharp but it hoped 
short-lived increase in interest rates to induce confidence in the foreign exchange market. 
The need for interest rate rises proved far greater than anticipated. The Riksbank planned to 
increase short interest rates by 50%, i.e. from 16% to 24% in early September but instead 
found itself compelled to raise them to not by 75% for four days. The attempt to return to 
more normal rates failed and after 3 days the Riksbank raised interest rates to 500% on 16 
September and kept them there for 5 days. This unusual show of resolve was successful in the 
sense that the exchange rate peg held and the interest rate could be lowered to 50% and 
subsequently eased to more normal levels over the succeeding weeks. However, this did not 
last and in mid-November 1992 Sweden experienced a further run on the currency. This time 
the extraordinary interest rate defence was not repeated and the krona was floated on 19 
November. 
4.2.2. Inflation targeting 
Sweden’s adoption of inflation targeting followed simply from the abandoning of the 
exchange rate peg. Two months elapsed before the new policy was announced – of managing 
inflation during 1993 and 1994 such that an inflation target of 2% with a tolerance band of 
1% either side could be followed from the beginning of 1995 onwards, by which time the 
temporary inflationary effects of the enforced depreciation of the exchange rate would have 
worked their way through the economy. It is not immediately clear what governed the 
particular choice of target (Heikensten and Vredin, 1998) but this choice is similar to that 
made by Canada and the UK, similar to the implied target for the Bundesbank and also 
similar to the prevailing rate of ‘underlying inflation’ in Sweden at the time. Matching 
German inflation would make readoption of a fixed exchange rate plausible. However, the 
primacy of the fight against inflation in achieving employment and growth goals had already 
been enunciated by parliament in 1991. 
One interesting remark in Heikensten and Vredin (1998), given Sweden’s history of targeting 
the price level in the 1930s (Berg and Jonung, 1999), is ‘More knowledge is needed before it 
can be said whether an inflation target is preferable to a price level target’ (p.8). This view is 
repeated in Berg (2000). 
There was no strong consensus for pursuing a floating exchange rate regime in Sweden when 
inflation targeting started. With the economy very firmly in recession in 1993 policy makers 
faced the unusual circumstance that they could achieve price stability in the new regime 
while cutting interest rates. Bernanke et al. (1999) question the commitment of the political 
parties to the target and suggest that they may have been leaving themselves the option of a 
more expansionary policy if the economy did not turn round rapidly enough. At that stage the 
Riksbank was only partly independent and while it was the initiator of the policy the 
government would have had the opportunity to make a change. Independence came in 1999.  
In practice the Riksbank used the two transitional years to develop the approach to inflation 
targeting. Initially no forecasts were published. A document entitled ‘Inflation and Inflation 
Expectations’ was published three times a year, which began to include an increasing number 
of forward-looking indicators.  
IP/A/ECON/ST/2008-18 Page 45 of 123 PE 416.223
In practice, however, policy was forward-looking, and after the initial easing was completed 
it was the prospect of inflation that led to a tightening. Initially it was not clear what emphasis 
was given to measures of underlying inflation compared to the headline and a degree of 
ambiguity surrounded policy. This has been steadily dispelled as policy has developed 
leaving the Riksbank as one of the most transparent, a point we return to in the next section. 
A change in format was adopted in 1996 with the introduction of quarterly ‘Inflation Reports’ 
and a much more thorough analysis of prospects incorporating an explicit forecast of 
inflation. This pattern lasted until 1998 when the Riksbank introduced an (asymmetric) 
interval round its forecasts (fan chart) (based on a two-piece normal distribution) to give an 
idea of the probabilities of various inflation rates rather than a simple best guess (Blix and 
Sellin, 1998). The time horizon for policy had also become clearer, with the Riksbank 
looking 18-24 months ahead (Heikensten and Vredin, 1998) and following a policy of smooth 
reactions to shocks. Unlike New Zealand they were not so concerned with immediate 
breaches of the target band provided they could see inflation falling back within the band 
over the policy horizon. 
Somewhat in the pattern of the UK, the Riksbank developed inflation targeting substantially 
first and became independent in the modern terminology second, as incorporated in the 
Riksbank Act of 1998, which came into force in 1999. However, the change in the structure 
of the decision-making body and there responsibilities has made an important difference to 
the clarity and focus of policy communication. Previously the Governing Board of the 
Riksbank, which contained outside representatives including the chairman, was responsible 
for policy. With the new Act a six member Executive Board became responsible, with the 
Governor as Chairman. The members of the Board are explicitly not to seek or accept 
instructions in monetary policy matters, nor is any public authority permitted to issue 
instructions to the Riksbank in this regard. 




Figure 44. Repo rate assumptions
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4.2.3. Communication policy 
When the Riksbank switched to producing an Inflation Report in 1996 the Governor then 
wrote a signed comment at the beginning rather than the head of the Economics Department, 
changing the status of the document from a support for policy to a direct policy tool in its 
own right. This has been emphasized again with the change in title of the Inflation Report to 
Monetary Policy Report in 2007. These Monetary Policy Reports are produced in conjunction 
with alternate of the six regular meetings that the Executive Board holds on monetary policy 
each year. On the other three occasions an Update is now published. (The policy statement is 
now signed by the Executive Board as a group.) 
However, the granting of independence produced a clear change in behaviour that enhanced 
transparency in the interest of both accountability and the better communication of policy. 
The Riksbank now uses the Monetary Policy Reports as the regular written reports for 
parliament that have had to be delivered since 1988 and the governor appears before the 
Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance when these are considered. 
Minutes are now produced of the Executive Board’s policy-making meetings and they are 
published, initially with a lag of 6-8 weeks that has now shortened to 2 weeks. These minutes 
are necessary as each of the members of the Executive Board is individually responsible for 
their actions, rather than the Board acting as a single unit. The minutes are therefore detailed, 
setting out the presentations made by the staff to the Board, each member’s contribution to 
the discussion in the order they occurred, as well as the eventual decision, the votes and the 
nature of any disagreement that the dissentients had. It is difficult to conceive how any 
further useful information could be published, without diminishing the quality and clarity. 
The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) experience has already demonstrated that 
publishing an exact record can lead to the reading of prepared statements, an element of 
grandstanding and a rather weak debate. It also has the danger of pushing the real debate out 
of the decision-making meeting into less formal gatherings where no record is kept. 
The Monetary Policy Reports are firmly driven by a model based assessment of the needs of 
monetary policy. They follow a clear format on each occasion with a summary signed by the 
Executive Board, an analysis of the prospects for inflation, beginning with the fan chart 
summary, followed by an analysis of the risks and some alternative scenarios, and then an 
exposition of the current position (articles on related topics are usually included). The Report 
is thus based heavily on decision-making under uncertainty and gives outside decision-
makers not simply a clear view of the problems being faced but of the thinking that underlies 
the strategic response. As with the New Zealand projections, policy is endogenous and the 
leading fan chart sets out the prospective evolution of the policy interest rate on the basis of 
the current knowledge set out in the rest of the document. 
4.2.4. The success of Swedish monetary policy 
Like several other central banks the Riksbank not only has a regular assessment of the quality 
of its policy by parliament but it has commissioned and published an independent review of 
its policy in the period 1995-2005 by Francesco Giavazzi and Frederic Mishkin.39 This 
constitutes a very favourable assessment.  
                                                 
39 Available on the main webpage on Monetary Policy 
http://www.riksbank.com/templates/SectionStart.aspx?id=10602 
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While the Riksbank has been criticized for lowering interest rates too slowly when inflation 
targeting was introduced, the authors conclude that the pace was appropriate as it reflected 
the slow return of fiscal policy to sustainable prudence. In the last 2 years of the period 
assessed, the Riksbank simultaneously overestimated inflationary pressures while under-
estimating the rate of economic growth. If anything, this appeared to be because the Bank had 
not detected a structural change in the economy. However, other forecasters were no better at 
predicting this problem. 
The very favourable overall assessment was reflected in the fact that there were only nine 
recommendations, none of which were fundamental criticisms. The Riksbank has responded 
to these criticisms, which related inter alia to the need for greater clarity over the role of asset 
prices, flexibility and the future path for interest rates (the latter being covered by the switch 
to model rather than market-based projections). One structural problem the reviewers 
highlighted was that the Executive Board in the Riksbank plays two roles – as monetary 
policy decision-maker and as manager of the activities of the Bank. It questions whether 
some at least of the members ought to be spending the whole of their time on monetary 
policy. 
However, perhaps more relevant is a comparison of the success of Swedish monetary policy 
with that of the ECB. Sweden has chosen firmly to run an independent monetary policy and 
keep a floating exchange rate rather than join the euro area as it was obliged to do by the 
versions of the EU Treaty that have been in force since Sweden’s entry was negotiated. In a 
report commissioned by the government in 1996 before the euro area started the general 
conclusion was that there was little to lose by staying out until unemployment was reduced 
and the conditions for being able to respond to idiosyncratic shocks in a relatively costless 
manner were in place (Calmfors et al., 1997). (This contrasts with the report in Finland 
shortly afterwards that came to a similar relatively neutral assessment of the costs of 
membership but looked favourably on membership as a means of forcing flexibility and 
structural change – Pekkarinen et al, 1997.) 
The fact that Sweden later voted firmly not to join the euro area in a referendum in 2003 
emphasises that by that point there was no evidence from the early years of the euro area that 
macroeconomic outcomes would have been served better by such a change in monetary 
policy. Subsequently the Swedish record on inflation has been rather better than that of the 
ECB, if anything straying too much below the target band as mentioned above, and not more 
inflationary. Policy has not needed to be much more active and the Swedish economy has not 
been more volatile than those of its partners.  
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Note: ECU prior to 1999. 
 
It is only in the recent phases of the present financial turmoil that a distinction has emerged. 
With some of the larger Swedish banks under some strain, in part because they have been the 
major force in the financial development of the Baltic States, which have shown a dramatic 
slowdown, the exchange rate has rapidly depreciated against the euro following a steady 
performance over the previous 7 years (see Figure 10). While the Riksbank views such a 
depreciation as a normal problem faced by small countries in times of uncertainty, it went as 
far as increasing interest rates marginally at its September 2008 meeting (by the Governor’s 
casting vote) at a time when others have been reducing them. This decision was more than 
reversed at the October meeting when interest rates were reduced by 50 basis points in line 
with the ECB. Inside the euro area there would have been no such pressure. But it will take 
the passage of time to tell whether this short run impact in response to what for many 
countries is the biggest adverse financial shock in over 70 years is going to be reversed when 
the immediate general loss of confidence in the world diminishes or whether it reflects an 
underlying weakness in the monetary policy strategy compared with that of its immediate 
Nordic neighbour Finland which is in the euro area. 
4.2.5. Financial Supervision and Stability 
The Riksbank is not the financial supervisor in Sweden and was not the supervisor in the 
past. An integrated supervisor was formed in 1991, under the Ministry of Finance, bringing 
together the separate banking and insurance supervisors. This integration occurred shortly 
before the Swedish banking crisis broke and is a coincidental rather than a consequential 
move. Both the Riksbank and the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority were heavily 
involved in the resolution of the crisis.  
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The current Governor of the Riksbank, Stefan Ingves, then Deputy Governor in charge of 
financial stability, went on to the IMF where he was responsible for the work of trying to get 
stronger institutional frameworks in the member countries through the Financial Sector 
Assessment Programmes. These assessments, which began in 1999, form part of the 
Financial System Stability Assessments conducted by the IMF. This has enabled the Swedish 
experience in a substantial financial crisis to percolate through widely in the world.  
The association between the Riksbank and the supervisory authority is described as ‘close 
collaboration’ by the Riksbank. The new head of the supervisory authority, appointed in 
2008, is the former head of financial stability in the Riksbank. 
4.3. The Baltic Republics: Currency Boards and the exchange rate as a 
strategic goal40 
4.3.1. Adopting a Currency Board 
There is a tendency to lump the Baltic States together but it was Estonia that was the pioneer 
of the currency board arrangement soon after it became independent from the Soviet Union in 
1992 – choosing to peg to the Deutschmark – Lithuania followed in 1994, pegging initially to 
the US dollar, but Latvia pegs directly to a currency basket and has not followed the currency 
board route. However all of them have been characterised by a wish to have a very strong 
currency peg as the route to price stability. 
At the time Estonia opted for the currency board approach it was unusual, confined to a small 
number of countries in ex-colonial regimes, with Argentina being the main recent example 
(April 1991). The IMF initially opposed Estonia’s plans but have since changed their mind 
and supported currency boards in other similar circumstances where there was little monetary 
credibility and the need for a new currency in an open economy. 
After 16 years it is difficult to understand how Estonia was able to cope on regaining its 
independence in 1992 as it, along with the other Baltic States, had been an integral part of the 
Soviet Union for nearly 50 years since the end of the War. It had no central bank (although 
the buildings still existed from before the War), the currency in circulation, the rouble, was 
rapidly becoming worthless, much of the economy was involved in uncompetitive 
production, dependent on other Soviet markets, that had been cut off.  
Fortunately, the economic independence of Estonia and the other Baltic States from the 
Soviet Union was presaged in the Gorbachev era, with active planning beginning in 1987, the 
Law on Economic Independence being passed in November 1989 and the Bank of Estonia 
being formed on 1 January 1990. A three-person Monetary Reform Committee was set up in 
March 1991 (composed of the Prime Minister, the Governor of the Central Bank and an 
expert), independence came in August and the currency board was implemented in June 
1992. Lithuania took longer to introduce a currency board and experienced a longer period of 
high inflation as a result. Furthermore when the board was introduced the peg was to the US 
dollar not the DM. The argument behind this was that most of Lithuania’s trade was 
denominated in dollars (particularly any exports from its oil refinery, situated at the end of 
the pipeline from Russia). Some of this dollar focus may have been illusory (Alonso-Gamo et 
al., 2002). As soon as membership in the EU euro area became a proximate possibility 
Lithuania switched the peg to the euro (February 2002) in a move announced well in 
advanced.  
                                                 
40 This section focuses mainly on Estonia. 
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Latvia also switched its peg to the euro on 1 January 2005 prior to joining ERM2 on 2 May. 
It operates with 2.25% round the central parity, making it similar to most fixed exchange rate 
regimes although not as tightly bound as that of Denmark to the euro. 
In both the Estonian and Lithuanian cases the exchange rate which was picked reflected a 
round number choice at the prevailing rate. However, these rates themselves reflected that 
great difficulties facing the countries at the time, with a shortage of foreign exchange, so in 
terms of purchasing power parity (PPP) these rates were clearly low. This therefore set up the 
prospect for considerable real appreciation as the situation normalised and exporting 
activities picked up. As discussed later, the level of the exchange rate picked initially may 
have important consequences for the process of convergence. A low rate may offer an 
advantage in terms of price competitiveness in the early stages. However, it is unlikely to be 
price that is holding back exports but simply the ability to produce items that are competitive 
in quality and style. Large swathes of production that may have been successful in the Soviet 
Union would have been unsaleable in open competition. Once production got underway the 
low valuation would imply the opportunity for considerable inflation without harming 
competitiveness. Added to more rapid productivity growth than in Western Europe, in itself 
permitting rapid inflation without loss of competitiveness, this lays the ground for 
persistently higher inflation over an extended period, without even the need to resort to the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect to explain it. Given that the Masstricht criteria for membership of 
the euro area focus only on nominal criteria this prima facie builds up a problem. 
With a floating exchange rate some of the adjustment can come through a nominal 
appreciation, which may make joining ERM2 rather easier. Hence as discussed below in the 
case of the Czech Republic, there may be a case for a multistage strategy: adopting a hard peg 
initially until inflation is brought down, then following inflation targeting to stand a better 
chance of controlling inflation and finally entering ERM2 for the final two years when 
convergence seems well set. Estonia joined ERM2 at the first real opportunity (28 June 2004) 
following membership of the EU on 1 May 2004. 
4.3.2. Experience with Currency Boards 
A currency board is no panacea, and if it is to work well it needs to be accompanied by the 
policies that are associated with all successful monetary policies, such as the rule of law, 
good institutions, a prudent fiscal policy, political stability and a flexible economy. In many 
respects it has been the focus on these facets that has characterised the Estonian regime and 
indeed its success. Fiscal responsibility has been high on the list, with an avoidance of debt 
and seeking to ensure that the public sector is not in deficit each year. Even in the current 
extremely difficult economic circumstances this has been maintained.  
Prima facie having a currency board (like any fixed exchange rate regime) puts much more 
emphasis on fiscal policy, as monetary policy cannot respond to any idiosyncratic shocks. 
Hence having a fiscal policy that does not have a strong countercyclical element to it 
(through automatic stabilisers) puts the onus firmly on the private sector. Comparisons with 
the euro area countries suggest that Estonia is more flexible in setting prices (Mayes, 2009). 
Not only are prices changed more frequently and are more related to competitive pressures 
rather than generalised rules, but firms are more ready to reduce prices, leading to less 
asymmetry across the cycle than in many other countries. A similar flexibility lies in the 
labour market, not simply in terms of hiring or firing but in the ability to reduce labour costs 
even to the extent of being able to reduce nominal wage rates in some circumstances. 
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The nature of household behaviour has also helped. Consumption has been less volatile than 
income, particularly in the period of rapid increase in income in the last five years. The same 
is true of the gearing up of bank lending and household indebtedness. The economies began 
with little bank lending and with little use of housing as collateral. Not surprisingly house 
prices have risen rapidly but, even if house prices fall substantially, the extent of negative 
equity is likely to be limited. In part this is due to prudent lending by the banks, in part due to 
the caution of borrowers following the difficult early years of independence, rather than 
simply to the regulatory system. 
There have been two strong tests of the currency board approach. The first was the Russian 
crisis and default of 1998 and the second is the present financial turmoil. Clearly in the 
second case we do not as yet know the full outcome. In the first case, however, the Baltic 
States came through remarkably well. The effect depended on the strength of their links with 
the Russian economy. Of the three Baltic States, Estonia had the most limited links. Inflation 
fell steadily from a peak of around 80% per month when the currency board was being 
introduced to 80% for the year in 1993, falling below 10% at the time of the Russian crisis 
and continuing to fall through into 1999 since when it has stabilised at around 4% a year. The 
process of convergence of GDP per head stalled for a year in 1999 but otherwise it continued 
each year. The shock was thus weathered with little difficulty. 
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While it is true that having a currency board makes it difficult to offer any lender of last 
resort facilities unless there are excess reserves, it is not clear how important a problem this is 
in countries with almost no domestically owned banks. The Baltic States still retain 
noticeable exposure to Russia, particularly through energy prices and so in current 
circumstances they are more vulnerable than many of the other new Member States. 
Nevertheless, the extent of their considerable current account deficits has until recently been 
little cause of concern. In Estonia, for example, where the deficit exceeded 10% of GDP 
before the current crisis, it has now fallen back to a very low level, once the profits of the 
banks are subtracted. In the past these profits have been reinvested so while they represent the 
major element in the deficit they have not represented a challenge to the currency board. In 
Latvia the Bank of Latvia expects the 2008 current account deficit to be halved in 2009 on 
the back of the recession, but the fiscal effect is substantial and the fiscal deficit will hence 
breach the Maastricht criterion for a while. 
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However, in the fight to re-establish confidence, it would be an unusual government that did 
not try to exude enthusiasm that the shock will be short-lived and that a sustainable 
convergence path will be regained with in a year or two. 
4.3.3. Joining the Euro Area 
In the early and mid-1990s the concern of the Baltic States was simply to stabilise the price 
level and recover from the major dislocation of the early post-Soviet years. The currency 
boards were not seen as an explicit long-term strategy. Indeed in the case of Lithuania it 
actually had an exit strategy planned, which was then not implemented in the aftermath of the 
Russian crisis. 
However, as the currency boards continued to be successful and the prospect of EU and then 
euro area membership came closer, it looked plausible to go straight from the currency board 
to the euro. (It was not clear immediately that it would be necessary for currency board 
countries to go through ERM2, at least technically, and hence the speed of entry could have 
been expected to be more rapid.) As it has turned out, however, entry has not proved as easy 
as many expected, none of the Baltic States has as yet joined – Lithuania failed to meet just 
the inflation criterion by 0.2 percentage points in 2006 and its inflation path was judged 
unsustainable– and the currency board in Estonia has now lasted more than sixteen years. 
Estonia also meets all of the criteria for membership save inflation. It is difficult to date the 
onset of firm credibility for the Estonian regime but using interest rates as a guide (see Figure 
12), they had fallen below 5% by the time of EU membership in 2004. Since Estonia has no 
longer-term government debt (see Figure 13) it is only possible to look at commercial lending 
rates. Figure 13 also shows that Estonia has met the Maastricht fiscal criteria from the outset, 
with a slight blip in the deficit over 3% in the aftermath of the Russian crisis in 1999. 
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The problem is general to the new Member States. There is a strong correlation between 
income level and price level (Figure 14), which on the whole is maintained in changes over 
time (Figure 15). There is just one obvious exception, Slovenia, where real convergence has 
been achieved without price convergence because the principal aim of monetary policy was 
to stabilise the real exchange rate. (If anything the inflation targeting countries, especially the 
Czech Republic have shown a faster convergence in price levels relative to income 
convergence but this is only a visual observation not a statistically testable hypothesis.) 
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If Estonia had been assessed for membership of the euro area on the day it joined the EU, it 
would have met the criterion but this has not happened since. Indeed the irony is that if the 
current downturn turns out to be really bad in the Baltic States, then they might meet the 
criteria soon. Clearly it makes no sense to fabricate convergence, either by having a bout of 
sustained inflation or deliberate recession. Hence we can expect that meeting the criteria as 
they are currently interpreted will take some time while real convergence continues. Since 
there is no means of telling where that process may end as it can be above or below the 
average income per head of the other Member States, it does not make any sense to have a 
time bound strategy for membership, even though for all three countries the answer is ‘as 
soon as possible’, as it is always possible that some asymmetric shock might lead the 
currency board or the exchange rate peg to collapse, whereas this is not possible inside EMU. 
Latvia is currently experiencing the greatest problems among the three countries. The Bank 
of Latvia is currently forecasting a fall in GDP of around 4% in 2009 and the country has had 
to seek an IMF loan. The major difficulty is that unlike the other two countries Latvia retains 
a significant domestically owned bank, Parex, in which it had to take a majority share on 9 
November 2008. With foreign-owned banks, depositors can benefit from the guarantees that 
have been issued by the governments in the parent countries.41 Without the IMF and 
acceptance of State responsibility for the bank it was impossible for the Latvian authorities to 
offer an equally reassuring guarantee so the bank lost deposits. However, it is not clear that 
there is any problem for monetary policy. Foreign exchange reserves are 130% of base 
money. 
                                                 
41 Although technically deposit insurance from the parent country only applies to depositors in foreign braches 
within the EU/EEA a guarantee of the parent with effectively apply to the whole group, whether it operates 
abroad through branches or subsidiaries. Reputation risk would make it very unlikely that a solvent parent 
would allow a subsidiary to fail. 
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4.3.4. Financial stability and supervision 
Initially the Bank of Estonia was also responsible for financial supervision. With a very small 
banking sector and a general lack of expertise this made sense. Along with many other 
transition economies Estonia experienced the collapse of many of the initial locally 
capitalised banks that set up and the country has ended up with a banking system that is 
almost totally foreign-owned with most of the parent banks being headquartered in Sweden. 
Banking supervision was split off from the Bank of Estonia in 2002, including the 
construction of some physical barriers between the Bank and the supervisory agency in the 
Bank. However the two organisations remain very close and the supervisory agency is an 
agency of the Bank of Estonia. At the same time the agency acquired responsibility for 
insurance and securities markets, which had previously been dealt with separately. 
This style of arrangement probably gets the best of both worlds. Supervision is unified in a 
single agency with an independent mandate but the links with the central bank remain strong 
and there is administrative cooperation that reduces the costs, somewhat along the lines of the 
relationship between the Bank of Finland and the new unified supervisory agency. The link 
with Finland is more than just geographical proximity and linguistic affinity. Finland’s 
largest bank Nordea has a branch in Estonia that has 10% of the market, making it of 
systemic importance. While under EU rules this branch could be supervised directly from 
Finland the Finnish authorities decided to operate supervision after Estonia’s membership of 
the EU with the Estonian supervisor acting as an agent, thus providing a closer relationship 
between supervisors than exists for some other cross-border banks in the EU. 
4.4. Changing monetary regimes in the Czech Republic 
4.4.1. Lessons from the dissolution of the Czechoslovak Monetary Union 
The delimitation of monetary areas is usually determined by political not economic 
circumstances and the division of Czechoslovakia is no exception. Thus, it is a little difficult 
to set out exactly what natural experiment we are able to observe. We can focus on three 
main issues.  
The first is an illustration of how a monetary union can be dissolved in a smooth and 
relatively costless manner. Any monetary union tries to make exit to a different regime look 
highly unlikely as otherwise that would damage its own credibility and make that exit more 
likely. One of the easiest ways to do that is to make the change appear extremely expensive in 
advance so that markets would consider that it would have to be unbelievably harsh 
circumstances that would prompt such a decision. However, at the time, given the decision, 
imposing any such costs would make a difficult situation even worse, especially since it is 
likely that it is the country/region in most difficulty that has to take the decision. It is 
relatively rare for the strong to leave as they can normally dominate the policy, although if 
they are small as in the case of Singapore, it may make sense.42 Nevertheless there are clear 
examples in the structure of the Czech and Slovak economies on exit from the CMEA43 
regime that make the choice of separate currencies a reasonable proposition on economic 
grounds. The existence of separate administrations also made it technically rather more 
straightforward then it would be if none of the apparatus of separate government existed. 
                                                 
42 Singapore was small compared to Malaysia but financially much stronger so it made sense for it to opt for 
separation. 
43 Comecon or Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. 
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The second issue, therefore, is to consider the trajectory of monetary policy after separation. 
To what extent did the choice of policy reflect the particular circumstances? It would not be 
very productive to ask what would have happened if the monetary union had continued, since 
this is unlikely to be productive as the political tensions that led to the separation would not 
have disappeared, with no way to know the effect this might have had on the subsequent path 
of economic development.  
What we can do, however, is to notice that the path to joining EMU has been different. 
Slovakia has become the most recent member of the euro area, while the Czech Republic is 
still some years away from achieving nominal convergence. If you had asked people to bet on 
which of the two countries would join EMU first at the time of separation, it is probable that 
the bulk of bets would have been on the Czech Republic rather than on Slovakia. The former 
was more advanced with GDP per capita about 20% higher while the latter had more CMEA-
related industry that would need to be unwound. 
We therefore deal with monetary policy in the transition in the next section while considering 
convergence to EMU in the third. The remainder of the present section deals with the 
separation itself. 
The Czech and Slovak Republics were separated on 1 January 1993. The process had been 
quite rapid during the previous year after a debate about whether the two entities should 
move closer together or further apart. The ‘velvet revolution’ approach of November 1989, 
when the communist government lost power without bloodshed, was applied on this occasion 
as well with national assets being split on a 2 to 1 basis reflecting population. The new 
currency for Slovakia came on 8 February, with the overstamping of the existing joint 
banknotes pending a new issue of both notes and coin during the year. A similar process 
occurred in the Czech Republic. 
4.4.2. Inflation Targeting Strategy 
After separation the Czech Republic followed a similar policy of exchange rate targeting, 
initially using a basket of five currencies (reduced eventually to just the US dollar and the 
Deutschmark), assisted by an M2 target and the objective of reducing inflation steadily. Up 
until 1996 there was no great problem from having multiple targets as the stable exchange 
rate target clearly predominated and it was initially possible to operate with a narrow band of 
+/- 0.5%. The M2 target tended to be exceeded and inflation remained. However, it became 
clear that something more effective in achieving price stability was required as capital 
inflows increased during 1995. The exchange rate target then began to rise and another 
nominal anchor was required – the exchange rate band widened to +/- 7.5% in February 
1996. The Czech National Bank (CNB) therefore prepared very thoroughly for making a 
transition, focusing on inflation targeting as the obvious alternative for a small open 
economy. There was an exchange rate crisis in May 1997, when the koruna had to be 
devalued by 10%. Added to this, regulated prices began to increase rapidly as part of a 
concerted move to market levels. 
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Figure 16: Nominal Exchange Rate Index 
 
 
Source: Coats et al. (2004) 
 
Figure 17: CPI-Based Measures of Inflation 
 
Source: Coats et al. (2004) 
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At the time of implementation, full inflation targeting was largely limited to a group of 
relatively small developed economies. None of the other central and eastern European 
economies had made the decision to adopt inflation targeting and the other economies that 
were not so developed – Chile and Israel in particular – were still moving towards price 
stability and had not completed the process. There was thus therefore no helpful pool of 
empirical evidence that such a move would have a strong chance of success. The CNB’s 
cautious approach in planning the process out carefully had merit and was a plan that others 
have since emulated. The CNB has gone from being a recipient of advice to a major provider 
of advice to aspiring inflation targeters round the world. 
The switch to inflation targeting at the beginning of 1998 (announced the month before) was 
explained as adopting a more effective means not a change in target. The CNB has opted for 
a straightforward structure for inflation targeting. It has a purely internal decision-making 
body composed of the Governor, two Vice-Governors and four Chief Executive Directors, 
formally appointed by the President of the Republic for six-year terms. The objective of price 
stability is laid down in the Bank Law with support from the constitution. Independence both 
for the Bank itself and the Board members individually in the exercise of their task is 
carefully established. This has been challenged and in 2000 a law was passed requiring the 
Bank to consult with the government of the setting of inflation and exchange rate targets. 
However, this was ruled unconstitutional and the Bank’s independent standing was reinforced 
in 2002. 
The initial target was to reduce inflation, starting with a range of 5.5-6.5% for the end of the 
first year with a medium-term target of 3.5-5.5% by the end of 2000. However in mid-1999 
the horizon was extended with an objective for price stability of inflation between 1% and 
3% a year set for the end of 2005. This gave a mid-point of 2% roughly in line with the 
Eurosystem target. (The CNB writes about both ranges and mid points +/- 1% but the official 
descriptions refer to a target with a tolerance range.) The CNB assumed that membership of 
the EU would occur some time between 2003 and 2005 and hence a reduction in inflation of 
0.5% a year would result in convergence round about the correct time. In line with many 
other transition economies the initial target was in terms of a core concept, labelled ‘net 
inflation’ so that special factors resulting from the need to bring some areas of regulated 
prices into the market system did not affect the overall target. By 2001, when these factors 
had abated, the target was changed to headline inflation, with a consequential change in the 
range to 2-4% to allow for the difference in forecast inflation between the two concepts. (1-
3% has since been reinstated (in March 2007) as the target for the years from the end of 2009 
onwards but this time for the headline.) 
In deciding on their definition of price stability in mid-1999 the CNB deliberately set aside 
the argument that the fact that their price level was 45% of that prevailing in the EU entailed 
a faster rate of inflation to be built in. They argued ‘the problem of price levels is a derived 
one. Relative productivity growth is the determining and primary factor for narrowing the gap 
in price levels. Processes at the microeconomic and institutional level generate this. 
Macroeconomic policy cannot set itself the goal of achieving price level convergence. The 
important thing is to create an environment and introduce mechanisms that will lead to an 
acceleration of productivity growth; this is exactly what the strategy of price and monetary 
stability is aimed at and contributes to.’ Real exchange rate appreciation was therefore 
expected with only a small measure of that occurring through differences in the rate of 
inflation (the Czech headline CPI and the HICP definition for the euro area are similar).  
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In March 2007, the Czech Republic accepted that early membership of the euro area was 
unlikely. The inflation target (beginning in 2010) was reduced to approximately the same 
level as the euro area (2% with a tolerance band of 1% above and below) on the grounds that 
the special factors that related to a transition economy would have largely disappeared by 
then. The March 2007 changes also represent the adoption of the leading edge approaches of 
the Nordic inflation targeting central banks with a forecast driven path for the policy interest 
rate being announced (as discussed in section 4.2). 
The experience under inflation targeting has not been smooth, as one might expect for a very 
open and rapidly growing economy. However, unlike the bulk of inflation targeting countries 
the problem for the CNB has been undershooting the target (Smidkova, 2008). For the 
majority of the period since inflation targeting started inflation has been below the band and 
never above it. Indeed until 2005-7 actual inflation was below the target range about twice as 
often as it was in it. It appears that it is downward shocks that are the major contributor, 
followed by a tendency to overforecast inflation. Policy-makers on the other hand appear to 
have taken decisions that were largely in line with the forecasts and the prevailing 
understanding of how the economy worked. There is some indication of asymmetry in policy 
in the early years with a more aggressive response to the threat of inflation above target than 
to the threat of inflation below it. However, such an approach is common where the 
authorities have not as yet succeeded in bringing inflation expectations firmly down to the 
target range. The forecasting process evolved. Up until 2001 forecasting was largely based on 
a series of small models and projections built up by sector experts. Between 2002 and 2004 
the forecasts were more driven by a core model, augmented by expert analysis, particularly 
for the short term outlook, and from 2005 on the augmented model with risk analysis. The 
sources of undershooting are therefore also evolving but it is clear that in the most recent 
period, the process of risk analysis appears to have lessened the errors and decision-making 
in itself has improved on the model-based forecasts. 
As a transition country the Czech Republic faced extreme problems of lack of useful data and 
the absence of any ready ability to estimate how the economy behaved. It therefore adopted a 
carefully organised modelling approach that explicitly allowed for transition. It was initially 
based on a fairly straightforward ‘gap’ approach with only a few equations but has grown in 
complexity so that it now has reached stage of a modern estimated dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium (DSGE) model. The CNB has been particularly adept in developing 
software. It has also developed a careful communications strategy, setting out its forecasting 
and policy analysis system (Coats et al., 2005). The CNB experience is thus very instructive 
for three main reasons. It shows that such targeting can be adequate even with limited 
information. It shows that a transition economy can operate successfully with low levels of 
inflation despite a large price level gap. It shows that extensive learning is possible. 
Nevertheless, the success of policy or rather the extent of undershooting was such as to push 
the limits of political tolerance in 2000, showing that unless the constitutional position of the 
central bank is sufficiently well enshrined it would be easy for adverse circumstances and the 
inherent inaccuracy of the process to derail the acceptability of policy aimed at price stability. 
However, such an experience is not simply a feature of inflation targeting it applies to any 
monetary policy. The key difference is that with a hard exchange rate peg the political cost to 
changing the system seems much higher. With inflation targeting, small changes can be made 
to the target that do not appear particularly costly at the time. Unlike New Zealand where the 
target, having been achieved, has been ratcheted up, in the Czech Republic the target has 
been slowly lowered to the Eurosystem (and New Zealand) level. 
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4.4.3. The Debate about Joining EMU 
The Czech Republic prepared a careful assessment of an appropriate strategy for joining the 
euro in the form of a joint document by the government and the CNB in mid-2003. (Since the 
Czech Republic has no derogation, it is a matter of how and when, not whether.) Unlike the 
Baltic States, Slovenia, Slovakia, Malta and Cyprus, who planned to enter EMU and hence 
ERM2 as soon as possible on entry to the EU, the Czech Republic judged that 2009-10 would 
provide a suitable entry date and that it would join ERM2 for the minimum time necessary 
(two years before the assessment) as the flexibility of the exchange rate formed an integral 
part of the inflation targeting strategy – tending to show a slow nominal appreciation. Halting 
this might harm price stability. 
Figure 18: The CZK/euro exchange rate in recent years 
 
 
Source: Smidkova (2008) 
 
The main reason for the measured approach was not due to problems of monetary policy, 
however, but simply that the budget deficit exceeded the permitted criterion, and would take 
a number of years to bring firmly into line. Furthermore, the labour market exhibited a 
number of rigidities and in the absence of reform the authorities were worried that the loss of 
the interest rate and exchange rate mechanisms for adjustment might result in large real 
effects in the event of an idiosyncratic shock. The authorities agreed that they would make an 
annual assessment of progress and whether to enter ERM2 and the 2-3 year run up to entry of 
the euro area. 
As the time for entering ERM2 in line with the 2009-10 deadline approached in 2007 it was 
clear that a reappraisal was necessary, partly because of adverse shocks to the budget but also 
because of inflation shocks both from energy prices and an increase in indirect taxes. This 
took the form of a second joint statement by the government and the CNB in August 2007.44  
                                                 
44 Available at http://www.cnb.cz/m2export/sites/www.cnb.cz/en/monetary_policy/strategic_documents/ 
download/eurostrategy_070829.pdf  
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The idea of a target date was abandoned although it was noted that the other Member States 
who were following a more measured trajectory were talking in terms of 2012-14. The Czech 
Republic’s own fiscal policy consolidation was aiming at a 1% deficit to GDP ratio in 2012, 
implying that same sort of horizon when taken in conjunction with the programme to increase 
flexibility in the labour market and remove administrative barriers. However, the fiscal 
programme was expected to go further than required for meeting the Maastricht deficit 
criterion and was being pursued on its own merits. 
It is noticeable that the joint assessment reads much more like an appraisal of the normal sort 
of optimal currency area (OCA) criteria than a simple assessment of compliance with the 
Maastricht criteria. In terms of trade, for example, the Czech Republic is more integrated 
with the euro area than are many of the existing members. Meeting the Maastricht criteria 
would involve simply reducing the government deficit as the other criteria were normally met 
each year (without the exchange rate constraint). Thus implicitly there was a weighting of 
relative costs and benefits from membership and not just a simple quantitative convergence 
criterion. Indeed the report makes it clear that the annual assessments could not be that 
simple.45 
The report also noted the major difference in nominal price and wage levels (wages were 
around a third of euro area levels). After euro membership convergence would need to come 
through increases in nominal wages rather than nominal appreciation, although this does not 
necessarily imply inflation if such increases are matched by relative productivity 
improvements. It is noticeable in the first report that the authorities recognised that 
discrepancies in price levels of as much as 30% could occur between monetary union 
members for extended periods. This therefore gives indications of two factors that 
differentiate the Czech Republic from some other new Member States. First, that inflation 
convergence was not the problem it was in the exchange rate targeting/currency board 
countries; and second, that nominal convergence was not expected within a foreseeable 
horizon. Real convergence has progressed well and Czech GDP/head is 70% of the euro area 
average in PPP terms, above that of Portugal. ERM2 membership remains something that is 
simply necessary for joining the euro area and not something desired on its own merits. 
                                                 
45 http://www.cnb.cz/m2export/sites/www.cnb.cz/en/monetary_policy/strategic_documents/download/ 
maastricht_assessment_2007.pdf 
IP/A/ECON/ST/2008-18 Page 63 of 123 PE 416.223
 
Figure 19: Percentage growth in real GDP in the Czech Republic compared with the 
euro area (12 countries) 
 
 
Source: Smidkova (2008) 
 
4.4.4. Financial stability 
In the course of its short history, the Czech National Bank has been deeply involved in the 
supervision and reorganisation of the financial system. Not only is the CNB the supervisor 
but many of the banks have got into difficulty and indeed failed. As a result, there is 
substantial foreign ownership of the Czech banking system as there was a lack of domestic 
funds to buy up the assets even at discounted prices. Having foreign-owned banks has not of 
itself solved the problem. The CNB’s takeover of Investicni a Postovni Banka (IPB), at one 
time the third largest Czech bank, in June 2000 has proved very controversial. Nomura had 
bought nearly a 40% holding in the bank from the Czech government and subsequently 
increased its shareholding to 46%. On investigation the CNB found that the bank was holding 
far less than the required capital and when the owners did not replenish it they stepped in, 
triggering a string of claims and prosecutions. 
The CNB has deliberately separated its financial stability and financial supervisory functions 
although the information flow remains. This enables stability to be treated as an economy 
wide issue rather than simply be built up from aggregating the experience with the individual 
banks. Thus stability is associated with the Economic Research Department on a par with its 
work on the real and monetary economies. This enables it to have a direct interaction with the 
modelling experts in the Bank. 
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4.5. China’s Monetary Policy46 
4.5.1. Introduction 
In this section, we analyze monetary policy in the largest emerging economy, China. Chinese 
economic reforms commenced thirty years ago, also embracing the financial sector. In the 
following, we describe the objectives of Chinese monetary policy and the framework within 
which it operates. The focus of our descriptive analysis is on the 1990s and the current 
decade. As China is undergoing a transition from a command towards a market economy, 
quantity-based instruments are still prominent in its monetary policy framework. Important 
role in policy is occupied by money supply – as opposed to interest rates in advanced 
economies. This is reflected both in the intermediate objectives and policy implementation by 
the People’s Bank of China (PBoC). We analyze how successful the People’s Bank has been 
in attaining its goals. Moreover, we look at the issue of Chinese exchange rate regime and 
discuss some of the issues arising from the chosen regime. Finally, we discuss recent inflation 
developments that illustrate how both the implementation of monetary policy and structural 
factors have been responsible for the movements in consumer prices.  
4.5.2. China’s monetary policy framework 
Before the start of economic reforms in 1978, macroeconomic policy-making rested solely in 
the hands of the State Council, China’s cabinet. While a monobanking system had been 
previously in place, the State Council decided in September 1983 that the People’s Bank of 
China should assume the functions of a central bank. The central bank status was confirmed 
legally by the Third Plenum of the Eighth National People’s Congress in March 1995.  
The PBoC’s official objective is to “maintain the stability of the value of the currency and 
thereby promote economic growth”. Importantly, China’s central bank is not an independent 
monetary authority. The PBoC implements monetary policy under the leadership of the State 
Council. This probably partly explains the fact that in addition to the target of price stability 
(internal value of the currency), the promotion of economic growth is explicitly mentioned in 
the central bank’s objective. As growth and a favourable employment situation are of primary 
concern for the Chinese policymakers, a possible inflation bias in the conduct of policy 
cannot be a priori ruled out. Nevertheless, inflation has been mainly held well under control 
in the reform era. As a large share of the wealth of Chinese economic agents is stored in bank 
accounts yielding low interest rates, inflationary bursts could quickly erode the savings of the 
general public.47 This makes low inflation an important source of both economic and social 
stability. 
The 1990s proved an important decade in terms of Chinese reforms, including those of 
monetary policy. In 1994, the official and market exchange rates were unified, and current 
account transactions were liberalized. This brought an end to the previous dual exchange rate 
regime. The exchange rate system was officially changed to a managed float, although a de 
facto US dollar peg was in place from 1995 to mid-2005. Banking reform included the 
creation of three policy banks, which separated policy finance from commercially-oriented 
banking activities.  
                                                 
46 This section was contributed by Dr. Aaron Mehrotra, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition 
(BOFIT). 
47 Indeed, the ratio of broad money to GDP in China is among the highest in the world. In 2007, it amounted to 
162%.  
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In the mid-1990s, the People’s Bank started to publish annual intermediate targets for 
monetary aggregates. To date, targets for the growth of monetary aggregates M1 and M2 
have been most prominent. Money supply has occupied a central place in the monetary policy 
framework. In particular, the PBoC has claimed that an appropriate rate of money growth will 
promote “economic growth positively and contribute to preventing both inflation and 
deflation”. In this regard, the current framework resembles monetary targeting, and is 
reminiscent of the policy adopted in several advanced economies in the 1970s.48 However, 
according to Geiger (2006), money growth targets in China do not seem to follow 
straightforwardly from the traditional quantity equation of money. While there is no formal 
inflation targeting regime in place, targets for annual CPI growth are set among the country’s 
targets for social and economic development. Intermediate targets for growth in broad money 
M2 – including currency in circulation, demand and savings deposits - have fluctuated 
between 14 and 17 % during the current decade. While point targets have been more 
common, the target for 2000 was defined as a range of M2 growth between 14 and 15 
percent.  
Deviations of actual money growth from the announced target have been reflected in China’s 
inflation development. For example, during the deflation climate of 2000, the midpoint of the 
M2 growth target range of 14-15 percent was undershot by over two percentage points. 
Similarly, actual growth in M2 in 2002 exceeded the central bank’s target by almost 4 
percentage points, after which deflation was over in China. However, in sum, for a 
developing economy, money growth has not deviated excessively from the pre-announced 
targets (see Figure 20). Moreover, China has been able to achieve high economic growth – on 
average 10% annually after the start of economic reforms – without runaway inflation.  
 
























































































Source: PBoC Annual Bulletin & Quarterly Statistical Bulletin, various issues; Own calculations. 
 
In academic research, China’s monetary policy is often modeled by variants of the so-called 
“McCallum rule” where money supply serves as the central bank’s operating target (see e.g. 
Koivu et al. 2008, and the references therein). This is in contrast to research for advanced 
economies, where studies usually employ “Taylor-type” interest rate feedback rules.  
                                                 
48 Monetary targeting was widely considered successful in e.g. Germany and Switzerland. 
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Some studies find that the McCallum rule would have suggested a more expansionary 
monetary policy than the one actually pursued in the late 1990s during deflation. 
Nevertheless, actual money growth has sometimes followed the rule rather closely. In China, 
interest rates have traditionally occupied a relatively small role in the monetary transmission 
mechanism. Until 1998, credit plans were in place. These determined the amounts of credit 
for the banks to extend and also the customers eligible for lending. Therefore, commercial 
banks’ activities were under close guidance of the authorities.  
Even today, while credit plans are no longer in place, commercial bank lending focuses on 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), leaving private firms and households with a worse access to 
credit. As budget constraints have often not been binding for the SOEs, price mechanisms 
have not functioned properly. This has weakened the risk management of China’s 
commercial banks. Moreover, the PBoC’s toolbox of instruments still includes “window 
guidance” which involves strict guidelines from the central bank to the commercial banks on 
the appropriate amounts of lending. Domestic growth in credit has also served as an 
intermediate target for monetary policy, although credit targets have not been set every year. 
As the State remains the majority owner of commercial banks, the profit orientation of the 
banks has been limited.  
Another important policy tool, especially in the authorities’ efforts to prevent overheating in 
2006 and 2007, has been the adjustment of the reserve requirements of commercial banks 
with the PBoC. The commercial banks have maintained excess reserves at the PBoC, which 
could to some extent decrease the effectiveness of monetary policy. However, these excess 
reserves have declined quite substantially in the recent years and they amounted to under 4% 
in 2007. 
Various reforms have increased the importance of interest rates in China’s monetary 
transmission mechanism. Interest rate liberalization commenced in 1996, after which the 
fluctuation bands around the central bank-set lending and deposit rates were enlarged. An 
important step was taken in October 2004, when the lower limit for deposit rates was 
removed. The lending rates were also allowed to move more freely, with the lower limit set 
as 0.9 times the central bank’s benchmark interest rate. Nevertheless, actual interest rates 
have not deviated much from the central bank’s benchmark interest rate. The PBoC reports 
that in the second quarter of 2007, the share of floating-rate loans that had interest rates above 
the benchmark rate was only 44%. In the implementation of policy, the PBoC controls the 
growth of monetary base by open market operations.  
Interest rates as policy tools gained importance in 2006-2008, first to avert possible 
overheating of the Chinese economy, and afterwards to diminish the impacts of the global 
financial crisis on China (see figure 21). In autumn 2008, interest rates were cut a total of five 
times. This included an interest rate cut taking place at the same time with the co-ordinated 
monetary policy easing by the world’s main central banks.  
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Source: PBoC Quarterly Statistical Bulletin; BOFIT. 
 
Reform is taking place also in the banking sector. Three of China’s four big majority state-
owned commercial banks, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, the Bank of China, and 
China Construction Bank have been stock-listed. Prior to the listing, China used its massive 
foreign exchange reserves to shore up the banks’ capital. All three banks have sold minority 
stakes to foreign strategic investors, and the foreign investors committed to holding their 
shares for a minimum of three years. In late 2008 and early 2009, some foreign strategic 
investors sold off part of their stakes. The only remaining unlisted bank of the “big four” is 
the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC). However, in autumn 2008 China released information 
about the amounts of money that would be used to increase the ABC’s capital base, and the 
eventual stock-listing of the bank is also expected to take place in the future.  
Prior to 2003, the People’s Bank was responsible for both financial supervision and the 
conduct of monetary policy. The reform of the organizational structure of the State Council, 
approved by the First Plenum of the Tenth National People’s Congress in March 2003, 
separated the supervisory responsibilities from the PBoC. At that time, the China Banking 
Regulatory Commission (CBRC) was established to supervise the banking industry.49 
Nevertheless, the amended central bank law of December 2003 mentions the regulation of 
financial markets (interbank lending and bond markets, foreign exchange and gold markets), 
together with the prevention and mitigation of financial risks to safeguard financial stability, 
as the central bank’s functions. The People’s Bank also has a functional department dedicated 
to financial stability.  
In terms of independence and accountability, the People’s Bank must report its decisions 
concerning the annual money supply, interest rates, exchange rates, and other important 
issues to the State Council. This is needed for approval before the decisions are carried out. 
The PBoC must also submit a work report to the Standing Committee of the National 
People’s Congress. This concerns the conduct of monetary policy and the performance of the 
financial industry.  
                                                 
49 The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and the China Insurance Regulatory Commission 
(CIRC) are responsible for regulating and supervising the securities and insurance markets, respectively.  
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The People’s Bank regularly publishes a quarterly monetary policy report, a quarterly 
statistical bulletin, and an annual report. The quarterly monetary policy report discusses the 
conduct of monetary policy and financial sector developments, and it also includes 
macroeconomic analysis. While monetary policy decisions are announced, the 
announcements are not necessarily followed by any explanation regarding the change in the 
monetary policy stance.  
The President of the People’s Republic of China appoints the governor of the People’s Bank 
of China. The candidate is nominated by the Premier of the State Council and approved by 
the National People’s Congress. The deputy governors are appointed into office by the 
Premier of the State Council. The current governor is Zhou Xiaochuan (since December 
2002).  
4.5.3. Exchange rate regime 
China’s monetary policy operates in the framework of limited flexibility in its exchange rate. 
From 1995 until mid-2005, the yuan was pegged to the US dollar. The dollar peg survived the 
Asian crisis, which has probably impacted the Chinese authorities’ views about the 
usefulness of exchange rate flexibility until to-date. After substantial outside pressure (mostly 
from the US) and claims about an undervalued exchange rate, China abandoned the strict 
dollar peg in July 2005. The authorities announced that the yuan would be pegged to a basket 
of currencies, with the highest weights occupied by the US dollar, the euro, yen, and the 
Korean won. Several smaller currencies were also included. Nevertheless, the US dollar has 
clearly occupied a central place in the currency basket, as the authorities have allowed a 
gradual appreciation of the yuan against the US dollar. Including the small revaluation of July 
2005, the yuan has appreciated by end-2008 by some 20% against the US dollar (see Figure 
22). China has announced a limit for a daily change in the yuan’s exchange rate against the 
dollar. At the moment the highest allowed change is +-0.5%, therefore permitting either a 
daily depreciation or appreciation. The authorities may have also used the exchange rate to 
maintain domestic price stability, as in the inflationary environment of spring 2008 the yuan 
appreciated more rapidly against the dollar, allowing for a faster decline in import price 
growth. As the international financial crisis intensified in autumn 2008, the value of the yuan 
against the US dollar has largely been stabilized.  
IP/A/ECON/ST/2008-18 Page 69 of 123 PE 416.223
 





















The movements in the yuan’s exchange rate against the euro have been dominated by 
movements in the dollar-euro exchange rate. As the dollar appreciated against the euro in 
2008, the yuan has seen an appreciation against the euro. The appreciation has been around 
10%, which increases the competitiveness of the euro area vis-à-vis China in terms of the 
nominal exchange rate.  
Despite the relatively fixed exchange rate regime, capital controls have largely allowed for an 
independent monetary policy in China. The organization responsible for the controls on 
capital in China is the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE), which is under the 
leadership of the PBoC. SAFE monitors and manages foreign exchange transactions under 
the capital account. Cross-border flows of money circumventing capital controls – sometimes 
called “hot money” - have arisen especially on speculation about yuan appreciation. Their 
amounts have been estimated using the errors and omissions item in the balance of payments. 
Given that the capital controls can never be perfectly binding and interest rate differentials 
vis-à-vis rest of the world lead to some in and outflows through the capital account, a more 
flexible exchange rate regime would benefit the Chinese monetary authorities in terms of 
improved domestic policy independence. This arises, as interest rate policy could operate 
without fear of hot money inflows or outflows to the economy. 
The current account surpluses of recent years – over 11% of GDP in 2007 – and foreign 
direct investment have contributed to foreign exchange inflows to the Chinese economy. A 
significant amount of yuan liquidity is subsequently created when the central bank purchases 
the foreign exchange from the domestic market in order to keep the yuan-dollar exchange rate 
at the desired level. Nevertheless, due to majority state ownership in the banking sector, the 
central bank has had little difficulty in selling bonds through open market operations to 
commercial banks in order to absorb the excess liquidity (sterilization). In particular, yields 
on the sterilization bonds have predominantly been lower than those on US government 
bonds where a large part of foreign exchange reserves have been invested. While the Chinese 
authorities have not disclosed the currency decomposition of the foreign exchange assets, the 
weekly newspaper Beijing Review suggested in 2007 that some 70% of the reserves would be 
in dollars, and 20% in euro. 
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While direct costs of sterilization have been small, China’s exchange rate policy creates 
implicit costs that are partly borne by the household sector. The commercial banks hold 
sterilization bonds with low yields, and the household sector obtains only low interest income 
for its savings in the commercial banks. Due to capital controls, the households are mostly 
hindered from investing abroad. This lack of investment alternatives has been offered as one 
explanation for the share price bubble of 2006-2007. On the other hand, China’s massive 
foreign exchange reserves (USD 1.9 trillion in September 2008) provide considerable 
insurance against financial crises.  
The possible undervaluation of the yuan has been the topic of intensive academic and policy 
debate. Several academic papers have attempted to estimate the misalignment of the yuan 
from its equilibrium exchange rate. The calculation of an equilibrium exchange rate is 
difficult, even more so for emerging economies that are undergoing deep structural change. 
Most studies conclude that the yuan is somewhat undervalued – although the magnitude of 
the misalignment varies significantly from one study to another – while some find that the 
yuan is fairly valued or even overvalued.  
A fast-growing economy catching up with advanced economies should experience real 
exchange rate appreciation due to productivity improvements and structural change in line 
with the Balassa-Samuelson effect. Currency appreciation increases the domestic purchasing 
power and therefore welfare. If the nominal exchange rate is maintained stable, real exchange 
adjustment should come through higher domestic inflation.  
4.5.4. Inflation developments in the 1990s and current decade 
Despite arguments about an undervalued exchange rate and the limited policy independence 
arising from a policy of relatively fixed exchange rates, China has been quite well able to 
maintain the domestic value of the yuan, i.e. price stability. In this sense, monetary policy has 
been successful. Asset price increases have been visible, however, including the stock price 
bubble of 2006-2007 and fast increases in housing prices especially during 2004-2007.  
Regarding the determinants of inflation in the short run, academic research has identified a 
link between the output gap – the difference between actual and potential output – and 
China’s inflation (e.g. Scheibe and Vines, 2005). This is also confirmed by the casual 
observation that as economic growth exceeded 11%  in both 2006 and 2007, cost pressures 
arose in the Chinese economy. Even if consumer price inflation excluding food prices only 
increased moderately, wages were rising rapidly.  
The analysis of inflation developments from the early 1990s until to-date reveals the role of 
both monetary policy and structural reforms in the determination of price fluctuations (see 
Figure 23). In the early 1990s, the Chinese authorities implemented major price reforms to 
reduce the number of administrated prices in the economy. At the same time, credit growth 
was rapid, associated with high levels of investment by the SOEs. Strong demand pressures 
in the economy drove inflation to over 25% in 1994. The authorities reacted by implementing 
tight monetary policy in order to drive down inflation. This included higher interest rates and 
strict controls on lending.  
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Source: National Bureau of Statistics; CEIC database. 
Inflation retreated slowly and eventually turned to deflation in the late 1990s at the time of 
the Asian crisis. Reasons for deflation included positive supply-side developments, such as 
productivity increases and WTO-related tariff cuts. But monetary and especially exchange 
rate policy also played a role; as the yuan was tightly pegged to the US dollar, the trade-
weighted exchange rate appreciated together with the US dollar, putting downward pressure 
on import prices.  
Inflation remained low until 2004, when food price increases, especially higher prices of 
grain, put upward pressure on prices. While inflation is ultimately a monetary phenomenon in 
the long run, food prices continue to exert important short-run influence in Chinese consumer 
price developments, as they carry a weight of one third in the consumer price index. Inflation 
increased again in late 2006, mainly due to increases in the price of pork. The latest inflation 
peak was experienced in February 2008, when CPI inflation was close to 9% year-on-year. 
The Chinese authorities reacted to price pressures with tighter monetary policy, but also by 
increasing incentives for farmers to increase food production and by direct guidelines for 
pricing. These measures, coupled with a favourable harvest, have helped in driving down CPI 
inflation to close to 2% year-on-year by November 2008. 
4.5.5. Future outlook 
The Chinese monetary policy framework faces challenges, as it gradually moves towards 
more flexibility in the exchange rate. As capital controls are slowly being dismantled, the 
possibility to conduct independent monetary policy would weaken considerably if exchange 
rates were to remain fixed. The increasing profit-orientation of the commercial banks and the 
growing role of foreign banks in the financial system contribute to promoting the importance 
of interest rates in the transmission mechanism. Given the mounting role of the private sector 
in the Chinese economy, price-based measures will gain importance over quantity-based 
policies in the implementation of policy and in determining its impact on the real economy. 
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4.6. Easy money policy of the Bank of Japan 
The case of Japan provides several helpful pointers as to what to do in the face of deflation 
and the zero bound for the nominal rate of interest that may unfortunately prove useful as the 
current crisis evolves. However, the experience also provides pointers over what not to do as 
most commentators consider that the problems were protracted far longer than necessary and 
as a result were far more costly than necessary.  
The downturn started in Japan in the middle of 1991 (see Figure 24) when land prices started 
to fall away after their meteoric rise that had started in 1985. The stock market moved and 
peaked earlier, 1983 to end 1989, but the economy did not start to slow until 1991. Both asset 
prices quadrupled in the boom. However, while land prices declined very rapidly for 5 years 
and then continued to decline more slowly to below their starting values, stock market 
behaved differently, with a 60% decline by 1992, then a period of volatility for 8 years before 
a second decline at the time of the bursting of the dotcom bubble in the US. Falls of that order 


























Source: 1985-2007, OECD (Bdsice database). 2008, The Economist.
 
 
The economy slowed rapidly but growth over the period 1992-4 was 1% a year and from 
1995 to early 1997 growth increased to over 3%. However, at that point there was a second 
collapse and by 1998 the economy was contracting. There was some recovery in 2000 but the 
economy remained sluggish with growth only slowly picking up in 2003. There was a steady 
improvement from then until 2007 but by 2008 the economy was in recession again. Thus 
two decades after the original collapse in asset prices the economy has not really got back to 
sustained growth. 
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Accompanying this poor economic performance has been a slow decrease in the price level 
(see Figure 25). Inflation was briefly negative in 1995 but from 1998 until 2003 the price 
level fell slowly by 3% after which prices were stable through to late 2007 and it is only in 
2008 that inflation started to reach levels typical of other OECD economies. In the last few 
months inflation has again died away. However, Broda and Weinstein (2007) argue that the 
actual deflation problem in Japan is much larger because the computation of the price index 
is deficient and implies an overestimate of the rate of inflation by as much as 1% a year 
compared to the United States. Since US inflation is itself thought to be biased upwards by 
around 1% the limited measured deflation in Japan may reflect a decline in a properly 
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Source: Statistics Bureau (Bdsice database).
 
Matching these developments in the real economy and prices, monetary policy was eased 
steadily until the rate reached 0.5% in 1996. Although it was not fully zero until the period 
from mid-1999 through to mid-2006, it was effectively at the zero bound as the Bank of 
Japan was at the limit of its actions. At the end of 2008 the interest rate again effectively 
returned to zero. However, in the second half of 2001 the Bank began a policy of 
‘quantitative easing’ which sought to increase the liquidity taken up by the banks despite the 
zero interest rate. These injections increased up to the beginning of 2004 and continued until 
2006. 
The experience at the zero bound and the period of quantitative easing in particular give a 
unique experience that provides helpful insights now that the Federal Reserve has also 
reached the zero bound and other countries may attain the same position if the crisis worsens. 
However, the Bank of Japan’s approach to policy has in part been criticised for the reaching 
of the zero bound in the first place (Ito and Mishkin, 2004 for example).  
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Japan has also been criticised for not taking other measures, particularly for not seeking to 
depreciate the exchange rate or tackle the problem of hidden losses, particularly among the 
banks. Thus better monetary policy alone is not likely to be the solution to avoiding or swiftly 
exiting from the zero bound but it could contribute to it. 
4.6.1. The monetary constitution of the Bank of Japan 
Up until 1998 the Bank of Japan (BoJ) operated with a very general mandate of maximizing 
economic potential and the Governor could be replaced by the Minister of Finance. The 
practice had however become rather different and the BoJ ran a fairly independent and 
conservative though somewhat opaque anti-inflationary policy successfully. Thus it was 
under this framework that the initial treatment of the crisis took place.  
In 1998 a new BoJ Law was implemented giving the BoJ clear operational independence and 
protection for the Policy Board members from capricious dismissal. The Board has 9 
members: the Governor, the two Deputies and six experts. The 1998 Law has price stability 
as the target, contributing to the sound development of the national economy. Since that date 
the BoJ has exercised its independence. Indeed it was criticised by Ito and Mishkin (2004) for 
not working more closely with the government in 2000 when it decided to raise interest rates.  
Although the BoJ has participated much more fully in central bank discussions in recent years 
and has developed its modelling and forecasting and policy assessment strategies in line with 
modern practice, it has not formulated clear objectives and has therefore had problems with 
transparency. Ito and Mishkin argue that the timing of independence might have been 
unfortunate as a vigorous easing policy was required just at the time the BoJ felt it needed to 
act carefully in exercising its new powers. Normally independence is associated with tougher 
policies as it is in part a reaction to an unduly inflationary regime. In this case there was no 
such problem but clearly the new regime had worries about getting a reputation for being lax 
over inflation before it had even got to a period when its resolve would be tested. 
When the quantitative easing policy, described below, was ended in March 2006 the BoJ also 
announced its understanding of the definition of price stability – inflation in the CPI 
(excluding food) between 0 and 2% year on year, making it look like a relatively 
conventional inflation targeter. In October 2000, after commissioning a six-month study the 
policy board decided against having any numerical target and the conditions under which the 
zero interest rate policy and the quantitative easing were to end were a little vague, implying 
that deflation needed to be clearly at an end. 
There is a record kept of the policy board meetings, focusing on what was decided and why. 
There is an opportunity for members to express dissent. Detailed minutes are published with 
a six week lag and the Governor gives a press conference after the decisions. Gubernatorial 
styles appear to matter and Hayami who was appointed in 1998 appears to have been less 
open than his successor Fukui, who took over in 2003, and communicated in a clearer manner 
(Ito, 2005). 
4.6.2. The conundrum of Japanese deflation 
With the benefit of hindsight the BoJ should have acted earlier as inflationary pressures 
increased and eased earlier as asset prices collapsed. It is difficult to establish the inflation 
forecasts available at the time for policy-makers who wished to be forward-looking. Okina 
and Shiratsuka (2004) suggest that if only a standard Taylor Rule has been applied using 
current values, policy would have been noticeably tighter in the years leading up to the asset 
price collapse (the same finding was made by Bernanke and Gertler (1999)).  
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Quite how that would have affected expectations, confidence and the asset price build up is 
difficult to say but the chances are that it would not have lasted so long or gone up so far. 
Bernanke and Gertler also argue that the decline in interest rates was too slow but Okina and 
Shiratsuka do not agree. 
However, this use of a Taylor Rule ignores any information from asset prices and is simply 
based on inflation and the output gap. As Ito and Mishkin (2004) point out there is some 
difficulty in deciding what the target rate of inflation was over this period as there was no 
explicit value stated. Picking the average may not be a good indicator as the implicit target 
could have been time varying. It is also rather difficult to argue that the simple rule should be 
followed when the lower bound approaches or is reached. The appropriate policy when 
people fear that the central bank is likely to incur problems suggests a more vigorous 
response than usual (Evans et al., 2008). Since people are acting in a region outside their 
experience, they have to learn how the central bank is likely to respond. The actions therefore 
have to be clearly different (Kuttner and Posen, 2004). Clearly if asset prices themselves were 
to be taken into account policy would have required tightening and then easing considerably 
earlier. 
The BoJ not only had some reticence in getting to the zero bound but having done so was 
keen to get away from it. In August 2000 it raised interest rates at the first sign of a recovery 
and hence may well have contributed to arresting it. Since the BoJ had no inflation target it 
was not able to convey readily how much of a stimulus was required. Moreover inflation 
targets bear no regard to past failures. There are hence arguments that the BoJ should have 
followed something like a price level target, making it clear that the longer deflation persisted 
the softer would be the subsequent response, thereby encouraging consumption while prices 
were low and encouraging the turnaround. It was clear that Japanese consumers would 
respond to price incentives as a promise of a consumption tax rise in 1997 did indeed act as a 
stimulus. Clearly such one-off measures need to be amplified by other actions but introducing 
tightening measures before the demand recovery is well under way is likely to be 
counterproductive. 
4.6.3. The Quantitative Easing Policy 
It was only after the second time the BoJ reached the zero bound in 2001, after the 2000 
recovery evaporated, that it moved towards the less conventional measures that academics 
and others had been advocating. Rather than trying to depreciate or operate further out down 
the yield curve the BoJ decided to push the banks into increasing the reserves they held at the 
BoJ (known as current balances) (Nakaso, 2007). The initial aim was to increase current 
balances by ¥ 5 trillion in March 2001, rising in 9 steps to ¥ 30-35 trillion in January 2004. 
Although such balances were effectively unremunerated the banks were willing to bid for 
them. There has been underbidding but it was only during the first half of 2002 that this 
reached significant proportions. Effectively this is just a large Open Market Operation 
(OMO). These were offered at slowly increasing maturity as the size of the operations 
increased, starting with an average of around 2 months in March 2001 and reaching an 
average of around 6 months by mid-2005. 
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In the early part of the crisis many of the banks had funding problems but steadily cleaned up 
their balance sheets. However it was not until fairly late in 2003 that spreads had returned to 
more normal levels. OMOs provide an opportunity to obtain cheap funds that can be lent on 
as not all interest rates were zero. It is therefore unlikely that the quantitative easing policy 
could have been followed much earlier. 
Quantitative easing ended in March 2006 and the operations became progressively smaller. 
4.6.4. What is the problem? 
One of the reasons for the Bank of Japan’s reticence in using monetary policy to try to solve 
the deflation problem was that they did not see that the activities that monetary policy could 
affect as being the source of the problem. In the early stages of the crisis there was a need to 
recognise the losses particularly in the banking system and then recapitalise the banks. This 
would have both helped to return confidence and enabled the banks to begin lending again. 
The process of amalgamations to some extent merely created large weak banks to replace the 
smaller ones. Later on the BoJ argued that what was required was restructuring – the 
inefficient needed to be allowed to go out of business so that the dynamic could prosper. 
It is not clear whether the quantitative easing actually contributed much to the ending of 
deflation. It did not expand the wider monetary aggregates (see Figure 27). If the intention is 
to mop back the excess once the period of difficulty is passed, it is not quite clear what effect 
this will have on expectations. If some of the increase is to be left to encourage inflation then 
there may be a reaction. 
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There is some debate about the possible success of alternatives. Operating in much longer 
dated securities might help in a version of ‘Operation Twist’ (Bernanke, 2002). The public 
sector can also buy private sector assets, whether securities or property portfolios. Rather 
than the idea of bailing out individual institutions by effectively partially or completely 
nationalising them, it may be more suitable to buy broad spectra of assets as is often practised 
by sovereign wealth funds. (There is a debate in New Zealand at present about whether their 
small sovereign wealth fund should expand into more focused purchasing to assist the 
recovery.) More successful might be the ideas of Svensson (2003) and others. Finally, 
currency depreciation not only contributes to assisting foreign demand but it may help to 
increase inflationary expectations. 
4.6.5. Financial supervision 
The Bank of Japan is not the financial supervisor but unlike most central banks, the BoJ does 
have powers of oversight and on-site inspections. These are a condition of having access to 
the BoJ’s facilities and since this is treated as part of the borrower-lender relationship, it has 
not required any particular legislative backing. It does however mean that the BoJ is very 
well informed about the condition of banks and hence in the course of the crisis years in the 
1990s was able to advise and pressure banks into reorganisations that limited the extent of 
failures and kept the system operating. This clearly blurs the role of lender of last resort to 
some extent but it enabled some Japanese banks to continue operating and recover, whereas 
in some other countries they would have failed. 
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Figure 28 




Source: Output for Economic Activity and Prices. October 2008. Bank of Japan 
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4.7. Inflation targeting in the UK 
4.7.1. A brief history of inflation targeting in the UK 
Inflation targeting is generally supposed to have come overnight to the UK, with the election 
of a Labour Government in 1997. When the Bank of England Act of 1997 was passed and 
implemented, the Bank of England became an “independent” central bank. It was 
independent in the sense that it could vary its policy instrument as it wished to achieve the 
target which had been set by the government. The target is a particular level of a particular 
measure of inflation. Both the level and the measure are chosen by the government. The 
outcome is supposed to approximate to price stability. There is much that is contentious about 
that; these contentious points are touched on below, as are the other, subsidiary, objectives of 
policy and whether it is sensible to have them. In this opening discussion the aim is to explain 
why it is maybe a mistake to view that move to inflation targeting as a sudden change in 
policy, introduced by a new government keen to establish a reputation for economic 
responsibility. Indeed, a historian could readily argue, in a counterfactual fashion, that a very 
similar change would have come about whichever party had won the election of 1997. The 
granting of independence was evolution not change, and is better understood when thus 
interpreted.  
Ever since the floating of Sterling at the end of Bretton Woods, an anchor had been sought to 
stop Britain being an inflation prone country. When Mrs. Thatcher’s first Government took 
office in 1979, one of its first steps was to announce a “Medium Term Financial Strategy”. 
One of the key parts of this strategy was a target for the growth of a particular measure of the 
money supply. The measure chosen was Sterling M3. This measure could be easily identified 
in the balance sheet of the banking sector, and had readily calculable counterparts in 
government borrowing. It thus linked back to targets and constraints that had been imposed 
on previous British governments by the IMF. It was evolution not revolution. That monetary 
measure also was well correlated with inflation in the past. Indeed, it seemed a good indicator 
of inflation when tested on almost a hundred years of data. (Griffiths and Wood, 1991) Its 
adoption was a commitment mechanism and a signal of the future course of policy. 
Unfortunately the relationship broke down when put to the practical test. Inflation fell and the 
economy slowed drastically as the money supply (on that measure) rose rapidly. The target 
was abandoned and other ways of guiding and committing policy sought. But inflation 
accelerated again, and eventually the British government gave up hope and decided to import 
Britain’s monetary policy from Germany, just as, for the same reason, British citizens 
imported motor cars from Germany. The performance was better. Britain joined the ERM. 
(This move also of course was a step towards closer European integration – the grounds on 
which some had resisted it.) 
Britain was evicted from the ERM in 1992, when interest rates in Germany, the core country 
of the system, were raised at a time when it was clearly both economically inappropriate and 
politically close to impossible for rates to go up in Britain. A new anchor for policy had to be 
found. This was the start of the evolution which led Britain to the inflation targeting 
independent central bank that it has today. 
The course was thus from a pegged exchange rate to floating without a clear nominal anchor 
(in which period inflation reached, in August 1975, 27% pa) to targeting the money supply to 
judgement to “shadowing” the DM and then back to pegged rates which in turn Britain again 
had to give up. 
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After that, monetary policy started to be conducted in a more open fashion, first under 
Norman (now Lord) Lamont as Chancellor, and then under his successor Kenneth Clarke. An 
inflation target was introduced in October 1992. There were pre-announced interest rate 
setting meetings between the Governor of the Bank and the Chancellor; the minutes of these 
meetings were first published in April 1994. The Bank of England started to publish, in 1993 
(the first issue was in February of that year), when Norman Lamont was still Chancellor, an 
“Inflation Report” in which it discussed the outlook for inflation.  These two events in 
combination surely doomed the system, and would have led to the transfer of decision 
making to the Bank regardless of the outcome of the 1997 election. For the Bank was 
publicly commenting on monetary policy decisions in which it had the role of adviser, while 
it was the Chancellor of the Exchequer who took the decision. Either the Bank could never 
dissent or the Chancellor could never count on getting his way. Change was inevitable. 
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Nevertheless when change came it was a surprise. This was no doubt due in part to the 
Conservative Chancellor (Kenneth Clarke) stoutly maintaining that such an important policy 
decision as setting the interest rate had in a democracy to be taken by an elected politician, 
while the opposition Shadow Chancellor, Gordon Brown, gave a speech (in February 1997) 
in which he said that the Bank was not yet ready for “operational independence”. That, he 
said, had to be preceded by internal reform at the Bank, and a period during which the Bank 
would “… demonstrate a successful track record in its advice and build greater public 
credibility.” How that could have been done under the existing system is not clear, but that 
soon became irrelevant when the Labour party won the election on Thursday, 1 May 1997, 
for it was less than a week later, on the subsequent Tuesday, that the new Chancellor 
announced a quarter point increase in base rate and at the same time announced that the bank 
would henceforward have freedom to set interest rates so as to achieve a publicly announced 
inflation target. 
There was at this time no discussion, at any rate in the UK, of whether Britain should join the 
Euro. Neither political party displayed any great enthusiasm for doing so, and it had not been 
even a minor issue in the General Election which had brought the Labour Party to office. This 
is worth remarking in the context of the granting of “independence” to the central bank, as it 
was as part of the process of joining the Euro that some central banks – the Bank of Spain, for 
example – had been given independence. 
4.7.2. Elements of inflation targeting in the UK 
The new framework has interest rate decisions taken by a committee (the Monetary Policy 
Committee, henceforth MPC) to achieve an inflation target set by the Government. The 
Committee has nine members; the Governor of the Bank and the two deputies, two other 
executive directors, and four “outsiders” whose sole policy task is the interest rate decision 
and who have no other occupation within the Bank. The committee meets every month, and 
its minutes are published the second Wednesday after the meeting, along with the votes of the 
individual committee members. The minutes are detailed, with extensive exposition of the 
arguments deployed, but the arguments are not identified with individual members. The 
minutes also include a summary of the information presented to the MPC by the Bank’s staff. 
All rate decisions, including no change, are announced at noon on the day the two-day 
committee meeting finishes. The dates of the meetings are announced each September for the 
year ahead, and the Inflation Report gives forecasts for inflation and output, and key 
underlying assumptions such as the path of the exchange rate. 
The Governor must send an open letter to the Chancellor if inflation is more than 1 
percentage point above or below target. This letter explains why the deviation has occurred, 
what is going to be done about it, and when it is expected to return to the target range. In 
1997 Mervyn King (not then Governor) observed that “…one of the main purposes of the 
open letter is to explain why, in some circumstances, it would be wrong to try to bring 
inflation back to target too quickly.” The Treasury Committee of the House of Commons (a 
subcommittee of the House of Commons) invites the Governor to appear before it after the 
publication of every inflation report, and can ask him to attend should he have to write to the 
Chancellor, so that he can further explain the deviation from target and his intentions for 
getting back to it.  
The Inflation Report is published quarterly, in an extension of the pre-independence system. 
It is produced by the Bank staff under the guidance of the MPC. The forecasts of inflation 
and growth represent the committee’s collective best judgement, not the judgement of the 
Bank staff. 
IP/A/ECON/ST/2008-18 Page 82 of 123 PE 416.223
There have been criticisms of this structure. They are in three groups – the nature of the 
appointments, some detailed reflections by Francis Maude when he was Shadow Chancellor, 
and discussion of the role of the outsiders on the MPC. There were some early complaints 
that the committee was “unrepresentative” of industry and of different regions of the UK. It 
was soon recognised that was an irrelevance, in view of the objective of the committee. 
Francis Maude raised some, somewhat contradictory, questions over the committee’s 
independence and accountability; but he took the continued existence of the Committee as 
given, as has all subsequent discussion. As for the outsiders, the puzzle over their role can be 
seen best by comparing the MPC with the FOMC of the Federal Reserve. The latter also 
comprises two groups – the Board of Governors and the Presidents of the Regional Reserve 
Banks. Every one of the latter has his or her own research staff at their own home bank, and 
each comes for a different region of the USA. It is clear what they contribute, at least in 
principle, that they could not contribute if based in Washington. What do the MPC outsiders 
contribute by virtue of being outsiders? This is not so clear, especially as individual votes are 
recorded and individuals have to defend their own decisions, so scope for “bank groupthink” 
is not great. 
4.7.3. Final target 
What is the objective the Committee has to achieve? The target was initially defined as 
inflation as measured by the Retail Prices Index (RPI). This is a broadly based and long 
established measure of retail prices, and includes a measure of housing costs. This was 
replaced by the then Chancellor (Gordon Brown) by what is known as the CPI – the British 
name for the EU’s Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices. The two will almost inevitably 
differ because of both method of calculation (arithmetic v. geometric mean) and coverage. 
This new measure attracted much criticism because of its exclusion of housing costs, but 
whether these criticisms will continue is yet to be seen50. It has also been the case that price 
expectations surveys, and indeed estimates from consumer surveys of what people think 
inflation is, have exceeded the actual index values quite persistently. This may be due to the 
recent experience of frequently bought goods (especially food) rising sharply in price, while 
prices of many consumer durables, less frequently bought, have been falling. A judgment of 
the efficiency of the MPC must take into account that it has to achieve the inflation target 
with consideration to the behaviour of the real economy; this has been interpreted as not 
continually striving to keep inflation at target, and not responding aggressively to deviations 
from target.  
 
                                                 
50 A complicating factor here is that the RPI seems likely to drop below the CPI in the early spring of 2009. 
Thus criticisms that switching to the CPI was a covert easing may be muted; although it will remain true that on 
average the RPI must by construction exceed the CPI. 
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4.7.4. Instrumental variable 
To achieve its objective, the committee sets a short term interest rate. How is this decision 
made effective? It sets “base rate”. This is the rate at which the Bank supplies reserves to the 
banking sector. Banks can decide the amount of reserves they want at this rate. They make 
this decision every “reserve maintenance period”; these periods run from one meeting of the 
MPC to the next, so approximately one month. Banks can also borrow as much as they want 
(against collateral) through a “standing facility”, at 1 percentage point above base rate, and 
deposit at the Bank any reserves they do not need at a rate 1 percentage point below base rate. 
Banks lend to each other in normal times at the London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR). This 
rate in normal times is close to base rate, and is the marginal cost of funds to the banks. In 
times of stress, though, LIBOR has been very substantially above base rate – above it by 
more than the rate charged to use the standing facility. The implications of this for the 
regime’s credibility are discussed below. 
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4.7.5. Openness, credibility and accountability 
What are the key aspects of the system in achieving credibility and time consistency? Several 
features stand out. There is the publication of forecasts and of the model, the publication of 
the voting record, and of course the open letter. 
The published forecasts always show inflation for all practical purposes exactly on target at 
the two year horizon; this is the time horizon for the forecast. This is perhaps the least 
interesting part of the forecast. Much more interesting are the so called “fan charts”. The 
publication of the forecasts was intended both to communicate the Bank’s view, and, on the 
assumption that they would be reasonably accurate, strengthen its credibility and by making 
the Bank more open increase its accountability. The Bank initially accommodated the 
inevitable forecast uncertainty by publishing a forecast band. This was replaced by a fan 
chart, so called because it looks like a fan since the forecast’s uncertainty rises with the time 
horizon; the fan is a graphical representation of the probability density function of the 
inflation forecast for the next eight quarters. In the third quarter of 1997 the Bank published 
details of its model, including the parameter values. Before 1997 these were determined by 
the Bank; since then they are determined by the MPC. The Bank was the first central bank in 
the world to publish such details of its forecasting model; its policy can thus be appraised 
(retrospectively) more thoroughly than that of any bank which does not publish such details. 
It is worth remarking on a curious aspect of the fan charts. They imply that inflation 
uncertainty increases with the time horizon. That is surely true under some monetary policy 
regimes; but can it be true under a successful inflation targeting one? Under such a regime 
forecasts should converge on the inflation target.  
The forecast and the rate decision are of course not automatic mechanical outputs of the 
model - otherwise all MPC members would always vote the same way. The members can 
differ about the course of inflation even if they agree about the assumed path of key 
variables. This could readily happen for example because of different weights placed on 
inflation expectations, on their prospects of feeding through to wages and prices, and indeed 
on which inflation expectations are watched. Despite this, the process is reasonably open, as 
the bulk of these differences (it is generally assumed) are revealed in the minutes of the MPC. 
This leads us to the publication of the nominal voting record. This too is intended to reinforce 
the credibility of the regime, by making individuals accountable (and they can be called to 
account by the Treasury Select Committee), by making the unconscious of committee 
groupthink less likely, and by reducing the dominance of any individual. This last is a cost as 
well as a benefit. What if the Governor is outvoted? Once is not enough to show that on 
average he is not dominant; but how many times are sufficient to demonstrate he is 
ineffectual? And what if in retrospect he turns out to have been systematically wrong? That 
last is a possibility for any committee member, but least important for the outsiders and 
surely most important for the Governor. 
Finally in this section we come to the “Open Letter”. This is unique in the monetary policy 
making world, and gives the Bank the opportunity to explain (at any length it wishes in 
principle) why inflation is outside target, and to set out and explain future policy responses. If 
transparency enhances credibility (a point that would surely have been disputed by at least 
one previous bank Governor, Montagu Norman) then the letter is a good and important aspect 
of the system. In 2007, CPI inflation rose to 3.1%, exceeding more than one percentage point 
the target (2%). The open letter to the Chancellor had to be written for the first time. In itself 
it had no relevant policy effects, but did communicate why it had happened and the policy the 
Bank was going to implement to bring back inflation to target. 
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4.7.6. Summary and a brief evaluation 
It is possible now to summarise the aspects of the system which are key to producing time 
consistency and credibility. First, it evolved; that has surely given it time to bed down in 
public consciousness, so that its removal would appear a drastic decision. Its broad outlines 
are accepted by every political party, as in particular are the open letter, the publication of 
forecasts, and the decision by committee. All these contribute to promoting time consistency. 
There are however several matters that undermine both time consistency and credibility. 
Crucial is that there is no formal procedure that has to be gone through, and justified in 
public, to change the target. This is a decision for the Chancellor, and he can take it at any 
time with no requirement to consult widely, to consult the Bank, or to publish his reasoning.  
Another matter is the relationship of the rate set by the Bank to market rates, particularly 
LIBOR. This relationship has changed drastically under stress. Should it not stabilise fairly 
quickly at a level such that it clearly moves with base rate, then the functional reliability of 
the system will be questioned.  
The system has not yet stood the test of time. Will it survive a period of stress, of for example 
high inflation and rising unemployment? Will it survive the present financial crisis or any 
repetition, when conditions in the real economy might lead to a steep devaluation of sterling 
and a consequently deep recession? Is it right that the Bank of England, despite not being in 
charge of financial inspection and regulation51, should have to shoulder a lender-of-last-resort 
role? How should the lender-of-last-resort role be redefined in view of the scale of systemic 
upheavals in a globalised and innovating financial system?  
A crucial weakness is the lack of formal procedure for political over-ride. Without such a 
procedure, time consistency will always be in doubt until the system is so embedded in the 
public consciousness that, like the gold standard, even temporary suspension except in times 
of dire emergency – such as war in the case of the gold standard – is unthinkable. The system 
has plainly been designed with the issues identified in Chapter 1 in mind; but the design has 
not solved the problem of how to ensure time consistency in a democracy such as that of the 
UK where parliament is the absolute sovereign and no government can bind its successor. 
4.8. The Strategy of the Fed 
4.8.1. Institutional arrangements of the Federal Reserve System : Plural and non 
hierarchical mandate 
The Federal Reserve, although not widely recognised as such, is in fact a distinct anomaly 
among central banks. It has neither operational independence (nor any other kind) nor a clear-
cut target for policy. To understand why it is as it is, and indeed to understand what it is, it is 
very helpful to go back to its early history and trace the main stages of its evolution to the 
present. 
The Federal Reserve Act was passed in December 1913, and the twelve Federal Reserve 
Banks began operations in November 1914. That there were twelve Federal Reserve banks 
was a result of the conflict between those who wanted a central monetary authority and those 
who opposed it.52 The act did not specify what would happen in the event of conflict between 
the Federal Reserve Board (in Washington) and some or all of the twelve district banks.  
                                                 
51 These competences were delegated to a separate body, the Financial Service Authority (FSA), in 1997. 
52 Whether there are any precedents for the ECB in this is discussed below. 
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Each of these banks was allowed in law to set its own discount rate, and could buy 
government stock so as to earn enough to pay the interest on their own stock, which was held 
by the private sector. The district bank presidents all earned more than members of the Board 
of Governors. Power thus appeared to lie outside Washington. 
At this stage the Secretary of Treasury and the Comptroller of the Currency were ex officio 
members of the Board of Governors, and the then Treasury Secretary (William McAdoo) 
presided over meetings of the Board. But by the end of the First World War, the New York 
Fed, led by Governor Benjamin Strong, had achieved a leading role in the conduct of 
monetary policy. (In its early years the Federal Reserve also had the duty of organising a 
nationwide system of cheque clearing at par; but that aspect of its evolution does not concern 
us here.) 
4.8.1.1. The First World War 
During World War I the Fed became the Treasury’s fiscal agent. The Treasury deposited its 
funds with the New York Fed, and the Fed acted as the Treasury’s banker. To facilitate War 
finance, the Federal Reserve Act was amended to allow banks to borrow from the Fed with 
government securities as collateral at a lower rate than with commercial paper as collateral. 
Unsurprisingly, as money creation was thus playing a substantial part in war finance, there 
was inflation. This inflation continued until the Treasury allowed the Fed to raise the discount 
rate at the end of 1919. A recession followed quickly, but the Fed raised the discount rate 
again, to 7%, and kept it there for almost a year. Agricultural prices fell sharply, and 
Congress soon added a sixth member to the Board of Governors, to represent agricultural 
interests. 
Benjamin Strong was, however, still in New York. He came to repudiate the real bills 
doctrine on the basis of the experience of the 1920-21 recession, and wanted to buy and sell 
acceptances and government securities to control monetary conditions. This control was 
designed to return the US to, and maintain it on, the gold standard. 
4.8.1.2. Open Market Operations 
It was in this period that the Federal Reserve Banks made a discovery. They discovered that 
when they sold government bonds, commercial banks had to borrow from the Fed and also 
restricted loans to their customers; and the opposite happened when the Fed bought 
government bonds. The Fed had discovered open market operations, a major tool even today 
of monetary policy in the USA. In contrast to discounting securities, these operations could 
be undertaken at the initiative of the Federal Reserve banks, without waiting for the 
commercial banks to approach them. 
The district banks were, however, still acting independently of one another in the conduct of 
these operations. Encouraged by the Treasury, in 1922 the Federal Reserve established The 
Committee of Governors on Centralised Execution of Purchases and Sales of Government 
Securities by Federal Reserve Banks. This committee was abolished in 1923, and replaced by 
the Open Market Investment Committee (which had the same membership as the committee 
that had just been abolished). The membership comprised five district bank governors plus 
the board of governors; the precedent for today is clear. The aim was to get all banks acting 
in unison in open market transactions; but, unlike today, any dissenting bank could opt out. 
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Despite these changes leadership remained with New York, because of the influence of 
Benjamin Strong. When he died in 1928 the system was in practice leaderless, and gripped by 
indecision as bank failures started. For that reason it consistently failed to act effectively as a 
lender of last resort (Friedman and Schwartz). There was not, despite some contrary claims, a 
shortage of gold. (Meltzer, 2003) 
4.8.1.3. Changes to the Act 
There were major changes to the Federal Reserve Act in 1933, in the midst of the depression. 
The Banking Act of 1933 forbad interest payment on demand deposits, and limited to 3% the 
rate that could be paid on time deposits. This was intended to prevent banks taking on high 
risks for high prospective rewards, but in fact encouraged cash hoarding and prevented small 
banks form earning interest on their deposits at money centre banks. In addition, the act 
enforced the separation of commercial and investment banking. But in the long run perhaps 
most important was the creation of a new agency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC). This plan had been advanced several times, but until 1933 had been rejected by 
Congress. Membership was compulsory for member banks and optional for non-members of 
the Federal Reserve; and there was a flat rather than a risk-adjusted fee as it was thought that 
the government would not be able properly to price for risk. Deposit insurance did put an end 
to bank runs, but it also preserved the unit banking system and was a partial substitute for 
bank capital. The wisdom of both these last measures looks perhaps even more doubtful in 
the long run than it did at the time. 
There was further change to the Federal Reserve in an act of 1935. The 1935 Amendment 
increased the power of the Board and reduced that of district banks. The Open Market 
Investment Committee evolved into the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) and now 
comprised all seven members of the Board of Governors, plus five, rather than all twelve, of 
the presidents of the district banks. All presidents could by convention attend and speak, but 
the right to vote rotated, except for the President of the New York Fed, who was ex officio 
always a voting member. 
There was then a pause in central banking legislation. The behaviour of the Fed was next 
affected by the Second World War.  
4.8.1.4. Expanded Role of Government 
The Employment Act of 1946 enjoined the government to ensure that there would be 
“…maximum employment, production, and purchasing power…”. Price controls that had 
been imposed during the War were removed in 1946, there was an inflow of gold, and the 
Fed was still under its wartime obligation to support the prices of government securities. 
Pressure to continue that support, along with rising inflation, caused anxiety at the Fed. In 
1949 the FOMC announced that henceforward primary regard would be paid to business 
conditions when setting monetary policy – so implying an end to bond price support. This 
matter came to a head in 1951, when the Secretary of the Treasury (John Snyder) announced 
that the Fed would keep the yield on long term treasury bonds fixed at 2.5%. The FOMC 
violently objected to this statement, and allowed the yield to rise to 2.75%. The Chairman of 
the Board of Governors wrote to President Truman, who wished bond prices to be pegged, 
pointing out the inflationary consequences of doing so. A Federal Reserve/Treasury 
committee was formed, and on 4th March 1951 an Accord was published. 
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“The Treasury and the Federal Reserve System have reached full accord with regard to debt 
management and monetary policies to be pursued in furthering their common purpose to 
assure the successful financing of the Governments requirements and at the same time, to 
minimise the monetization of the public debt.” 
This was plainly a step towards letting the Fed conduct monetary policy, but it was not a big 
step. In April 1951 the Fed supported a bond issue, albeit at a gently declining price. Only in 
1953, with an administration (Eisenhower’s) committed to “sound money” did the Fed 
withdraw support from the bond market.  
This was followed by adoption of the “bills only” doctrine. W.M. Martin was then Chairman 
of the Board of Governors, and he wished open market operations to be conducted only in 
bills because that would be sufficient to control bank reserves while not risking the Fed being 
drawn into a bond market support operation. Although there were objections from the then 
president of the New York Fed, Alan Sproul, who wished the Fed to be able to influence the 
whole term structure of interest rates, the policy was implemented. 
As the 1950s ended there was controversy over the Fed’s instruments. There was widespread 
agreement that open market operations were crucial. Some (Milton Friedman for example) 
maintained that the discount window facility was (in normal times) undesirable and a subsidy 
to member banks – after all, banks could borrow in the Federal funds market. Some, 
however, defended its use. Since the discount rate was announced, so, it was claimed, there 
was an “announcement effect”. In addition the Fed had since 1935 been able to change 
reserve requirements; nowadays seldom used, it was of some importance when the Fed was 
committed to pegging bond prices. Also at the end of the 1950s there was a change in the 
permitted composition of reserves; for the first time banks could count vault cash in their 
required reserve total. 
4.8.1.5. Rising Inflation 
Further changes took place in the 1960s, changes this time in the nature of Fed-Government 
relations. These changes took place under the pressure of rising inflation, inflation which was 
associated with President Lyndon Johnson’s “guns and butter” programme of fighting the 
Vietnam War and introducing generous social provision at the same time. 
W. M. Martin was still Chairman of the Board of Governors. He was content, indeed 
convinced, that the Fed should have multiple targets. These were price stability, employment, 
the balance of payments, and conditions in the government bond market. He was exceedingly 
influential, despite frequently clashing with Congress on policy. But one area in which he did 
not get his way was his desire to make the term of the Chairman coincide with that of the 
President. This would have meant changing a provision in the 1935 Act which was intended 
to give the Chairman some measure of independence from the President. Why Martin wished 
to change it is not clear. 
Despite Martin’s desire for price stability, inflation rose towards the end of his term. He left 
during a period of recession combined with rising prices. This experience had however 
refocused the techniques of the Fed yet again. 
4.8.1.6. A Role for Money? 
In 1970, under the influence of then Governor Sherman Maisel, the Federal Reserve started to 
pay attention to money in the formulation of policy. The concept of free reserves was 
important for a time. These were excess reserves minus member bank borrowing at the Fed. 
The reason that led to their being considered important was as follows.  
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Member bank borrowing from the Fed was believed to be always with reluctance, so banks 
did not rely on it more than temporarily. Hence, it was believed, controlling free reserves 
controlled the trend of reserves. Unfortunately, that turned out not to be the case; but it did 
show an interest in monetary quantities for the first time in the Fed’s history. There was also 
a move to lagged reserve accounting. This remained in effect until 1984, despite its making 
monetary control more difficult. It made it more difficult by making banks count their reserve 
requirement on deposits two weeks previously, and by the complication of having vault cash 
count on a current period basis. 
Despite this interest in monetary conditions, inflation rose, and by 1979 was sufficiently high 
as to lead further changes in the relationship between the Fed and the Executive. 
4.8.1.7. The Chairman as Hero 
Paul Volcker was appointed Chairman of the Board of Governors by President Carter. Volker 
was already President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York; but, notably, he was not 
President Carter’s first choice for the job – some of Carter’s advisers apparently thought him 
too resolute in his anti-inflation views. Desite these concerns, he remained characterised as a 
resolute inflation fighter, and the subsequent policies designed to bring down inflation were 
identified with him. Policy became personalised and identified with the Chairman. Very soon 
after his appointment, following the decision that inflation had to be brought down quickly to 
break inflation expectations, the discount rate was raised (from 11 to 12%) and reserve 
requirements broadened in coverage. 
Most significantly, the Fed announced that it would in its money market operations focus on 
non-borrowed reserves, and not as heretofore announce its policy in terms of interest rates. 
This was interpreted by some as a move to direct targeting of a measure of the money supply, 
but was in fact, as both Volker and Governor Wallich publicly stated, primarily intended to 
reduce the political pressure that would follow the announced imposition of high interest 
rates. 
Volcker also promoted the Depository Institutions Deregulation Monetary Control Act. 
Inflation had created incentives for banks to leave the Federal Reserve System. There were 
three incentives of particular importance. Non-member banks did not have to hold shares in 
the Fed; these shares had a fixed and low yield.  In some states banks could under a state 
charter hold lower reserves than the Fed required. And third, some states allowed reserve 
holding in (interest bearing) treasury bills. 
The law was supposed to improve monetary control by bringing all institutions under the 
reserve requirement control of the Fed; but they were also given access to the discount 
window, so scope for slippage remained. 
Inflation was brought down under Volcker, and he was reappointed in 1983. After a turbulent 
second term in which his proposals for changes in banking regulation were rejected, in 1987 
he declined the offer of a third term. Alan Greenspan was appointed as his successor in 
August of that year. The Fed briefly remained focussed on inflation, and in September raised 
the discount rate. Then on October 19th the stock market fell by 508 points, about 18% of its 
value. The Fed eased via open market operations and increased the supply of non-borrowed 
reserves. After a pause, the Fed refocused on inflation, but was then hit by the Savings and 
Loan (S&L) crisis. Inflation had led many of these mortgage-focused institutions to pay more 
for their funds than they received on their loans. Accordingly, they soon got into difficulties. 
Part of the response was legislative.  
IP/A/ECON/ST/2008-18 Page 91 of 123 PE 416.223
In 1991 the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act was passed. This 
required “prompt corrective action” when a bank or thrift’s capital fell below a prescribed 
level; essentially the institution was closed while solvent, and run by the regulators until it 
could be wound up or sold on. 
Greenspan was similarly successful in his other legislative proposals. He got the section of 
the McFadden Act of 1927, which limited bank branching to within one state, repealed. He 
resisted “narrow bank” proposals. He managed to defend the existence of multiple regulators, 
and, perhaps most important in view of recent events, he got repealed the section of the 1933 
Glass-Steagall Act which separated commercial and investment banking. 
4.8.1.8. Views of the Governors 
There were several recent or new appointments to the Board of Governors while Greenspan 
was Chairman. Among these the economists (by training) are of particular interest because 
both in their appointment hearings before Congress and in subsequent speeches and writing 
they revealed a continuing debate about what the Fed should do. They discussed, in other 
words, its monetary policy objective. 
David Mullins (appointed in 1990) wanted to achieve a steady growth of money and credit to 
produce a low but stable rate of inflation – low to include zero. (This of course differs from a 
price level stability target by accommodating price level shocks.) 
Lawrence Lindsey (appointed in 1991) in answering questions about the accountability of the 
Fed conceded that “experts” making decisions without being answerable to the electorate 
could be a cause for concern. Whether this concern could be ameliorated by adopting a 
politically-approved (or chosen, as in the UK) target was not discussed in his appointment 
hearings. He thought the M2 measure of money a good indicator but did not recommend 
targeting it, and resisted targeting nominal GNP on data grounds – there are only twelve 
readings on it a year, and of these twelve eight are revisions of the other four. Susan Phillips 
(appointed 1991) focussed on regulatory matters both in her testimony and subsequently. 
President Clinton’s first appointment was Alan Blinder. He shared Governor Mullins’ view 
that a constant price level target would be too demanding, as it could require falls in nominal 
prices, and favoured low to zero inflation. He left after one term. The next economist to be 
appointed was Janet Yellen. She faced up to the difficulties of the Fed’s multiple goals – 
maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long term interest rates. These are of 
course desirable, but the Fed is given no guidance on choices between them when these are 
necessary. Her contribution was to suggest that the best the Fed could do to achieve all of 
these was to stabilise long term inflationary expectations. Lawrence Meyer (appointed in 
1996) concentrated on regulation and banking sector stability, but also spoke in favour of low 
inflation as the Fed’s target. He favoured very limited policy activism. President Clinton’s 
remaining appointments were Alice Rivlin, Edward Gramlich, and Roger Ferguson. The first 
continued her long-term focus on fiscal policy and the budget deficit, and the second his on 
international matters. Roger Ferguson concentrated explicitly on inflation and urged on 
several occasions that the Fed’s most important goal is to keep long term inflation 
expectations low and under control. 
Accordingly, then, the appointment of several economist governors did, as might be 
expected, lead to discussion of the Fed’s objectives, but while there seemed to be some 
convergence at that time around inflation and inflationary expectations, there was nothing 
more precise than that. 
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4.8.2. Ecclectic approach 
4.8.2.1. Changes in Operating Procedure 
In the early 1990s the previously observed relationship between money and prices seemed to 
break down. Alan Greenspan discussed this in congressional testimony (July 1993) and 
revealed that in his view there was now no single measure to replace M2 as a guide. Even 
persistent movements in that (nor in any other monetary variable) conveyed no information. 
It has been suggested that the Fed in fact behaves, either consciously or unconsciously, as if 
implementing a “Taylor rule” (see Taylor, 1993) – adjusting the Fed Funds rate in 0.5 
percentage point steps in response to deviations of 1 percentage point from 2% inflation or 
potential GNP. This certainly does seem to describe behaviour fairly well. (Judd and 
Rudebusch (1998) find that the rule describes policy under both Greenspan and Volcker, with 
the interesting variation that the response to output variations exceeded that prescribed by the 
rule under Greenspan, while the response to inflation variations exceed the rule’s 
recommendation under Volcker). Governor Gramlich has suggested basing policy explicitly 
on this rule, with policy responding when the target variables moved outside their 
predetermined bounds. He suggested (2003) that the Fed engage in “Flexible Inflation 
Targeting”. This involves announcing a two year inflation target, but allowing deviations in 
response to supply shocks. His suggestion has not yet been adopted. 
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Figure 34: CPI in the US (all items less food and energy) 
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4.8.2.2. Changes in Openness 
Since 1994 the FOMC, which meets eight times per year, plus unscheduled meetings as seem 
necessary, has published its policy decisions whenever they were made, rather than after a 
delay. There was also at that time the tying of the discount rate to the funds rate, making it 
always 1 percentage point higher, thus losing both the announcement effect and the 
possibility of a subsidy to member banks. 
There is also the question of the minutes and votes of the FOMC, and, subsequent to that, the 
importance of “dissents”.  
Minutes of the meetings are now published. Beginning with the 1994 meetings, the FOMC 
Secretariat has produced transcripts shortly after each meeting from a recording of the 
proceedings. The remarks of each speaker are “lightly edited, where necessary, to facilitate 
the reader’s understanding”. Meeting participants are given an opportunity to “review” the 
transcripts before publication. Details of how the pre-1994 transcripts have been prepared are 
below. The phrases in quotations are from the Federal Reserve’s own description of what is 
done; no example of these procedures has ever appeared. 
A “dissent” is when a Governor or Regional Bank President differs from the majority view. 
How important are these? So far as immediate policy goes, obviously of none. The questions 
are how serious a division of view they represent, and whether they have any import for 
future policy.  
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As to the first, a dissent is believed to vary in significance with the Chairman. Some try hard 
for consensus, some object strongly to dissents, and some, apparently close to the UK model, 
are more relaxed. In any event, there seems to be no particular significance of these for future 
policy. 
Minutes and transcripts 
For the meetings before 1994, the transcripts were produced from the original, raw transcripts 
in the FOMC Secretariat's files. These records have also been lightly edited by the Secretariat 
to facilitate the reader's understanding. In addition, where one or more words were missed or 
garbled in the transcription, the notation "unintelligible" has been inserted. In some instances, 
words have been added in brackets to complete a speaker's apparent thought or to correct an 
obvious transcription error or misstatement.  
Nonetheless, for the pre-1994 transcripts, errors undoubtedly remain. The raw transcripts 
were not fully edited for accuracy at the time they were prepared because they were intended 
only as an aid to the Secretariat in preparing meeting minutes. The edited pre-1994 transcripts 
have not been reviewed by present or past members of the Committee.  
In transcripts from all years, a very small amount of information received on a confidential 
basis from, or about, foreign officials, businesses, and persons that are identified or 
identifiable was subject to deletion. All deleted passages, indicated by gaps in the text, are 
exempt from disclosure under applicable provisions of the Freedom of Information Act. 
4.8.2.3. Clear Targets Again? 
In recent years, with the appointment of more (academic) economists to the Board of 
Governors, there has been further discussion of adopting an explicit inflation target. What is 
of course striking about this discussion is that at least some Fed officials appear to believe 
that the Fed could do this without the consent of Congress, although of course Congress 
could explicitly prohibit it. No such step has as yet been taken; but the discussion surely 
reveals the unusual constitutional position of the Fed. 
4.8.3. Lender of Last Resort 
Finally in this review of the action and position of this constitutionally curious central bank 
we come to its role as Lender of Last Resort53. 
That role traditionally involved the provision of liquidity on collateral at a time of general 
shortage in the banking system. The Fed carried out just that action several times in the years 
immediately after its creation. Then, strikingly, it failed to do so in 1929-1931, and thus 
produced the Great Depression (Friedman and Schwartz). It was this failure that led to the 
creation of the FDIC (see above). 
In very recent years there has been a further development. In the financial crisis of 2008 the 
US Treasury became involved in assisting the banking system. Why? So far as can be seen, 
this is because, after some initial confusion, it became clear that the problem could well be 
shortage of capital, not shortage of liquidity. (This appears, too, to be the problem in the UK.) 
If the diagnosis was correct then Treasury intervention was inevitable, for the Treasury, 
unlike the Fed, has access to taxpayers’ funds, and only these would be sufficient; the Fed, 
like every other central bank, does not have capital sufficient to help the banking system. 
                                                 
53 A review of the development of this concept, and of how some central banks carried it out, can be found in 
Wood (2000). 
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4.8.4. Concluding Observations 
The first is to emphasise how anomalous, and indeed unclear, is the constitutional position of 
the Fed. It is partly privately owned, but essentially run by the Government; (Regional Bank 
Presidents are before appointment vetted by the Board of Governors). It has no clear 
mandate, and sometimes seem to think it can choose its own. Created in 1913, it has evolved 
steadily since then, sometimes in opposition to the Government. What this means for its 
credibility is obscure in general; the historical experience suggests that the credibility of the 
Fed is highly dependent on its Chairman. 
The second, of particular importance for the Eurosystem, is the change in its Lender of Last 
Resort role. The role changed because of the need for capital. Who would provide the capital 
in the Eurosystem? The answer may be clear for a bank operating essentially in one country. 
But with increasing European integration, such banks are becoming rarer. Who could, who 
would, take responsibility for such banks is not clear.54 It should be. 
Finally, the US system of financial regulation is not a system but a patchwork, largely 
reflecting history and political attitudes of distrust for finance rather than a coherent thought 
out position. Banks can be regulated by the Federal Reserve, but they can also be chartered, 
and therefore regulated, by states. It is also possible for banks to change from one situation to 
the other, according to where they see advantage. The important point to emphasise is that no 
overall economic reasoning can be inferred into the situation one observes at any time. 
 
                                                 
54 This issue is discussed in detail in Mayes and Wood (forthcoming), see References. 
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5. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND LINES OF REFORM OF THE ECB STRATEGY 
5.1. Theoretical considerations 
The provision of low inflation is the primary goal for most modern central banks as inflation 
is costly for many reasons (see Section 1.1.1.). While the high costs of inflation suggest that 
low inflation should be a goal of central banks, why should it be the primary, or even the 
overriding objective? High employment and output are desirable, so why should they, too, 
not be part of a central bank’s objectives? In the 1960s most academics and policy makers 
believed that there was a long-run trade-off between inflation and unemployment and output; 
society could enjoy a higher level of economic activity if it were willing to tolerate the higher 
inflation. However, by the end of the 1960s, this belief had waned (for the arguments on the 
Phillips curve, see Sections 1.1.2. and 1.1.3.).  
However, the expectations-augmented Phillips curve might suggest that monetary policy 
could possibly be used to smooth business cycle fluctuations if the central bank has an 
information advantage over the private sector (see Section 1.1.3.). An unfortunate implication 
of the relationship between unexpected inflation and employment and output is that it creates 
an inflation bias via the so-called time inconsistency problem. Society would be better off if 
the government could commit itself to not inflating. In this case there would be no 
unexpected inflation. Employment and output would be the same as in the time-inconsistency 
scenario and there would be no inflation.  
As a consequence of the view that low and stable inflation is desirable, that monetary policy 
cannot be used to systematically increase employment and output, and that long and variable 
lags in monetary policy limit its usefulness in offsetting transitory shocks it is now common 
to mandate price stability as the principle goal of the central bank. Given the time-
inconsistency problem, however, it is not enough to mandate the pursuit of low inflation. The 
government must find some way to commit itself to low inflation. Unfortunately, however, as 
law maker, judge and enforcer, it is difficult for a government to compel itself to behave in a 
particular way. 
It is widely believed that a good way to lessen the time-inconsistency problem and to ensure 
price stability is to make the central bank operationally independent of the government and to 
give it an inflation target. This is the reasoning behind the wave of central bank legislation 
that introduced inflation targeting around the world. The above arguments suggest that a 
central bank should target zero inflation, but a number of practical considerations result in a 
wide-spread view that the target should be between 1 and 3% for an advanced economy.  
Central banks have various instruments at their disposal - such as open-market operations – to 
meet an inflation target. However as the relationships between their instruments and inflation 
are difficult to infer, central banks often have intermediate targets that are both more directly 
related to inflation than their instruments are and more easy to target precisely using their 
instruments than inflation is. During the 1970s and 1980s, monetary aggregates were a 
popular intermediate target. However, due to the lack of a stable relationship between money 
and prices, the targeting of monetary aggregates has been abandoned and most inflation-
targeting central banks have adopted short-term interest rates as intermediate targets.  
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There is a cost to devising institutional structures that cause central bankers to focus on 
inflation to the near exclusion of employment and output. While it is not possible for central 
banks to systematically increase employment and output, as discussed earlier, it is 
theoretically possible, although practically difficult, for central banks to offset transitory 
random shocks if they have an informational advantage over the public. That is, there may be 
some stabilisation role for central banks. Central banks cannot affect the levels of real 
variables, but perhaps they can affect their variances. If the central bank is unwilling to 
tolerate any variance in inflation, however, it will be unwilling to smooth real variables. 
A sizable body of research has grown around the problem of designing a central bank that is 
both credible that it will pursue low inflation and flexible enough to respond to shocks. It is 
generally believed that using monetary policy to fine-tune the economy is not possible. 
However, a central bank should not permit or create unnecessary turbulence in employment 
or output. If some large, visible event created a collapse in domestic demand, it might be that 
the central bank ought to pursue a more expansionary policy than would be sufficient to 
ensure price stability. In the face of a sufficiently large and visible supply shock, say a rise in 
the price of oil, it might be that the central bank should not pursue a monetary policy that is 
contractionary enough to ensure that it hits its inflation target. If the communication strategy 
of a central bank is good and if a central bank has a reputation for inflationary toughness, 
then failing to pursue its mandate to the letter in the face of a rare, large, easily observable 
event should not cause a serious problem. 
5.2. Institutional lessons  
The comparative analysis of the institutional and policy arrangements of different central 
banks (CBs) can help evaluate the pros and cons of the ECB strategy. The institutional 
arrangements of the ECB should be those that allow the achievement of its target with 
minimum short run costs; which requires the central bank strategy to be predictable and 
transparent. Some of the institutional elements and the policies of other CBs could be 
usefully applied to improving ECB strategy. Still, drawing lessons from the practice of other 
CBs should be subject to the proviso that institutional arrangements about governing bodies, 
decision-making, voting procedures, transparency, and communication are not easily 
transportable from one central bank to another. One should not forget that launching the euro 
and running a single monetary policy for a Union of diverse nation-states show significant 
idiosyncratic elements. 
5.2.1. Institutional arrangements 
5.2.1.1. The target, the mandate 
In order to be predictable, a single policy target, or a clear hierarchy of plural targets, must be 
set in the statutes and applied in the day-to-day policy arrangements of the CBs. Most CBs 
have inflation as the single or primary policy target (undoubtedly so the ECB), and the 
chequered experience of the Fed, with the double statutory aim of employment and low 
inflation, indicates the advantages of a single mandatory goal or at least of a lexicographic 
arrangement of goals for the proper functioning of CBs. The difficulty encountered by China 
in its management of the price level while trying to sterilize the accumulation of foreign 
reserves occasioned by an undervalued yuan shows the difficulty of double remits. 
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As to the quantification of the target, most central banks have defined price stability as an 
increase of a price index (be it the CPI or the GDP deflator) in the range of 1-2% a year. CPIs 
are widely accepted as measures of inflation by the public and they are easy to monitor and 
interpret; and thus are useful variables to inspire monetary policy and transmit CB 
expectations. However, since the different indices do not take into account all the prices in 
the economy but rather a basket of representative consumption goods and services, they are 
not totally accurate measures of the purchasing power of the currency.  
A general defect of CB strategy, also of the ECB’s, is an asymmetric attitude towards 
inflation and deflation. Deflation is feared and guarded against, even when benign as brought 
about by technological advance and lower production costs. Small inflation on the other hand 
is seen with greater indulgence. As a result, adopting a minimal but positive inflation rate as a 
policy target may imply a de facto inflationary policy in times of economic growth brought 
about by increases in productivity. 
5.2.1.2. Lender of Last Resort 
A function not directly mentioned in the remit of CBs is that of Lender of Last Resort 
(LoLR), though the 1913 Act that created the Fed did speak of an obligation to supply a 
“flexible currency” that would ”satisfy the needs of trade”. Whether mentioned or not, one of 
the main obligations of a CB is counteracting systemic risk, even at the cost of the short term 
creation of liquidity causing inflation later. During the present crisis, the possible need to 
save the financial system of countries in the euro area or aspiring to enter has led to 
questioning the Maastricht Treaty rule of no bailouts. If the CB is expected to be a LoLR, 
then someone must perform the functions of regulation, supervision and inspection. Who 
should be in charge of those functions is a moot question and one where arrangements differ 
markedly from place to place. 
5.2.1.3. Independence and accountability 
There are wide differences in the degree of independence that CBs enjoy. Arrangements go 
from merely operational autonomy to almost full independence: from a conference of 
authorities for important decisions at the People's Bank of China; or the Treasury Minister 
setting the inflation target (UK); or the Minister and Governor temporarily setting aside the 
goal of price stability in exceptional circumstances (NZ); to the arrangement of no political 
instructions whatsoever at the ECB. The arms-length relationship with the European 
Parliament, the Commission, and National Governments/legislators seems to be of the 
essence of the ECB’s independence and the stability of the euro, as is the prohibition to lend 
to European and national institutions, except for purposes of monetary policy. 
However, these Chinese walls do pose the question of how democratically accountable the 
ECB is. The ECB can be considered as one of the most independent central banks, and thus it 
should also be equally transparent and predictable. Unlike other CBs, such as the Bank of 
England (BoE), the ECB does not publish its working model of the economy nor does it the 
voting record and the minutes of its Governing Council meetings. Rather than a means to 
preserve its independence from local interests and national public opinions, the comparative 
lack of information provided by the ECB makes it more opaque and less predictable. Ten 
years after the launch of the euro, the ECB could usefully make a clear move towards more 
transparency in line with other CBs, in order to gain credibility, be more predictable and in 
effect more accountable.  
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This increase in transparency and openness to differing opinions can be achieved in various 
ways: 
1. Following the BoE, the Fed or the BoJ, the ECB could publish the Governing Council 
minutes, including the voting record, just after the meeting or with a short delay  
2. The governor of the BoE must send an open letter to the Chancellor of the Exchequer when 
it misses the inflation target by more than 1 percentage point; in it, the Governor must explain 
why the target was not achieved and the measures planned to bring inflation back on target. If 
adopted by the ECB, this would provide an additional channel to transmit useful information 
to the market on the recent and expected path of monetary policy.  
3. As with other central banks such as the Fed, reporting by the ECB to the European 
Parliament should be more detailed. In particular, sessions of the so called “monetary 
dialogue with the ECB” could be made informationally more effective: short summaries of 
the published position of the ECB on the topics to be discussed could be circulated among 
MEPs before the hearing; monographic sessions on selected topics of ECB policy could be 
organised; and in all sessions, MEPs should have the right to ask supplementary questions 
after the fashion of the UK Parliament. All this would make the ECB more accountable to the 
European Parliament while not reducing its statutory independence. 
Independence is also linked with governance. When policy decisions are taken by consensus, 
as normally happens at the ECB, the president effectively enjoys special weight. Within the 
smaller executives of other CBs, such as the Open Market Committee of the Fed or the 
Monetary Policy Committee of the BoE, the members have in effect a greater say. As regards 
the rules for eligibility and term limits, the example of the Monetary Policy Committee of the 
Bank of England, with a small number of members chosen on the basis of professional 
competence and not of nationality, could be followed at the ECB. If adopted, it would result 
in a smaller board with more fully responsible members. In this sense, adopting a decision by 
consensus inside a Governing Council of more than twenty members makes true discussions 
difficult and readily insubstantial. 
5.2.2. Implementation of monetary strategy 
In current circumstances everyone is asking themselves two questions: 
(i) Without the benefit of hindsight could monetary policy have been run in a manner 
that would either have avoided the present crisis or at least made its impact milder? 
(ii) With the benefit of hindsight can monetary policy be improved so that there is 
greater stability in future? 
The ECB’s monetary policy has largely conformed with current normal practice. Where it did 
not, such as the overbidding problem in early open market operations, it moved quickly to a 
more conventional position. 
In order to achieve price stability the ECB aims to achieve inflation in the HICP below, but 
close to 2% year on year, over the medium term. While this is a somewhat vaguer 
commitment than that of inflation targeting central banks, it is difficult to criticise the ECB 
for the success or failure of its policy until well after the event, it is in line with common 
practice among central banks in the OECD, who typically aim at inflation in a 1-2% range 
over an undefined medium term.  
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However, similarity to others could reflect a common misperception. Having inflation as high 
as 2% a year does not represent a stable price level. Even after allowing for mismeasurement 
of perhaps 1% a year, this will represent major erosion of purchasing power for pension 
provision. Especially when it is accompanied by exceeding the target as has been the case in 
the euro area.  
In recent years there has been an increase in interest in price level path targeting which would 
eliminate this upward drift and erosion. Now that inflation has been brought down to low 
levels, the concerns that price level targeting might have an enhanced threat of hitting the 
zero bound or leading to deflation are misplaced. In present circumstances price level 
targeting is likely to lead to a stronger fight against deflation than inflation targeting. 
Of greater concern is whether, despite its two-pillar strategy the ECB has placed insufficient 
weight on the monetary pillar. The ECB was initially rightly criticised for the lack of 
transparency in having two pillars (economic and monetary) on which policy decisions would 
be based, without any clear explanation of how conflicts between them would be recognised. 
Since the revision of the policy stance in 2003 the main basis for short-run monetary policy 
has been the conventional economic pillar with money acting as a cross-check. Normal 
practice in other central banks would include all the monetary information inside the 
formulation of the view of the future but having it as a specific cross-check makes the role 
clearer.  
As Beck and Wieland (2008), inter alia, point out monetary information can help show that 
analysis based on ‘gaps’, for example, in output or unemployment from their non-inflationary 
trends, is likely to be mismeasuring the trend. Monetary growth, clearly inconsistent with the 
growth of economic activity and expected trends on velocity is likely to indicate a potential 
problem for inflation in the future. Unfortunately in the ECB’s case the problem was that 
monetary growth from an early stage indicated such a problem and yet seemed clearly at 
variance with a muted economy. Such deviations were therefore described as ‘portfolio’ 
shifts – one-off shifts in behaviour that have no implication for the underlying relationship 
between money growth and inflation. Monetary indicators, just like real economy indicators 
suffer from the same reliance on unobservables. Any concept of excess monetary growth can 
only be measured relative to some sustainable baseline determined by a view of how the 
unobservable underlying relationship is developing. 
The same problem can be transformed to the interest rate (price) rather than money (quantity) 
dimension. In a Wicksellian framework a simple monetary rule would be to try to track the 
‘natural real rate of interest’ through the cycle. But this natural rate is not observable; we can 
only hypothesise on what natural phenomena reflect it. Even though the single value is 
unobservable, the trend of the natural real rate of interest compatible with price stability in 
the long run could be a guide for policy making. 
It is important to note that it is neither the nature of the model underlying the explanation of 
the transmission mechanism nor the estimates of the gaps in the economy – whether output 
gaps or deviations of price expectations from the ECB target – that are the explanation of 
much of the discrepancies over the period, but the choice by the ECB of interest rate settings 
that lay below that prescribed by a simple Taylor Rule (a point developed at greater length in 
the section below).  
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5.3. The relative success of the ECB 
We can address two questions. The first is simply how successful the ECB has been in 
achieving its own targets. The second is whether the ECB could have performed better, both 
in achieving its targets more closely and in achieving them at lower cost (measured perhaps 
in terms of output fluctuations). There is however a third issue which to some extent is 
peculiar to the euro area which also has an impact on policy. We consider that first. 
In any economy there will be variations in the appropriateness of monetary policy for 
individual regions or industries, or even for individual households and firms. More than that, 
some industries are disproportionately affected by monetary policy compared to others. This 
is in part the normal concern that monetary policy is a blunt instrument and does not tackle 
inflationary problems in the economy in a manner that is closely focused on their origin. In a 
well-developed unitary economy, even a diverse one like Canada or the United States there 
are various corrective mechanisms that will offset this poor aim, particularly fiscal 
redistribution. In the euro area not only are such mechanisms very limited but the area itself 
is only in the process of coming to terms with the common policy and the single currency 
area. While this would imply simply a cost to a single monetary policy if the problem were 
symmetric but the policy was still appropriate, inflationary processes are very obviously 
asymmetric.  
This is perhaps illustrated best by the case of house price inflation. Taylor (2008) shows 
(Figure 36) that if one considers the departures of the single monetary policy from what 
would be implied by a Taylor rule applied individually to each country, the cumulative 
departures are clearly positively related to housing investment. Applied to prices this 
generates a much stronger cycle in the countries for whom policy is ‘too loose’ and a 
consequently sluggish performance for those for whom the policy is too tight. However, with 
asymmetry the consequences for those countries for whom the policy is too loose will be 
much more extreme. While this may imply that monetary policy should take account of such 
asymmetries on the whole this is not a problem that a single monetary policy can address. It 
simply reflects that the euro area is not an optimal currency area. Finding other policies to 
offset this effect until such time as the area approaches such an optimal state will be difficult 
but clearly some progress can be made through the tax system. 
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Figure 36 
 
Source: Taylor (2008) 
 
To some extent deficiencies in the overall setting of policy by the ECB will simply reflect the 
problem of overcoming this heterogeneity. 
Assessing the success of ECB monetary policy simply in terms of the achievement of its 
objectives tells us relatively little. Since the first year or so when much of inflation will have 
been determined by the predecessor central banks, inflation was above 2% in every year and 
averaged 2.2% in 2001-2007. (It was 3.3% in 2008.) The ECB has tended to try to explain 
this away by suggesting that this period has been subject to a number of special factors but 
this is true of any period. 8-10 years is quite long enough for a learning period. Normally, in 
any process of learning, policy will overshoot in both directions. It is difficult to zero in 
directly on the target. The common experience of inflation targeting countries for example 
has been that initially they overestimated how high interest rates would have to be to contain 
inflation. Then followed a period when they eased too much as they tried to find where the 
new equilibrium was but after that their track record has been quite good. 
It is clear therefore that there are some persistent errors in the ECB’s processes. One option 
would be that the Eurosystem’s forecasting has been biased. This is certainly the general 
experience that Beck and Wieland (2008) attribute to both the Federal Reserve and the 
Bundesbank over the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. The ECB itself noted an error that had 
introduced a downward bias into its Narrow Inflation Projection Exercise. If the information 
input is somewhat biased it is difficult for policy-makers to overcome this as they have to 
make judgements that disagree with their assessment of the impact of a policy stance. 
However, in time one would expect just that adjustment to take place. This therefore implies 
that even if there have been errors in the outlook presented to policy-makers, there have been 
problems in policy-making as well. 
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One commonly cited cause is the Eurosystem’s decision-making process whereby a large 
committee agrees on policy actions by ‘consensus’. If other monetary policy committees 
operate by something that is closer to a simple majority then they would tend to be more 
activist. Some inflation targeting countries, such as the UK and the Czech Republic, have 
indeed shown rather more dissent from the agreed policy but in general, the number of those 
‘outvoted’ in monetary policy committees who feel sufficiently strongly that they need to 
record their dissent is quite small. 
It is probable that the Governing Council has been rather over-obsessed by the need to show 
unity in supporting their decisions and have hence been rather keener on unity of view than 
may have been the case elsewhere. Other monetary policy committees permit the public 
expression of different points of view and have not found that their credibility has been 
undermined be such diversity. Under uncertainty everyone expects views to differ and seeing 
the extent of the difference makes policy more predictable. Both the Federal Reserve and the 
Bank of Japan have been able to convey more information about the extent of uncertainty by 
publishing Board members' views about the future values of key variables in the economy 
that affect policy. These do not identify which members thinks what but they give an idea of 
the distribution of views. Since markets appear to find this useful the ECB could beneficially 
make a similar move, which would result in a more predictable policy. However, as to the 
reform of the ECB communication policy, the views need not be identified with individual 
Governing Council members in order to avoid national governments pressure. 
One obvious cause of a less active policy has been that the ECB has not wanted to surprise 
markets and has hence tried to make its policy intent clear in advance, thus to some extent 
virtually delaying decisions by a month. However, delay should not lead to a bias in favour of 
inflation unless shocks are asymmetrically in favour of inflation. 
One trend used elsewhere among inflation targeting central banks that the ECB has resisted to 
is to give a clear idea of the requirement on future policy to bring inflation back into line. 
Only the current decision is announced with oblique indications of future steps through the 
use of code words such as ‘vigilance’. A more direct approach, setting out a path, as is 
practised in Norway, Sweden and New Zealand could be helpful to give greater credibility to 
the willingness to act. A step in the right direction, however, was moving the forecasting 
basis from an artificial ‘constant policy’ criterion to a more realistic use of ‘implicit market 
assumptions’. Without that, forecasts tend to be inconsistent and implicitly take the effect of 
likely policy into account so that the forecasts always turn out to be relatively on target. One 
consequence of this is that, in simulations, it will always look as if policy can achieve 
relatively little, thereby introducing a bias against strong action. 
However, Taylor (2008) provides a neat assessment of the ECB, which offers a very plausible 
explanation. He attributes much of the mis-setting of policy to a tendency to follow US 
interest rates. He documents dramatically how since 2001 the Federal Reserve has deviated 
from what a simple Taylor Rule would prescribe (Figure 37). While short period deviations 
are nothing unusual a sustained deviation on this scale will result in a major inflationary 
distortion. Taylor then applies the same methodology to the euro area and shows that the 
ECB’s own departure from a Taylor rule can largely be explained by the degree to which the 
ECB has followed the interest rate setting of the Federal Reserve (Figure 38). 
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Figure 37 
 
Source : Taylor (2008) 
 
Figure 38 
ECB actual rates vs. Taylor rule fitted rates 
 
Source : Taylor (2008) 
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It is difficult to explain the origins of this excess following of the actions of the Federal 
Reserve but there are two obvious candidates of explanations. The first is simply that the 
decision-makers all have an experience in countries that were small relative to the United 
States and that were much more open than the euro area is to external trade. Applying that 
experience would assign a higher role to US policy in determining economic conditions in the 
euro area than was actually the case. A second explanation would be an understandable 
diffidence in suggesting that a new player could have an extensive and different impact on 
activity and inflation. A third explanation is that the Governing Council had similar 
misperceptions of the inflationary pressures in Europe to those their colleagues in the FOMC 
had of the US. 
Perhaps what is most disturbing is that John Taylor attributes an important part of the US’s 
failure to emerge from the recession as being due to a misperception of the causes of the 
current problems. The ECB appears to be going down the same policy route, with a delay. If 
that is similarly driven by an incorrect perception of the nature of the crisis then it too will 
prolong the recession. Taylor is firmly of the view that current problems are caused by risk 
not by lack of liquidity – pursuing the wrong objective will simply lead to an ineffective 
programme of quantitative easing as was observed in Japan in the ‘lost decade’. Moreover, 
the persistent downward bias of official interest rates compared with rate levels compatible 
with long-term price stability indicates that both economies have run too easy monetary 
policies, possibly one of the causes of the recent instability in the markets. A decade of 
apparently low inflation as measured by consumer price indices induced a cheap credit policy 
that contributed to the onset of the present crisis. 
The ECB sets some store by having a monetary policy that is not very responsive or active 
but steady. However, this in itself can cause greater fluctuations in the economy as it allows 
booms/inflation to develop further and recessions to be deeper. An ideal policy is anticipatory 
but often not feasible, a lagging policy can be just as destabilising. 
5.4. Practical questions 
5.4.1. Additional and unsettled questions 
5.4.1.1. The Centralisation of Supervision in the EU 
The centralisation of supervision is a subject which covers two areas. The first is whether the 
central bank should be separated from the supervisory authority. The second is whether, 
whichever body does the supervising, it should be EU-wide, euro area wide, or national. 
5.4.1.1.1. Central Bank – Supervisory Separation? 
When Northern Rock ran into difficulties in the UK, the Bank of England seemed completely 
unprepared. Why was that? There may have been institutional reasons internal to the Bank. 
Some have suggested that it concentrated too exclusively on its monetary stability brief: see, 
for example the article by Clive Crook in the “Financial Times” of 17 February 2009. But 
there was also another reason. When the Bank of England was in 1997 given instrument 
independence to conduct monetary policy, it lost the tasks of debt management and financial 
supervision. Because it no longer had the latter, it no longer received reports on individual 
banks. It could of course get anything it asked for from the FSA. But what use is that? How 
could it know what to ask for? The lesson of this has been learned, or perhaps, to put it better, 
forced on the Government by a report by the Treasury Select Committee of the House of 
Commons.  
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That report suggested the establishing within the Bank of a Financial Stability Committee, 
parallel in authority to the Monetary Policy Committee, and integral to both the Bank and the 
FSA. The crucial parts of the FSA’s information flows would thus, as they passed up the 
FSA, be passed also to the Bank. This scheme goes a long way towards addressing the 
information problem.  
The lesson this might suggest is that it is even better if the central bank actually does the 
supervision. After all, when the Bank of England supervised banks, there were no banking 
sector problems of any significance. But when the Bank had that responsibility the banking 
system in Britain was both smaller and simpler. Further, there is an inevitable problem – 
perhaps two such problems – with a central bank being responsible for supervision. The first 
is that when a bank runs into difficulties the question of why the central bank did not prevent 
that will inevitably be raised. That the purpose of supervision is to foresee and contain the 
consequences of difficulties is beside the point so far as popular concern goes. In such 
circumstances the reputation of the central bank, of the greatest importance when conducting 
monetary policy, will be contaminated. A second problem is the possibility of “capture”. 
Supervisors inevitably get to know those they supervise. This might lead to regulatory 
forbearance, or even to lax monetary policy for the sake of assisting the banking system. 
There is no ideal correct answer. But it does seem on the balance of argument that an intimate 
connection between the central bank and the supervisory authority is preferable to the 
supervisory authority being part of the central bank. The new UK model is of course yet to be 
tested, but it is in some ways closely analogous to the model in Germany when the 
Bundesbank ran monetary policy for that country. 
5.4.1.1.2. Europe-wide Supervision? 
There are two issues under this heading. Europe aims to maintain a single market across all 
fields of economic activity. Does this require that financial services be supervised on a 
Europe-wide basis? And second, should banks which can borrow from the ECB be 
supervised by a European supervisory authority, whatever that body may be? 
The existence of a single market does not self-evidently require a single regulator. The 
example of the USA shows this: there are substantial banks with a state charter and therefore 
supervised by the state supervisor. Whether or not that is efficient is an interesting and 
important question, but one to which no clear answer has yet been given. It would seem on 
logical grounds that there is no necessity for a single regulator within a single market, so long 
as a common core of regulatory principles applies everywhere in the EU.  
What of banks having the right to borrow from the ECB? Does that require centralised EU 
supervision? Consider first the case within a country. There is interesting and useful guidance 
in “The Art of Central Banking” by Ralph Hawtrey (1932). He pointed out there that the 
purpose of a central bank’s taking collateral for loans in a crisis was that since the collateral 
provided security, there was no need, in that emergency when time was short, to undertake 
the time-consuming process of examining the solvency of the borrower. By extension, so 
long as the ECB takes collateral, there would appear to be no need to supervise. 
The one objection to this is when the collateral turns out to be inadequate. If this were on 
other than a trivial scale, the question would then arise of who would cover the ECB’s losses. 
Of course, since supervision cannot prevent all failures, the question might arise anyway.  
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Whether home country supervision with the ECB informed, or Europe-wide supervision with 
the ECB informed, or supervision by the ECB, is the system adopted, the question of who 
covers ECB losses still merits consideration. It might seem to suggest that the dictum that a 
monetary authority requires a fiscal authority with the same domain requires reconsideration. 
5.4.1.2. Asset prices and monetary policy 
In the late 1990s, there was a widespread view that inflation-targeting central banks should 
not be concerned with asset prices. Indeed, the influential work of Bernanke et al. (1999) 
neglects the topic of the relevance of asset prices for monetary policy almost entirely. 
However, the so-called bubbles in housing and equity markets in the early 2000s focused 
attention on this issue. Equity and land booms had occurred throughout Europe, Asian and 
Latin America since the 1980s and were often followed by financial crises and sharp 
economic contractions. Some central bankers suggested that monetary policy committees 
should respond aggressively to bubbles; leading UK monetary economist Charles Goodhart 
(2001) to make the perhaps most radical proposal: asset prices should be part of the consumer 
price index used to measure inflation. In this section we consider whether asset prices should 
be part of the central bank’s price index, whether central banks can and should attempt to 
prick bubbles and whether asset prices provide useful information to policy-makers. 
5.4.1.2.1. Asset prices should not be in the central bank’s price index 
Current price indices used by central banks are measures of the purchasing power of money 
over current consumption and do not generally include asset prices. The theoretical 
justification for including asset prices in the central bank’s price index is that households care 
about both current and future consumption. If it is to be a welfare measure, inflation ought to 
measure the fall in the purchasing power of money over current and future consumption. 
Thus, the central bank’s price index should include the current money prices of current goods 
and services and the current money prices of future goods and services. 
To see how constructing such a price index might work, consider a world that has a single 
consumption good and that lasts for two periods. Then the period-one price index should 
include the period-one money price of the good in period one and the period-one money price 
of the good in period two. As markets for purchasing consumption goods intertemporally do 
not usually exist, households use period-one money to buy period-two goods by purchasing 
financial assets in period one and then using the savings and interest to buy the good in 
period two. To purchase a unit of the good in period two with period-one money, the 
household must have nominal savings equal to the period-two price divided by the (gross) 
nominal interest rate. This is equal to the current price of the good divided by the (gross) real 
interest rate. This suggests that the price index should be a weighted average of the current 
price level and an asset price: the real interest rate.  
In the short run, frictions in the economy mean that the central bank can affect the real 
interest rate, but in the long run it is beyond the power of the central bank to smooth this 
(real) relative price of consumption today in terms of consumption tomorrow. Nor, in the 
absence of a market failure, should it want to: relative prices changes are the mechanism by 
which a market economy allocates resources efficiently. A central bank which targets a 
weighted average of the current price and the real interest rate will produce volatile inflation, 
as currently measured; each period’s price level is used to offset swings in the real interest 
rate. It seems more appealing, instead, for the central bank to smooth the purchasing power of 
money in each period, while the market determines the relative price of consumption in 
different periods. 
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5.4.1.2.2. Can asset prices be used to predict inflation? 
Should central banks at least consider asset prices because they are useful in predicting 
inflation? Changes in asset prices may be followed by changes in aggregate demand and 
inflation. There are at least two ways that this might occur. First, if equity prices rise, 
consumption demand may rise as households become wealthier and business investment may 
rise as Tobin’s (marginal) q rises55. Second, an increase in collateralisable wealth may 
increase the spending of credit-constrained households and businesses.  
Unfortunately, the empirical evidence on the usefulness of asset prices in predicting either 
output or inflation is weak. Mayes and Viren (2001) find evidence that house prices are 
useful in predicting future inflation and output, but stock prices are not. Goodhart and 
Hoffman (2000) fail to find a marginal predictive content in stock prices and Bond and 
Cummins (2000) found little connection between market value measures of Tobin’s q and 
investment. Stock and Watson (2003) comment, “Some asset prices predict inflation or 
output growth in some countries in some periods. Which series predicts what, when, and 
where is difficult to predict; being a good predictor historically is largely unrelated to 
subsequent performance.” 
5.4.1.2.3. Can the central bank prick bubbles? Should it? 
While we suspect that there is little enthusiasm in the economics profession for including 
asset prices in the central bank’s price index, there may be some interest in central banks 
attempting to combat asset price bubbles. Cecchetti, Genberg and Wadhwani (2002), for 
example, argue that central banks should respond to asset price misalignments. If one could 
establish that a bubble exists, then there are two sensible reasons for wanting to pop it. First, 
bubble prices do not reflect fundamentals; hence, resources may be allocated inefficiently. 
Second, asset price collapses not only redistribute wealth, the resulting bankruptcies and 
restructurings destroy it. 
Establishing that an asset price is a bubble is not easy, however. Not all explosive movements 
in prices are bubbles. Hyperinflations result from accelerating money growth; sticky goods 
prices can cause exchange rates to overshoot their equilibrium values. Thus, apparent bubbles 
may result from non-stationary fundamentals or a non-monotonic adjustment process. 
A central bank that wants to test whether a bubble exists must first specify a model. If asset 
prices are not explained by the model, it could be that they are a bubble, but it might just be 
that the model is not specified correctly. Hamilton and Whiteman (1985) show that bubbles 
cannot be observationally distinguished from unobserved movements in unobserved 
fundamentals and even small persistent undetected movements in fundamentals can lead to 
huge approximation errors. Even when prices appear to be wildly out of line with the 
fundamentals, it is impossible to verify empirically whether a bubble exists. Garber (1990) 
even goes as far as to claim that the spectacular Dutch Tulip Mania, Mississippi Sea Bubble 
and South Sea Bubble were not bubbles at all.  
Even if a central bank could identify a bubble, it is not clear how effective it could be at 
popping it. Bubbles are, by definition, deviations from the fundamentals. Thus, it does not 
seem obvious, that changing a fundamental would eradicate a bubble. In addition, if the 
central bank were to have multiple goals: meeting an inflation target and eliminating bubbles 
it is likely to compromise its credibility, especially since, as we have just argued, it is difficult 
or impossible to prove that a bubble exists. 
                                                 
55 Tobin’s q is the market value/replacement cost. 
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Past attempts by central banks to pop bubbles should provide some caution. In late 1989 the 
Bank of Japan responded to skyrocketing Japanese property and equity prices by tightening 
monetary policy with the explicit intent of bursting the bubble. It has been argued that inept 
anti-speculative policies by the Federal Reserve in 1928-29 were the proximate cause of the 
downturn in economic activity that became the Great Depression.56 
5.4.1.3. Monetary policy and fiscal overruns: Should the Stability and Growth Pact be 
obeyed at all times? 
The Stability and Growth Pact was added to the Maastricht Treaty at the behest of the 
Bundesbank, so as to extend the obligation to control public deficits and public debt from 
candidates to adopt the euro to members of the Monetary Union. The reason was twofold: 1) 
a currency’s stability is in doubt if the State authorities indebt themselves to such an extent 
that their ability to service the debt is undermined; 2) the temptation for the smaller 
participants in a monetary zone of free-riding on the well-behaved members should be 
restrained both for reasons of fairness and of prudence. 
After the European Commission applied the Pact and its sanctions to Ireland and Portugal 
there came an ironic twist: Germany and France failed to abide by its provisions as their 
Governments feared that reining in public expenditures would constrict the growth of their 
economies. The Pact was diluted by increasing the degrees of freedom and the time frame for 
the return to budget balance. This diplomatic equilibrium has been upset by the present 
financial crisis. The huge sums spent by the US in their economic stimulus programme have 
become an example of irresponsibility for European nations. One thing is to bring financial 
markets to full working order and quite another to expand public debt and incur budget 
deficits well beyond the limits of the Stability and Growth Pact. Unless international holders 
of euro-debt are content to keep it in their portfolios indefinitely that debt will have to be 
repaid with higher taxes or depreciated with higher inflation. The rules of the Pact should be 
obeyed and budgets be brought back to equilibrium within the stated period.  
5.4.2. Considerations for times of disturbance 
5.4.2.1. Central banking in financial crisis 
During a financial crisis, the way in which a central bank makes monetary policy may change 
and a central bank’s role in the provision of stable financial markets may become more 
important. As inflation drops toward zero or even becomes negative, possible declines in the 
policy rate may be limited. With sufficient counterparty risk, banks may be unwilling to lend, 
even when interest rates tend toward zero and the banks are flooded with liquidity. In this 
section, we consider alternative policy tools for central banks and the role of the central bank 
in restoring the market for interbank lending. 
5.4.2.1.1. Quantitative Easing 
A problem with a nominal interest rate as an intermediate target is that it may be difficult to 
have a nominal interest rate that is below zero. Thus, in periods when inflation is near zero or 
is negative, central banks may employ a tool referred to as quantitative easing.  
                                                 
56 See Field (1984). 
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Quantitative easing refers to an expansion of the banks balance sheet brought about by an 
increase in base money: the central bank eases monetary policy by printing money and using 
the money to purchase financial assets. This tool was used by the Bank of Japan in the early 
2000s in an unsuccessful attempt at tackling deflation and is currently being aggressively 
employed by the Federal Reserve.  
When banks were the main providers of credit, financial crises manifested themselves as 
bank runs or liquidity squeezes, where troubled banks were unable to borrow. Central banks 
were expected to assist in promoting financial stability by acting as lenders of last resort: 
lending at a penalty rate to solvent, but illiquid, financial institutions. Now, however, that 
external financing is increasingly provided through the issuance of tradable financial 
instruments, a credit crunch can appear as dysfunctional financial markets, with little or no 
trade taking place in certain types of financial assets. To the extent that this reflects the 
market’s inability or unwillingness (because of its affect on their balance sheets) to price 
these financial instruments, central banks may have a role to play as market makers of last 
resort: either by outright purchases of these assets or by accepting them as collateral (with an 
appropriate haircut) in repos and in loans at the discount window. 
Thus, in addition to expanding the size of its balance sheet, a central bank can ease monetary 
policy by lowering the quality of either its assets or the collateral that it accepts in repos or 
for discount window borrowing. The Bank of Japan pursued such a policy in the early 2000s 
and it is being currently pursued by the Federal Reserve, Bank of England and the ECB. 
Quantitative easing is designed to expand the money supply and hence encourage people to 
buy assets and spend because they do not want to hold so much money in the face of 
mounting potential inflation. If the banks merely hold the extra reserves and do little with 
them as in the case of Japan this achieves little. Quantitative easing also not the same as 
trying to encourage bank lending, that is done by a different route in recapitalising banks and 
also in trying to make the future look more secure so risks can be managed by lenders. 
5.4.2.1.2. Financial Stability and Central Banks 
In a severe enough financial crisis, flooding financial institutions with liquidity may not 
restore the market for interbank lending; in the current crisis, financial institutions borrow 
from the ECB and deposit the proceeds at the ECB’s deposit facility, even though they make 
a loss on the interest rate spread. Such a complete cessation of trade in the interbank market 
can be a result of both fears that counterparties may become insolvent and adverse selection. 
To see this, suppose that financial institutions are imperfectly informed about each others’ 
solvency and that for a potential lending bank to be willing to lend it must set an interest rate 
that is sufficiently high that, given the expected likelihood of repayment, it makes a sufficient 
return. But, if there is enough financial turmoil that this interest rate is sufficiently high, 
banks that are unlikely to become solvent will not borrow. As they exit the pool of potential 
borrowers the interest rate that must be charged to ensure an adequate return rises further. 
This causes the highest quality banks that remained in the pool of potential borrowers to 
withdraw and the interest rate that is high enough to ensure the needed return goes up again. 
If the situation is severe enough, the market can vanish altogether. 
In the long-run, the solution is to identify the quality of financial institutions: assets must be 
priced and balance sheets made transparent. In the short-run, the central bank may need to 
ensure counterparty risk, or even act as a universal counterparty.  
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Unfortunately, the central bank’s role in ensuring financial stability is a political one. It 
decides the valuation of risky assets and the haircuts applied to them; it sets the interest rates 
at its discount window; it may decide who to accept as counterparties. This raises the spectre 
of real or perceived favouritism. While a society may allow the independence of an unelected 
body in the conduct of a technical task such as inflation targeting, it is less likely to allow it 
for political tasks. Thus, to maintain the independence of the monetary policy committee, it 
may be necessary to define the central bank and the monetary policy committee as separate 
legal entities. The monetary policy committee can be allowed independence, but the central 
bank – at least in its role as insurer of financial stability must be accountable. 
It is also important to recognise the limitations of central banks in the provision of financial 
stability. In the event of a financial crisis of the magnitude of the current one, viable financial 
institutions need to be recapitalised. While central banks can carry out the first two tasks, 
they cannot carry out the third and still meet an inflation target: this must be done by national 
treasuries, funded by the taxpayers. 
5.4.2.2. Lender of Last Resort 
5.4.2.2.1. Deposit Insurance 
Deposit insurance was, when first introduced, intended to be a substitute for lender of last 
resort action by the central bank. It now fulfils several purposes, and is seen as supplementing 
and complementing rather than replacing the lender of last resort role of the central bank. 
Lender of last Resort evolved in England in the 19th century in response to a problem 
inherent to fractional reserve banking. Should a bank fail, and be unable to pay its depositors, 
there is a risk, and one which sometimes materialises, that depositors at other banks, seeing 
this hasten to their own banks to withdraw their funds. Because all banks are fractional 
reserve banks, it is possible in principle for other banks then to fail. It is there that the central 
bank acting as lender of last resort comes in – it lends on collateral to the banking system 
when the system as a whole is short of cash. This provision of cash calms the fears of 
depositors, the panic ends, and stability returns to banking. This worked in Britain in the 19th 
century, and also in other countries such as France, and it worked in Italy when the technique 
was used at the beginning of the 20th century. 
It had also worked in the United States. That is why it was, and remains, a puzzle why in the 
1929 panic, and in several immediately subsequent ones, the Federal Reserve did not act in 
this way. It did lend, but so cautiously as to give no relief to banks or their anxious 
customers. But be that as it may, it was feared that the Federal Reserve might again prove 
deficient, so among the numerous laws that followed the onset of the Great Depression in the 
United States, deposit insurance was introduced. The intention was that because customers 
would know their funds to be safe, they would not rush in panic to withdraw them, so the 
banking system would be more secure. 
From the point of view of a modern banking system with extensive interbank lending, deposit 
insurance is of little use in promoting stability. The reason for this is set out below. 
Nonetheless, it still serves a purpose. It does ensure that retail depositors have confidence in 
the security of their funds. Further, it helps prevent ad hoc protection, the rushing after the 
event to compensate depositors. And perhaps most important it lets individuals use banks, a 
valuable social function, even though they have neither the ability nor the time to investigate 
and judge their soundness. It inevitably brings problems also.  
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With complete deposit protection, at whatever limit (or of course with no limit), there is an 
incentive to put funds, up to that limit, with whoever pays most interest, regardless of the 
riskiness of the institution concerned. But as UK experience in the Northern Rock episode 
showed, incomplete coverage does not seem to be politically tolerable. 
5.4.2.2.2. The Discount Window 
This subject leads us immediately to why deposit insurance does not prevent bank runs 
nowadays. The point is well illustrated by the Northern Rock episode in the UK. The run that 
brought down Northern Rock was not the well televised and publicised run by retail 
depositors. It was a run by Northern Rock’s wholesale market creditors, what has been called 
a “silent run”. Such creditors do not have the protection of deposit insurance (and rightly so – 
they are professional investors). For security in a fractional reserve banking system they turn 
to the discount window, to, in effect, classic lender of last resort. Such a run is met by the 
central bank discounting securities it is offered by the commercial banks. It has to choose the 
rate of discount, and the quality of securities it will accept. The quality is generally lowered 
in such an episode, one reason for the central bank’s raising its interest rate. This action of 
course provides stability only so long as the system as a whole has enough acceptable 
collateral, and does not guarantee the security of all institutions. Any institutions which run 
out of collateral must close down. Use of the discount window in this way is thus consistent 
with not encouraging imprudence by bankers. It does however show the social role for 
deposit insurance – for if banks close, the insurance fund protects depositors.  
Use of the discount window does expose the central bank to risk of capital loss. There may be 
none, but the risk is always there, and central banks have a small balance sheet. Accordingly, 
it is prudent if there is standing behind the central bank an agency which can supply capital if 
needed – this can nowadays, when central banks are no longer privately owned, only be the 
fiscal authority. 
5.4.2.2.3. Widening the Balance Sheet and its effect on ECB independence 
In a crisis the central bank inevitably ends up with a “wider” balance sheet. In other words, it 
has lowered the quality of the assets that it has accepted as collateral. This in turn poses 
threats to the central bank’s solvency, and thus makes it more likely that it may call on its 
shareholder, the government, for fresh capital. Unfortunately, while necessary, this may pose 
some threat to the central bank’s independence. Dependence on government for day-to-day 
finance appears as a variable weakening the independence of the central bank in studies of 
central bank independence, and it usually appears to be significant. There is, however, a 
qualification to this. In a time of crisis, the government faces tremendous costs if it does not 
support the central bank, and the government and central bank both know it. There is little 
opportunity then for the government to gain control. The widening of the balance sheet in a 
crisis is undesirable, but necessary, and poses no immediate threat to independence. A 
metaphor would be that as both parties possess the atomic bomb neither dares use it. 
5.4.2.2.4. Lifeboats and the role of the Treasury 
One of the best known lifeboats in the history of banking is that which rescued Baring’s bank 
in 1890. Although Baring’s was no longer a large bank, it was still one of large reputation, 
and it was feared that if it were allowed to fail there would be threat to London as a financial 
centre, and perhaps to Britain’s gold reserves. That lifeboat was entirely a private sector 
affair; the main banks in London, and the Bank of England, all put up funds for the sake of 
their common good.  
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There have been other such episodes. But such techniques are limited now to banks which are 
so small that their failure would be of little practical significance. (It is possible that a bank 
sufficiently small to be rescued by the private sector might be so because it was crucial to the 
functioning of one market.) Usually, though, lifeboats inevitably involve the Treasury of the 
country concerned, because the institution at risk is so large that other banks coming together 
cannot commit enough means to support it, because they are themselves under stress, or 
because they do not recognise a common interest. In such interventions the central bank is 
highly likely to be the government’s agent. This need not compromise its independence in 
any way, however, just as the fact that the Bank of England in 1890 co-ordinated the private 
sector rescue of Baring’s did not compromise the Bank’s independence regarding the other 
banks. 
5.5. Summary of conclusions and proposals 
The ECB clarified its two pillar strategy in 2003, so that deviations of money aggregates from 
a preannounced reference would not be interpreted as an effective guide of policy. The ECB 
now uses monetary analysis as a cross-check of the projections resulting from the economic 
analysis. This is a distinguishing element of ECB institutional arrangements, applied in the 
belief that it allows the bank to run a monetary policy consistent with a long-term price 
stability policy.  
However, there are other institutional elements that should be clarified. After comparing the 
strategy of the ECB with that of other CBs, we conclude that to be more effective and 
predictable the ECB should make a clear move towards more transparency. Rather than 
changing the ECB statutes, properly based as they are on the understanding of the proper 
scope and limits of monetary policy, a change in day to day policy procedures would be 
needed and, particularly in its communication policy:  
(1) In order to transmit a more comprehensive and accurate definition of price stability, 
current final target as measured as a small growth of the HICP should be accompanied by a 
review of non consumption goods and assets. 
(2) The ECB should adopt a symmetrical target to avoid an inflationary drift.  
(3) More detailed projections, as well as the public release of the model of reference of the 
ECB Governing Council used for their calculation, should be adopted to communicate the 
ECB's expected inflationary bias, and thus the expected path of interest rates in the medium 
term.  
(4) Generally central banks have found that small committees are more effective for making 
monetary policy decisions. The Eurosystem may therefore gain by appointing a small body, 
based on professional competence and not nationality nor on administrative skills as with the 
Executive Board. 
(5) The Governing Council minutes, including the voting record, should be released to foster 
a better understanding of the different views coming into play in the meetings. On the 
question of whether the names of the individual members should be identified on the voting 
record there was a difference of views among the authors of this Report. 
(6) Without affecting its independence, the ECB should be more accountable by making the 
quarterly hearing of the ECB President to the European Parliament more effective and 
fruitful, and better focused on the questions addressed in each session. 
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(7) If involved in lifeboat operations, the ECB has no fiscal authority behind it, so there needs 
to be a mechanism for recapitalising the Eurosystem. The ECB needs to be cautious in the 
measures it uses to sustain financial stability so that it does not give contradictory signals for 
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